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Abstract
Nearly every organization, regardless of size, type, or industry faces threats 
associated with corruption, abuse and occupational fraud (Hodge, 2012). 
Recently, also small and medium sized companies (SMEs) are becoming aware 
of these threats but many of them still lack a proper risk management to cope 
with such increasing threats (Funk RMCE et al., 2011). The exposure to these 
risks increases tremendously when companies establish Foreign Direct 
Investments (FDIs) and the strategies to reduce a company’s exposure to them 
become more complex, because investors have to operate in a cultural 
environment, which is different from their home country. The aim of this case 
study is to develop appropriate, practically oriented strategies for investors to 
avoid or at least to reduce threats of corruption and occupational fraud when 
they undertake an FDI into El Salvador.
A qualitative research methodology is the favourable approach to solve this 
problem in the real business world, because this research question deals with 
corruption and occupational fraud, which are very complex research problems 
with high levels of uncertainty and a need to act flexible (Corbin and Strauss, 
2008). The data collection in El Salvador has been undertaken in the form of 
semi-structured interviews with managers and owners of companies, as well as 
individuals, people working for NGO’s (Non Governmental Organizations) and 
business consultants. The empirical data have been analyzed by grounded 
theory to develop practically oriented strategies for investors.
The research suggests managing corruption by (1) implementing strict rules and 
procedures, (2) strictly saying no to corruption, (3) avoiding governmental 
contracting, (4) being in a favourable position by offering competitive products, 
(5) providing enough funds to support the implementation of the FDI, (6) 
maintaining a certain tolerance towards an “acceptable” level of corruption and 
finally (7) working together with lobbyists and intermediaries, so that one does 
not get involved directly into corruption. Occupational fraud within the FDI can 
be reduced by (1) profound knowledge of one’s business, (2) advanced HR 
recruitment and well designed management processes, (3) a good working 
climate, (4) a variety of controls including latest technology, (5) organizational
and managerial strategies, which must fit to the cultural environment of El 
Salvador, (6) a cooperation with third parties and finally (7) the support of 
external consultants. Investors have to select the location of their business 
carefully, should not show any wealth, have to invest into security and are 
advised not responding to extortions to face the threat of El Salvadorian youth 
gangs (maras).
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1. Introduction
Foreign direct investments into developing countries are in general riskier and 
have a higher degree of uncertainty and challenges compared with investments 
into developed countries which fulfil more or less the same standards as the 
investor’s home country. Kulhavy (1989, p. 5) explains that the farther away one 
operates a subsidiary, the higher are the “centrifugal forces” one has to deal 
with like cultural divergence, distance, time differences and increased efforts for 
managers to travel to the subsidiaries. The project management of such 
international projects “vary from domestic projects by their complexity of culture, 
politics, law, local practice, language, time zones, processes, resources and 
more” (Grisham, 2010, p. 2). As a result, investors are exposed to a higher level 
of corruption and occupational fraud (Poole-Robb and Bailey, 2002).
The following figure summarizes why FDI suffer from a higher degree of 
corruption and occupational fraud caused by the variety of external forces.
Figure 1: Increased threats for SMEs in the internationalization process
Increased threats for SMEs with respect to corruption and 
occupational fraud when they internationalize their operations
Increased dynamic 
markets
Increased 
com plexity in 
managing the FDI
Increased and 
unknown  
com petitors
Dealing w ith  
different legal
environm ents
Dealing w ith  
different 
cultures
FDI /  Investor
Internationalizing  
the value chain
Distance to the  
hom e base
Increased economic 
activities outside of 
the existing markets
Financial
constraints
Source: by the author
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The aim of this study is to develop strategies which can help German SMEs to 
successfully set up and operate their FDIs in developing countries where they 
have to deal with higher levels of corruption and occupational fraud. The 
outcome of the research is to identify relevant problems and critical success 
factors as well as “practically oriented solutions” which will help managers of 
German SMEs to be aware of pitfalls before they start investing into mostly 
political, legal and economic unstable environments in emerging market 
economies. The results of this research should help German SMEs establishing 
and operating a FDI into El Salvador, as well as investors from other countries 
to minimize their risk of failure, loss of money or even threatening the parent 
company in their home base because they have not been able to manage risks 
“outside their normal day-to-day experience” (Poole-Robb and Bailey, 2002).
The central research question is: “What strategies should German SMEs apply 
to detect and to avoid the threats of corruption and occupational fraud when 
they undertake a FDI into El Salvador?”
The following sub-questions help to answer this question:
• Why do companies undertake FDIs?
• What are potential risks for the investor in general when investing in 
foreign countries?
• What are potential risks of corruption and occupational fraud within the 
organization and how can they negatively affect or even harm the 
organization?
• What factors foster corruption and occupational fraud in emerging market 
economies?
• How can these risks be detected and be avoided?
• What are appropriate strategies for investors based on the practical 
knowledge already applied by existing investors in El Salvador?
• What are possible threats for the successful implementation of these 
strategies?
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In the literature review, motives why investors undertake a FDI and potential 
problems, which can face them during the investment process into emerging 
economies, are discussed. In the next step, corruption and occupational fraud 
as specific problems are distilled. The factors, which can foster corruption and 
occupational fraud, are explained. Positive as well as negative effects of 
corruption for economies and for companies are displayed. Then, strategies 
how to avoid corruption and occupational fraud, as well as problems during the 
implementation of these strategies are discussed. Finally, the main ideas out of 
the literature review are distilled.
In the next chapter, the methodology for this research project is discussed. It is 
explained, why a qualitative methodology is an appropriate way to answer the 
research question. The data collection with unstructured interviews is discussed 
and it is explained, why the data analysis with Grounded Theory is the 
appropriate strategy for this topic. Finally, the limitations of this methodology 
study for this research question, as well as ethical considerations are discussed 
and the data collection process is displayed.
Then, the findings of the interviews are illustrated. The information is clustered 
into main ideas including best practice examples of the interviewees. In the 
following chapter, the findings are condensed and categorized to find similar 
concepts. These concepts and ideas are applied to generate strategies, how 
investors can eliminate or at least reduce their exposure to corruption, 
occupational fraud and the increased threat caused by maras.
Finally, these strategies are triangulated with existing literature and the 
knowledge of experts. That chapter closes with concluding remarks, discusses 
limitations of this work and gives suggestions for further research.
The reflective diary displays the academic development of the researcher 
during the research process and discusses how the knowledge acquired during 
the DBA programme will help to improve and to enrich the professional work of 
the researcher.
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2. Literature review
2.1. Introduction
Internationalization is not a new trend in the business world. Wilkins (1970, p.3) 
explains that “from the period of the earliest known civilization in 2.500 B.C., 
Sumerian merchants found in their foreign commerce that they needed men 
stationed abroad to receive, to store, and to sell their goods.” Technological 
advances in communication, information, transport, finance and production 
make it easier to invest in foreign markets, and bring the world closer together 
(Knight and Cavusgil, 2004; Hummel, 1994). Especially emerging market 
economies provide numerous opportunities for FDIs (Chudnovsky et al., 1985).
However, business strategy and operations in non-domestic markets expose 
companies to risks like corruption and occupational fraud outside their normal 
day-to-day experience (Poole-Rob and Bailey, 2002). Corruption can decrease 
the level of success of FDIs in the host country, can lead to lower profitability of 
the investment and also reduces the advantages of the host country (Mauro, 
1995; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Corruption has also negative social 
consequences for the host country like poverty, poor infrastructure and a higher 
level of organized crime (The World Bank, 2000). El Salvador suffers from a 
considerably high rate of criminal violence, resulting in organized crime, youth 
gangs and street crime (Cruz, 2011), which is an additional threat for investors.
It is essential to watch for “red flags” and other irregularities and to improve 
control mechanisms continuously for detecting corrupt activities within the 
company and when dealing with third parties and other stakeholders (Albrecht 
et al., 2011, p. 179; Globalt Ansvar, 2008). Organizational processes have to be 
redesigned to eliminate corruptive actions and top management has to work on 
the social culture within the FDI (Hess and Dunfee, 2000; Kroll, 2010). Doig 
(1998) and VDMA (2010) recommend a practical, pragmatic approach to 
implement anti corruption strategies in companies which have to be integrated 
into the strategic management of the FDI successfully. It will not be possible to 
completely eliminate corruption within organizations, but appropriate strategies 
can at least help to minimize corruption and occupational fraud and their 
negative effects on FDIs.
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2.2. Motives for companies to undertake FDIs
2.2.1. Definition of FDI
The OECD (1996, p.7) defines foreign direct investment (FDI) as “the objective 
of obtaining a lasting interest by a resident entity in one economy (“direct 
investor”) in an entity resident in an economy other than that of the investor 
(“direct investment enterprise”)”. The long lasting interest and a significant 
degree of influence on the management distinguish FDIs from portfolio 
investment (OECD, 1996; Hymer, 1960/1976).
There exists a wide variety of reasons, why companies invest into foreign 
countries. Berger and Uhlmann (1985) and Calvet (1981, p.53) have clustered 
the motives for internationalization into two basic categories: (1) motives 
stemming from the investor and (2) motives stemming from the “attractiveness” 
of the host country.
2.2.2. Investor driven motives
The driving force to internationalize can stem from the entrepreneur (Mohr,
2008) or from the entrepreneurial internationalization, which is linked directly 
and cyclically, to various aspects of firm performance like market success, level 
of risk awareness or organizational learning (Jones and Coviello, 2005, p. 299; 
Acedo and Florin, 2006). Such business driven decisions can be supported by 
personal motives of the entrepreneur e.g. because he found sympathy for the 
region (Kulhavy, 1989; Wolf, 2009).
Penrose (1960) states that it is necessary to grow a firm by finding and 
integrating new resources which can be done by going international. Berger and 
Uhlmann (1985) recommend internationalizing to achieve higher returns of 
investment. The internationalization can also be driven by the success of the 
company and its products in the home country and the intention to transfer this 
success to other countries (Hummel, 1994).
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2.2.3. Host country driven motives
Some motives are market driven - e.g. the globalization of markets (Knight and 
Cavusgil, 2004). Internationalization offers companies the chance to exploit 
economies of scale and higher profits in new and fast growing markets and 
helps them to secure the entry into these markets (Sethi et al., 2003; Li and Li, 
1999).
Other investors seek to participate from tax incentives, preferential policies and 
government grants for FDIs in the host countries (Li and Li, 1999). Labour 
intensive companies want to participate from lower labour costs in developing 
countries (Reitmeier, 2008). Some entrepreneurs are forced to internationalize, 
because their competitors have done so; other companies want to be closer to 
their customers, want to develop new sources of supply or need to secure 
sources of supply to other parts of the company group (Li and Li, 1999; 
Halbach, 1983).
The following table summarises the wide variety of motives for investors.
Table 1: motives for investors to undertake FDIs
Motive Authors
1. Motives coming from the 
investor
*********************
Value chain:
• exploiting economies of scale 
within the company group
• internalizing profit through vertical 
integration along the value chain,
• increasing profitability through 
controlling enterprises in more than 
one country
Hymer (1960/1976), Berger and 
Uhlmann (1985), Porter (1985), 
Kulhavy (1989), Linneman and 
Stanton (1991), Hummel (1994), Li 
and Li (1999),
SudpIv and production:
• developing new sources of raw 
materials and energy supply
• avoiding high production costs of 
the domestic market
• securing sources of supply to other 
parts of the company group
• establishing better access to newly 
developed technology
• improving network relationships,
• utilizing excess production 
capacities in the home country
Hymer (1960/1976), Braun et al. 
(1983), Berger and Uhlmann (1985), 
Kulhavy (1989), Hummel (1994), Li 
and Li (1999), European Commission 
(2003), Kahai (2004), Zain and Ng 
(2006)
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Motives coming from the investor 
(continued)
Authors
Market:
e market orientation
* following major clients
* globalization of the markets
* escaping recession in the home 
country
Chudnovsky et al. (1985), Kuo and Li 
(2003), McGregor (2005), Armario et 
al. (2008)
Comoanv internal:
e exploiting the advantages of the 
own company it possesses relative 
to firms from another country (e.g. 
OLI advantages)
• acquiring gradual knowledge of the 
foreign market (Uppsala 
Internationalization Model)
• being born as global companies, 
which develop through a series of 
evolutionary stages
e growing the company
• being successful in one country 
with its product is a good reason for 
companies to internationalize
• expanding the product lifecycle
• having already good experience 
with the market as an export 
market
Penrose (1960), Hymer (1960/1976), 
Vernon (1966), Johanson and 
Wiedersheim-Paul (1975), Johanson 
and Vahlne (1977), Dunning (1977), 
Cavusgil (1980), Linneman and 
Stanton (1991), Brand (1993), 
Hummel (1994), Bell et al. (2003), 
Knight and Cavusgil (2004), De Vita 
and Lawler (2004), Acedo and Florin 
(2006), Dunning and Lundan (2008), 
Mejri and Umemoto (2010)
Risk and reoutation:
e reducing political and financial risks 
by investing into more than one 
country
• increasing company reputation
Hymer (1960/1976), Braun et al. 
(1983), Kulhavy (1989), Hummel 
(1994) "
Entrepreneur:
• international entrepreneurship
• personal motivation of the 
entrepreneur
• cognition and risk perception of the 
entrepreneur
e increased international knowledge
• high strategic (proactive) 
orientation of the owners/managers
Kulhavy (1989), Jones and Coviello 
(2005), Klaiber (2005), Acedo and 
Florin (2006), Mohr (2008), Nitu and 
Feder (2010), Okpara and 
Koumbiadis (2011)
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2. Motives stemming from the host 
country
Authors
Market:
e penetrating new and fast growing 
markets, emerging markets or even 
niche markets,
e increasing market size
• exploiting the benefits of monopoly 
in new geographical areas
• exploiting imperfections of the 
foreign market
• using the host market as a stepping 
stone for servicing other countries 
in the region
• increasing the marketing activities 
in the host country market
• getting closer to main customers in 
foreign countries in order to 
respond to their changing demands 
more quickly and to reduce 
transportation costs
• being forced by competitors
• having already good experience 
with the market as an export 
market
Hymer (1960/1976), Braun et al. 
(1983), Berger and Uhlmann (1985), 
Chudnovsky et al. (1985), Kulhavy 
(1989), Porter (1990), Linneman and 
Stanton (1991), Brand (1993), 
Hummel (1994), Li and Li (1999), 
Caslione and Thomas 
(2000),Cavusgil et al.(2002), Tseng 
and Zebregs (2002), Kahai (2004), 
Thorpe (2004), McGregor (2005), 
Reitmeier (2008)
Privatizations:
• increased privatizations in the host 
country
• ease with which on can buy 
existing firms
e more liberalization in the host 
country
Chudnovsky et al. (1985), Levin and 
Satarov (2000)
SuddIv and production:
e rationalizing production by making 
use of the best locational 
advantages (e.g. cheap labour)
• achieving economies of scale
• being able to modernize the home 
production with additional profits 
generated by the FDI
• supplying the home market with 
products produced in the host 
market
e using obsolete production
equipment in the home base further 
on in the host country
• securing access to raw materials
Hymer (1960/1976), Braun et al. 
(1983), Berger and Uhlmann (1985), 
Porter (1985), Kulhavy (1989), Porter 
(1990), Hummel (1994), Agosin 
(1995), Li and Li (1999), Caslione and 
Thomas (2000), Tseng and Zebregs 
(2002), De Vita and Lawler (2004), 
Kahai (2004), Thorpe (2004), 
Reitmeier (2008)
8
Motives stemming from the host 
country (continued)
Authors
Tax and laws:
• taking advantage of tax incentives 
of the home country and of the host 
country
• bypassing heavy import duties at 
the national border
• exploiting preferential policies and 
government grants for FDIs in 
foreign countries,
• bypassing strict laws and 
regulations (e.g. regarding the 
protection of the environment) in 
the home country
Hymer (1960/1976), Braun et al. 
(1983), Berger and Uhlmann (1985), 
Chudnovsky et al. (1985), Kulhavy 
(1989), Hummel (1994), Li and Li
(1999), Caslione and Thomas
(2000),Tseng and Zebregs (2002), 
European Commission (2003), Kahai 
(2004), Thorpe (2004)
Risk:
• eliminating or reducing the 
exchange risk
• avoiding discrimination by 
government, by consumers, and by 
suppliers in the host country
• reducing the risk of expropriation in 
one country by setting up a plant in 
another country
• substituting centralized decision 
making by decentralized decision 
making to remove conflict within the 
company group
• securing the value chain
Hymer (1960/1976), Braun et al. 
(1983), Porter (1985), Kulhavy 
(1989), Hummel (1994), Poole-Rob 
and Bailey (2002)
Technoloav:
• taking advantage of the 
infrastructure, the workforce, 
knowledge, legal regulations, 
technology and of suppliers in the 
host country
• participating from increased 
advances in communication, 
finance, production techniques and 
logistics
Braun et al. (1983), Berger and 
Uhlmann (1985), Chudnovsky et al. 
(1985), Kulhavy (1989), Hummel 
(1994), Caslione and Thomas (2000), 
Cavusgil et al. (2002), Tseng and 
Zebregs (2002), European 
Commission (2003), Knight and 
Cavusgil (2004), Thorpe (2004)
Politics:
• globalization and political 
agreements regarding trade 
liberalization e.g. WTO
• end of the cold war
• socio-political events, increased 
opportunities and lower levels of 
risks
Braun et al. (1983), Chudnovsky et al. 
(1985) Cavusgil et al. (2002), Kahai 
(2004), Knight and Cavusgil (2004), 
Reitmeier (2008)
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2.3. Problems which can face the investor
Berger and Uhlmann (1985) classify possible problems for investors into two 
categories: (1) problems, which are caused by the investor himself e.g. lack of 
financial or personnel resources and (2) problems which stem from the host 
country e.g. an inadequate infrastructure or an unstable political environment.
2.3.1. Problems of the investor
The choice of entry mode is an important part of a firm’s foreign investment 
strategy (Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001). The investor has to decide the legal 
form of the FDI (e.g. joint-venture or wholly foreign owned enterprise) and the 
timing of the implementation (Kulhavy, 1989; Ekeledo and Sivakumar, 1998; 
Gaba et al., 2002). The entry mode is a trade-off between control and the cost 
of resource commitment (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986) and is influenced by 
the ownership structure of the investor and the risk preferences of the main 
shareholders (Filatotchev et al., 2007). The form of the entry mode can also 
influence the success to overcome cultural barriers and corruption in the host 
country (Barkema et al., 1996). Especially SMEs face problems to find 
appropriate partners for a successful joint-venture (Kirby and Kaiser, 2005) and 
they are more exposed to corruption than larger companies which “can operate 
above the muck” because their deals are often very large and very visible 
(McGregor, 2005, p.119). FDIs differ from local investments “by their complexity 
of culture, politics, law, local practice, language, time zones, holidays, 
processes, resources and more” (Grisham, 2010, p.2). Foreign investments can 
threaten especially SMEs, which have fewer financial and personnel resources 
than multinational players and they lack international knowledge and access to 
networks (Hohenthal et al., 2003; Figueira-de-Lemos et al., 2011).
Buckley and Casson (2009) have discovered that the main problem in 
internationalization arises from the strategic complexity and shape out two main 
sources of complexity: (1) uncertainty involved in long term planning and (2) 
managing physical and social networks. Bartlett and Gosha! (1987) add that it is 
difficult for managers to make their decisions in an organization whose 
operating units are often divided by distance, time and culture. The 
management of internal knowledge and the “internationalization of the
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information” is still a hurdle for SMEs when they invest abroad (Liesch and 
Knight, 1999, p. 385). Additional threats can arise, when companies want to 
apply western business strategies, which are not always applicable in low 
income markets (London and Hart, 2004). Internationalization can lead at the 
beginning of the investment process to lower performance and productivity 
because essential resources like financial funds, machinery and skilled 
personnel are drawn away from the home base to build up the new subsidiary; 
this can lead to the loss of competitive advantages or even disadvantages in the 
home country (Lu and Beamish, 2001; Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2007; Porter, 
1985). Additional costs for implementing institutional processes and the 
knowledge transfer between the organizations in the home country and in the 
host country lower the profitability on both sides (Doz and Prahalad, 1984; 
Kogut and Zander, 1992). Underestimating the time frame as well as the costs 
for undertaking an investment abroad can lead to the failure of the FDI and in 
the worst case even result in bankruptcy of the investor (Grisham, 2010). Some 
investors underestimate the efforts required to align the company's own 
organizational capabilities for going international (Cavusgil et al., 2002). 
Sometimes, the pressure of time and money can be so hard, that the company 
may take into consideration committing illegal actions to achieve its goals and 
neglects control within the company due to financial constraints (Wells, 2007; 
Grisham, 2010).
The lack of cross cultural knowledge and cross-cultural competence of 
managers should not be underestimated. Even one single expatriate failure can 
lead to the failure of the FDI in the long run (Johnson et al., 2006). For example, 
Nike in the 1990s did not supervise their global supply chain well enough and 
allowed their facilities in Pakistan to employ children for the production of soccer 
balls (Grisham, 2010). When the company was held accountable by the public, 
Nike’s managers neglected any responsibility and tried to bribe and to influence 
third parties instead (Boje and Khan, 2009). However, customers did not believe 
them and started boycotting Nike’s products. It took Nike a lot of efforts, money 
and a long time to recover from their loss of reputation.
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2.3.2. Problems of the host country
Managing essential relationships with various stakeholders, maintaining 
collaborative relationships in international environments and adopting them to 
the new environment can be harder than expected and can hinder the 
successful implementation of the FDI (Cavusgil et al., 2002; Day, 1994; Chen et 
al., 2004). Such business relationships cannot be solely developed and driven 
by the investor himself but are also influenced by a lot of third parties in the host 
country and it needs time for the investor to build up networks to manage these 
stakeholders (Johanson and Vahlne, 2003).
Cultural and geographic distance influence and sometimes hamper the entry 
(Kogut and Singh, 1988; Cai and Wang, 2010; Tseng and Zebregs, 2002). 
Managers have to cope with different cultural issues, which Hall (1960) 
describes as “the silent language in overseas business”. Cultural differences 
and different technical standards can influence the organizational culture of a 
company and its internal relationships which may reduce the performance of the 
FDI (Zhou et al., 2006; Kostova and Roth, 2002; Grisham, 2010). Fortunately, 
managers today are better aware of cultural differences than 20 years ago, 
based on their education and their increased knowledge through media and 
communication technology, which helps them to work in countries with 
dissimilar cultures (Tihanyi et al., 2005).
Investors in emerging countries still have to suffer from poor infrastructure, lack 
of adequate skilled personnel and low performing governments (Caslione and 
Thomas, 2000). The legal environment and the law enforcement in some 
countries can be relatively weak for foreign investors (Himmelmann and 
Hungerbach, 2005). In addition, investors have to cope with considerably higher 
rates of criminal violence, resulting in organized crime, youth gangs and street 
crime, because the political transition processes from authoritarian rule to 
neoliberal politics was not performed well enough (Cruz, 2011).
Finally, operating in a different cultural environment can bring up ethical issues 
because the company may get involved into crime, corruption, bribing, 
kidnapping and drug trafficking (Kahai, 2004; Wolf, 2009; Bishop and Hydolski,
2009). Linné (2011) argues that one of the most serious success factors for
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German SMEs is to manage compliance, administration and corruption abroad. 
Hofstede (2001, p.112) argues that a major threat to the functioning on any 
administrative system is corruption; however, corruptive activities are 
sometimes necessary to satisfy the law (Himmelmann and Hungerbach, 2005) 
and to substitute the lack of bargaining power of SMEs (Grosse, 1996). Wei 
(2000) argues that corruption not only deters companies from undertaking the 
FDI but also increases the costs of operating the FDI, because corruption is like 
an additional tax for the investor. While Aidis and Mickiewicz (2006) see 
governmental corruption as the most important threat hampering business 
expansion, Okpara and Koumbiadis (2011, p.71) state that “surprisingly” 
corruption is ranked low among the obstacles of investors for not going 
international.
The following table summarises the main problems which can face the investor 
when undertaking a FDI, clustered into the two main areas “problems of the 
investor” and “problems of the host country”. The table also explains specific 
problems within these two main areas and gives practical examples, how these 
problems can face the investor.
Table 2: problems which can face the investor of a FDI
Problem Authors
1. Problems of the investor ****************
Strateav:
• strategic complexity in 
international business (e.g. 
multidimensional, simultaneous 
management)
• choosing the appropriate entry 
strategy, the form of FDI, the 
rate of equity and finding 
appropriate partners
• timing of the FDI (when, how)
• lack of planning an exit 
management in advance to 
avoid any surprises later and to 
reduce losses
• insufficient efforts to devise 
strategies to combat corruption
Kogut and Singh (1988), Kulhavy (1989), 
Ekeledo and Sivakumar (1998),
Klitgaard (1998), Chang and 
Rosenzweig (2001), Gaba et al. (2002), 
Bartlett and Gosha! (1987 and 2005), 
Kirby and Kaiser (2005), Rasheed 
(2005), KPMG (2006), Buckley and 
Casson (2009), Meyer et al. (2009), 
Tekin-Koru (2009)
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Problems of the investor (continued) Authors
Finances:
• financing the FDI
e low performance of the FDI at 
the beginning
• transaction costs (e.g. caused by 
more international linkages)
• high costs for the SME for 
implementing the FDI because 
one has just one FDI project 
(lack of economies of scale)
• lack of resources (e.g. finances, 
personnel, time)
• timely and financial pressures
• cross border tax planning
• corruption increases the cost of 
operating the FDI
Braun et al. (1983), Berger and Uhlmann 
(1985), Wei (2000), Anderson and 
Gatignon (2001), Lu and Beamish 
(2001), Tseng and Zebregs (2002), 
KPMG (2006), Buckley and Casson 
(2009), Hennart (2009), Grisham (2010)
Information:
# information gathering about the 
host country
e transfer of knowledge and of 
information
• identifying problems in advance
e lack of information and know­
how can increase the risk of 
corruption
Berger and Uhlmann (1985), Klitgaard 
(1998), Liesch and Knight (1999), 
Himmelmann and Hungerbach (2005), 
KPMG (2006), Buckley and Casson 
(2009), Hennart (2009), Tekin-Koru 
(2009)
Management:
* distance to the home base
e managing the global network 
and the various relationships in 
the host country
* managing the company’s 
organizational capabilities
e sourcing and managing the 
value chain
e quality issues
e managing the marketing tools
* conflict between the home and 
the host country
* ignoring or oversimplifying 
possible problems
Berger and Uhlmann (1985), Porter 
(1985), Day (1994), Johanson and 
Vahlne (2003), London and Hart (2004), 
Bartlett and Gosha! (1987 and 2005), 
Zain and Ng (2006), Buckley and 
Casson (2009), Hennart (2009), 
Grisham (2010),
Culture:
e cultural problems and cultural 
misunderstandings
* lack of cross cultural 
competence
e language problems
* international ethics (diverging 
values)
e different law enforcement based 
on different cultures
Hall (1960), Berger and Uhlmann (1985), 
Barkema et al. (1996), Hofstede (2001), 
Poole-Robb and Bailey (2002), Tseng 
and Zebregs (2002), London and Hart
(2004), Himmelmann and Hungerbach
(2005), Johnson et al. (2006), Fisman 
and Miguel (2008), Grisham (2010), 
Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner 
(2011)
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Problems of the investor (continued) Authors
Risk and control:
e keeping the control, sovereignty 
and autonomy of the FDI
• risk management away from 
headquarters
e managing the control of the FDI
• managing the risk in new 
environments
• short term orientation of the FDI 
can lead to corrupt actions
• verifying optimistic market 
forecasts and feasibility studies
Poole-Robb and Bailey (2002), Luo 
(2004), KPMG (2006), 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008), Kobrin 
(2009), Grisham (2010)
HR issues:
e workforce in the home country 
resists against the FDI (e.g. they 
fear the loss of their workplace)
• transfer of skilled personnel from 
the home country to the host 
country
• project management of the FDI
• lack of cross cultural 
competence
• management of expatriates
Berger and Uhlmann (1985), KPMG 
(2006), Grisham (2010)
Size of the comoanv:
e SMBs are more exposed to 
corruption because they lack the 
financial resources of bigger 
companies
• their deals are too small to be 
visible
• SMBs have to deal with lower 
level governmental employees 
which are usually more corrupt
Penrose (1960), Klitgaard (1998), 
McGregor (2005),
2. Problems in the host country *******************************
Infrastructure:
• lack of infrastructure in the host 
country
* access to raw materials and 
other supplies
e local capacities are constrained 
by costs, lack of know how or 
poor strategies to combat 
corruption
Braun et al. (1983), Klitgaard (1998), 
Caslione and Thomas (2000), Cavusgil 
et al. (2002)
HR issues:
e lack of skilled personnel
* wages and labour regulations in 
the host country (e.g. minimum 
wages, social benefits, trade 
unions)
* finding non corrupt personnel
e high turnover of personnel
Braun et al. (1983), Berger and Uhlmann 
(1985), Poole-Robb and Bailey (2002), 
Bishop and Hydolski (2009), Clissold 
(2010)
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Problems in the host country 
(continued)
Authors
Law and taxation:
• environmental regulations
• strict regulations regarding the 
production processes (e.g. the 
investor has to invest in the 
latest technologies instead of 
importing his old machinery)
• repatriation of profits
• local content regulations
• taxation
• long and expensive way to get 
permissions
• risk of expropriation
• protecting the property of the 
investor (security staff or paying 
bribes)
• crime (e.g. organized crime, 
youth gangs, street crime)
Braun et al. (1983), Berger and Uhlmann 
(1985), Cavusgil et al. (2002), Poole- 
Robb and Bailey (2002), Himmelmann 
and Hungerbach (2005), Fisman and 
Miguel (2008), Kraemer and van Tulder 
(2009), Cruz (2011), The World Bank 
(2011)
Market:
• lack of market information
• lack of market transparency
• distance to home market
• already existing strong 
competitors
• low profitability of the market
• unfair competition
• corruption
Braun et al. (1983), Berger and Uhlmann 
(1985), Brand (1993), Poole-Robb and 
Bailey (2002), Himmelmann and 
Hungerbach (2005), Grisham (2010)
Third parties:
• access to financial institutions, 
financing
• red tape with local authorities
• lack of bargaining power for 
SMEs in the host country
• underestimating local 
competitors
Braun et al. (1983), Berger and Uhlmann 
(1985), Grosse (1996), Poole-Robb and 
Bailey (2002), Himmelmann and 
Hungerbach (2005), KPMG (2006), 
Grisham (2010)
Ethics:
• getting involved in crime, 
corruption, bribery, extortion and 
theft of assets
• extortion and crime caused by 
youth gangs
• problems in the politics and in 
the society of the host country
• negative impact on the 
organizational culture of the 
investor and of the FDI
• corruption deters investors from 
undertaking the FDI
• corruptive officials
Braun et al. (1983), Berger and Uhlmann 
(1985), Hummel (1994), Wei ( 2000), 
Poole-Robb and Bailey (2002), O’Gara
(2004), Himmelmann and Hungerbach
(2005), McGregor (2005), Aidis and 
Mickiewicz (2006), Kostova and Roth 
(2002), Zhou et al. (2006), Wells (2007), 
Bishop and Hydolski (2009), Collins et 
al.(2009), Clissold (2010); Cruz (2011)
16
2.4. Corruption and occupational fraud
Kulhavy (1989, p. 5) argues that the “centrifugal forces” caused by larger 
geographical and cultural distances from the home markets make managerial 
problems in FDIs more complex. Cultural ethics and increased levels of 
corruption are central challenges for investors (Grisham, 2010; Poole-Robb and 
Bailey, 2002). While on the one hand the awareness of international investors 
for corruption and occupational fraud has been raised, on the other hand the 
risk of corruptive activities has disproportionally increased within the last years 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2008 and 2009). Ryan (2000) found out that 
corruption is more prevalent in periods of rapid economic growth and change, 
as well as in periods of economic crises. Kroll (2010) states that the threats of 
corruption and occupational fraud are growing faster when economic conditions 
decrease, global competition becomes harder and therefore companies are 
under constant higher pressure to compete; this is the fact for many companies 
today. Therefore, corruption is one of the most significant current problems 
facing societies (Cleveland et al., 2009). Perpetrators make a good living out of 
such criminal activities and “there is little chance that they change their attitude 
and will give up a steadily growing wealth” (Poole-Robb and Bailey, 2002, p.4).
Figure 2: How corruption is eating up positive effects for FDIs
<J— i
< * — - 3
corruption
e.
* o
FDI
Positive effects for the investor: e.g. 
higher return on investment. Oil 
advantages, growth, risk reduction
Positive effects 
for the host 
country: e.g. 
tax revenues, 
economic 
growth, social 
issues, know­
ledge transfer
Locational 
advantages of 
the host 
country: e.g. 
market size, 
lower 
production 
costs
Source: by the author
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2.4.1. Definition of corruption
Corruption is not a new social phenomenon. Bribery as one form of corruption 
has already existed 2.400 B.C. when Urukagina, king of Lagash made a treaty 
with his god Ningirsu (Noonan, 1984) and corruption was already considered a 
sin against God in the Old Testament (Sackmann and Horstmann, 2010). 
According to Miller et al. (2005, p. XV) corruption is “a species of moral 
wrongdoing or of unethical behaviour, which is not necessarily an unlawful 
activity”. The same corrupt elements which can be found in today's modern 
transition economies have been existent in nineteenth century America 
(Glaeser and Goldin, 2004, p. 1). Nye (1967, p. 419) defines corruption as “a 
behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of 
private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status 
gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding 
influence. This includes such behaviour as bribery (use of a reward to pervert 
the judgement of a person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of 
patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit); and 
misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for private-regarding 
uses)”.
While Shleifer and Vishny (1993, p. 599) focus on the governmental area and 
define “corruption as the sale by government officials of government property 
for personal gain”, Ocampo (2000, p.53) describes corruption in a broader way 
as a “phenomenon licensed, eventually promoted, and stimulated by other 
normative systems of formal and informal, public and private, domestic and 
international rules that coexist with prohibitive laws.” Lange (2008, p.710) 
describes organizational corruption as “the pursuit of individual interests by one 
or more organizational actors through the intentional misdirection of 
organizational resources or perversion of organizational routines.” According to 
Luo (2004) corruption includes the six following natures (1) perceptual, (2) 
contextual, (3) power related, (4) illegal or norm-deviated, (5) intentional and (6) 
almost always covert.
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Based on the fact, that corruption is embedded into the culture, where it occurs, 
it is difficult to find a “worldwide” valid definition of corruption (Fisman and 
Miguel, 2008). The fieldwork will take place in El Salvador; however, the 
researcher grew up in Germany and some of the interviewees grew up in 
Germany, while others have been El Salvadorian natives. As a result, the 
perception of corruption may differ. For the purpose of this research, the 
definition and perception from the view of the researcher will be applied; 
therefore this thesis will take a German approach to corruption.
2.4.2. Definition of fraud
Unfortunately, fraud lacks a clear definition and is not a crime in itself but an 
integral aspect of several criminal statutes like computer fraud or bank fraud; 
the definition of fraud may change over time and based on the environment in 
which it appears (Podgor, 1999). “Fraud encompasses an array of irregularities 
and illegal acts characterized by intentional deception. It can be perpetrated for 
the benefit of or the detriment of the organization and by persons outside as 
well as inside the organization” (O’Gara, 2004, p.1). Wells (2007, p.1) defines 
occupational fraud as “The use of one’s occupation for personal enrichment 
through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing organization’s 
resources or assets”. The “illicit action is performed without the participation or 
the knowledge of the affected part” (Del Castillo and Ampudia, 2005, p.4). 
“Fraudsters use their influence in business transactions in a way that violates 
their duty to their employers in order to obtain a benefit for themselves or 
someone else” (ACFE, 2008, p.10).
2.4.3. Difficulties in research on corruption and occupational fraud
Donaldson and Dunfee (1994, pp. 252-253) state that “on the one hand, 
research deals with empirical ideas and concepts which describe the facts of 
corruption (empirical business research) and on the other hand, research 
consists of normative ideas what managers should do (normative business 
research)”. However, the connection between these two directions is weak,
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sometimes resulting in theoretical norms which are not applicable for business 
life. Collins et al. (2009) and Lambsdorff (2003) summarize that corruption is (1) 
difficult to define, (2) difficult to observe, (3) difficult to measure and (4) difficult 
to generalize. Sometimes, organizations apply double standards when they deal 
with corruption e.g. in the form of “grease payments” (TRACE, 2009). 
Measuring corruption is a difficult task, because victimization surveys are not 
available for the case of corruption (Glaeser and Goldin, 2004) and the research 
of corruption lacks “a global forensic economics network” to coordinate the work 
of researchers worldwide for a better understanding of corruption (Fisman and 
Miguel, 2008, p. 213). Bardhan (1997, p. 1320) adds that through the “inherent 
difficulties of collecting good empirical data on the subject of corruption”, the 
research of it has to be primarily analytical and speculative. Major management 
fraud against the organization is significantly underreported and managers do 
not prosecute it effectively, because they do not want to get involved and so, 
they evade the possible risk of being prosecuted themselves (O’Gara, 2004; 
Hess and Ford, 2008). An in depth-understanding of corruption is necessary for 
a successful research of corruption; corruption has to be analyzed not 
superficially (e.g. by describing its symptoms) “but from a systemic perspective 
which has to be integrative, interactionist and processual” (Ashforth et al., 2008, 
pp. 672). To do so, one has to understand, that corruption is always embedded 
in the culture of a country. One has to take that country-specific culture into 
consideration, which makes it difficult to compare different levels and different 
forms of corruption between countries (Fisman and Miguel, 2008).
2.4.4. Forms of corruption
Kautiliya describes in the fourth century BC “with remarkable precision” in his 
book Arthasastra that there exist “forty ways of embezzlement” in India 
(Bardhan, 1997, p. 1320). According to the (ACFE, 2008) the primary 
categories of corporate corruption are asset misappropriation, corruption and 
financial statement fraud. Wells (2007, pp.1 and 45-46) lists in the “Fraud Tree” 
these three common forms of occupational fraud, corruption and abuse.
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Figure 3: Forms of corruption: The Fraud Tree
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O’Gara (2004, p. 2) describes the types of fraud as (1) internal fraud against the 
organization e.g. corruption (2) fraud for the organization e.g. bribery and (3) 
external fraud against the organization e.g. credit card fraud. Burke (2011) adds 
insider trading and the padding of one’s expenses as additional examples of 
corporate wrongdoing and Kroll (2010) states that theft of information and 
electronic data has overtaken physical theft for the first time as the most 
frequently reported fraud. Rosenblatt and Shapira-Lishchinsky (2011, p. 189) 
see the withdrawal syndrome of employees as another form of corruption since 
employees contribute sub-optimally while they are still on the payroll of an 
organization. Child (2007) explains that employees behave corruptly, when they 
steal time to pursue private interests and misuse the company’s equipment for 
private purposes.
Corruption in foreign markets is mostly assumed with bribery. In doing so, the 
international press neglects other forms of corruption, which make the 
marketing efforts of companies more difficult like (1) product piracy and stolen 
R&D data (2) terrorism and violence, and (3) black market activities (Chandler 
and Graham, 2010). Bishop and Hydolski (2009) warn that management 
override i.e. the risk of overriding controls by management to perpetrate fraud 
as an additional risk of employee corruption is still underestimated in 
organizations.
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Especially SMEs in emerging countries have to deal with the following forms of 
corruption (UNIDO and UNODC, 2007):
• Bribery
• Embezzlement and misappropriation of funds
• Extortion e.g. from larger companies in order to obtain contracts
• Fraud
• Nepotism
• Bureaucratic or administrative corruption
• The sale of rights granted by the government (e.g. permits, contracts)
• Corruption in combination with certain forms of organized crime
Kroll (2010, p. 20) lists, based on a survey undertaken in Latin America the 
following areas of frequent loss where companies in Latin America suffer from:
• Information theft, loss or attack (35% of the companies interviewed)
• Management conflict of interest (27%)
• Theft of physical assets or stock (26%)
• Vendor, supplier or procurement fraud (22%)
• Regulatory or compliance fraud (21 %)
2.4.5. Parties involved in corruption
Ashforth et al. (2008, p.670) as well as UNIDO and UNODC (2006) and Tl 
(2010) state that corruption afflicts for-profit, non-for-profit and governmental 
organizations, natural monopolies like mining and even religious organizations 
and can be committed by anyone in the organization. O’Gara (2004, p. 2) 
classifies fraud based on the type of perpetrator: (1) management (2) employee 
and (3) nonemployee. Occupational fraudsters are generally first-time offenders 
and occupational frauds were most often committed by the accounting 
department or upper management (ACFE, 2008). Kroll (2010, p.4) found out 
that fraud is largely an inside job across all geographies and industries (44% 
employees and 11% agents or intermediaries). The Council of Europe (1999) 
distinguishes between active involvement into corruption and fraud (i.e. the 
function does actively bribe) and passive involvement (i.e. the function receives 
bribes or is harmed by the corruptive act).
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2.5. Factors fostering corruption and occupational fraud in emerging 
markets
2.5.1. Culture, society and past heritage
Some societal factors like (1) power distance, (2) uncertainty avoidance (3) 
interpersonal trust and (4) a collectivistic culture are positively related with 
corruption (Getz and Volkema, 2001; Husted, 1999; Levin and Satarov, 2000). 
Swamy et al. (2001) and Dollar et al. (2001) add that a high level of masculinity 
can increase the level of corruption. Such factors influence people’s perceptions 
of corruption and explain their higher tolerance towards corruption (Morris and 
Blake, 2009; Fisman and Miguel, 2008). Webster (2005) adds that companies in 
Latin America are more exposed to corruption than companies in OECD 
countries (28% vs. 12%) because corruption is a way of life in Latin America 
(Little and Posada-Carbô, 1996). Fisman and Miguel (2008) found out, that 
people with resentments against the investor’s home country will easily justify 
their corrupt behaviours against the foreign investor.
Secrecy helps fostering corruption. Lambsdorff (2002) as well as McGregor 
(2005) state that corrupt forms of hidden network ties like the Chinese “guanxi” 
facilitate the sealing of corrupt deals. Levin and Satarov (2000) conclude that 
existing corruption can foster additional corruption, because the attractiveness 
of grassroots corruption is explained and justified by mutual gain and minimal 
risk for those involved in bribes. A predominant religion in a country can 
influence the level of corruption. Traditional, hierarchical religions like Islam, 
Orthodox or Catholicism foster corruption, while predominantly Protestant 
cultures show a lower degree of corruption (Treisman, 2000; Hofstede, 2001).
Mauro (1995) and Tanzi (1998) state, that corruption is inherently affected by 
ethnic diversity and ethnolinguistic fractionalization. However, Leite and 
Weidmann (1999) contrast their view and found out that ethnic diversity is not 
correlated with higher levels of corruption. In developing countries, new 
emerging middle-class groups have built up a structural pressure against 
already existing corruption (Khan, 1998). Paradoxically, this generates 
additional corruption because these groups use corruption as a tool to enforce 
their interests (ibid).
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To a large extent, today’s corruption in emerging market countries is inherited 
from their collectivist past, which is responsible for today’s relatively poor 
governance and absence of the so-called “good civil society”, leading to 
additional corruption (Colombatto, 2003, p.373). The heritage of a totalitarian 
regime or centralized socialist governments combined with just a short 
exposure to democratic traditions lead to political instability and weakness of 
the judiciary, resulting in higher levels of corruption (Levin and Satarov, 2000; 
Treisman, 2000; Svensson, 2005). Fisman and Miguel (2008) see frequently 
upcoming civil wars after the end of these totalitarian regimes as an additional 
source for corruption, because they destroy unity and finally weaken society 
and government institutions. The weakness of such governments allows 
governmental agencies to impose bribes and therefore, corruption arises to 
correct pre-existing government failures like weak institutions, political 
instability, underdeveloped legislature and legal loopholes, misguided 
government policies or red tape (Aidt, 2003; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Levin 
and Satarov, 2000). Cruz (2011) adds, that unfortunately, the “mano dura” 
policies (strong hand; zero tolerance of the government towards crime and 
corruption) in some of the newly established democratic governments in Latin 
America implemented to fight against crime gave state institutions a high 
degree of discretionary power resulting in an adverse effect, “opening the gates 
wide for abuses and extralegal violence” (ibid, p. 26) and allowing them to 
behave corrupt. Unfortunately, “mano dura” has not significantly reduced the 
level of criminal violence in these countries (Cruz, 2011).
Countries undergoing a massive dislocation in the form of politic, economic, and 
social changes are very vulnerable to corruption (Sanyal, 2005). In such 
countries, corruption is assumed as a fact and therefore predictable, which 
causes further corruption based on the fact that investors are less motivated to 
seek for alternatives (Lambsdorff, 2002). The freedom of the press is not yet 
well protected, which leads to increased corruption because the press is still too 
weak to discover and accuse corruption openly (Treisman, 2000). Montinola 
and Jackman (2002) describe an inverse- U-shaped curve for the development 
between corruption and the progress of democratization: corruption is low in 
dictatorships, increases with democratization and then decreases again with a
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higher level of democracy. This process view is supported by Treisman (2000) 
who states that long exposure to democracy predicts lower levels of corruption. 
Cruz (2011) adds, that a transition from authoritarian regime to neoliberal, 
democratic governance can also foster the growth of criminal violence in the 
form of organized crime, youth gangs, street crime and a high rate of homicides, 
because newly established democratic governments have to regain power for 
security and justice institutions and to stop the survival of violent entrepreneurs 
and “other illegal groups and rogue agents” (ibid, p. 9).
The legacy of colonial rule is a significant factor in explaining higher levels of 
corruption. Former British colonies tend to have lower levels of corruption than 
francophone colonies (Robinson, 1998). Treisman (2000) argues that former 
British colonies have higher quality governments based on their Protestant 
traditions and the Common Law tradition stemming from England. Such “an 
increase in governmental quality in general is correlated with lower rates of 
corruption” (ibid, p.402).
As a result, the level of corruption in El Salvador is considerably higher than in 
other countries influenced by the following factors (1) a collectivistic culture 
influenced by the Spanish “Conquistadora” i.e. Spanish colonization of the 
Americas (2) a high level of masculinity, (3) a weak government caused by the 
heritage of a totalitarian regime and (4) a relatively new established democracy.
2.5.2. Economic issues
The countries with the highest level of corruption are emerging or transition 
countries with low income levels (Svensson, 2005). Tl (2008) and Spector 
(2005) report, that some sectors are more exposed to corruption like the justice 
system, political parties, health care, education, public finance, environment, 
energy and agriculture. Simmons & Simmons (2006) and Kroll (2010) add that 
infrastructure projects, transportation, construction, telecom and even the 
private sector can be negatively influenced by corruption. Especially capital 
intensive natural resources industries like the oil industry or mining are major 
determinants of corruption (Leite and Weidmann, 1999; The World Bank, 2000; 
Ades and Di Telia, 1999). This view is supported by Montinola and Jackman 
(2002), who found out, that a membership of the Oil Producing and Exporting
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Countries (OPEC) goes along with a higher level of corruption. Unfortunately, “a 
lot of natural resource booms did never translate into generalized prosperity” 
(Fisman and Miguel, 2008, p. 156). O’Higgins (2006, p. 243) explains the 
interaction between extractive resource dependency, corruption and low human 
development for countries rich of natural resources:
Extractive resource dependency <-> Corruption <-» Low human development
A low GNP per capita leads to higher levels of corruption (Hofstede, 2001). 
Unequal income distribution is surprisingly not related with corruption (Husted, 
1999; Sanyal, 2005) but the lower the educational level, the higher the level of 
corruption is (AN and Isse, 2003; Svensson, 2005). Periods of economic 
downturns can increase the level of corruption (Fisman and Miguel, 2008; 
Poole-Rob and Bailey, 2002). Corruption is also a matter of public wealth. 
Preventing all corruption is excessively costly, so for less developed economies 
it is better tolerating a certain level of corruption and not enforcing all property 
rights (Acemoglu and Verdier, 1998 and 2000). Corruption is more pervasive in 
low income-countries which tend to underpay public sector employees 
(Montinola and Jackman, 2002). Varese (1997) argues that in poor countries 
the lack of enforcing property rights and the nonexistent possibility to derive 
income from goods owned leads to higher levels of corruption.
Police states, small oligarchies and homogeneous societies found in East Asia 
and Latin America are more likely to suffer from corruption than more open, less 
tightly governed and heterogeneous societies (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). In 
economic environments where domestic firms are sheltered from foreign 
competition by policy induced barriers, foreign investors are facing higher levels 
of corruption (Ades and Di Telia, 1999). Husted (1999) as well as Montinola and 
Jackman (2002) found out, that government size is not systematically related to 
corruption. More government does not necessarily lead to a higher level of 
corruption because corruption exists within certain limited sectors which are 
independent of the size of that specific government agency (Husted, 1999). 
However, AN and Isse (2003) object, that the size of government is positively 
and significantly correlated with the level of corruption: a 10% increase in 
government employees leads to 2% more corruption.
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There exists a contrasting view of the relationship between corruption and 
economic liberalisation. Liberalization and privatization generate higher levels of 
corruption (Robinson, 1998; Levin and Satarov, 2000). Kaufmann and 
Siegelbaum (1996) object that privatization programmes can help to decrease 
corruption, when properly implemented with high speed and a high level of 
transparency and access to information. However, they also argue, that 
management-employee buyouts and spontaneous privatizations can lead to 
higher corruption based on a lack of transparency and high levels of 
discretionary power of the governmental agencies. According to Kroll (2010) 
and Svensson (2005), the rate of corruption in emerging markets is higher 
because the quality of secondary information is often inaccurate or nonexistent, 
and there exist robust relationships and shared information between customers, 
suppliers and local officials which nourish corruptive relationships.
Although El Salvador is described as being the Central American Tiger in 
economic growth (Hidalgo, 2009), the country still grades poor with respect to 
the level of GNP and its GINI Coefficient, which results in a higher level of 
corruption.
2.5.3. Geographic issues of the host country
The geographic location of a country can also influence the level of corruption. 
The closer a country is located to the equator, the higher the level of corruption 
is. La Porta (1999) explains this phenomenon with a higher rate of mortality in 
such countries caused by tropical diseases. This leads to a short term 
orientation of the people in general and of their economic activities in specific, 
which goes along with higher levels of corruption. Extreme poverty and violence 
in some countries, frequently accompanied by drug production and drug 
trafficking to neighbouring countries increase the level of corruption and vice 
versa (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Carpenter, 2005; The World Bank, 2011). 
Sandholtz and Gray (2003) found out, that countries which are surrounded by 
corruptive neighbours experience a higher level of corruption because 
corruption can spill over. Countries which have a larger distance to the world's 
major trading centres suffer from a higher level of corruption because they are 
protected from non-corrupt competitors (Lambsdorff, 2006). And finally, the
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“paradox of corruption” points out, that corruption “is universally disapproved yet 
universally prevalent” and that firms from countries with minimal domestic 
corruption play a major role as bribe-payers in corrupt environments caused by 
“exported corruption” (Hess and Dunfee, 2000, p.595 and p.598). Thus, 
increasing FDI inflows can worsen national corruption (Pinto and Zhu, 2008).
El Salvador is located in the above discussed tropical area close to the equator 
and the country is surrounded by a lot of corrupt countries. In addition, the 
country operates as a highway for drug dealers, transporting drugs from South 
America via El Salvador and Mexico to the USA. As a result, investors have to 
deal with higher rates of corruption in this country.
2.5.4. Factors fostering corruption within organizations
According to Ryan (2000, p. 332), “corruption has existed as long as there have 
been people in power and money to influence them”. Based on increased 
globalization, mangers are more exposed to unfamiliar business environments 
influenced by political, religious, cultural, and economic factors as well as 
bribery, fraud, violence or organized crime and managers are well aware that 
corruption can hinder their overseas activities (Chandler and Graham, 2010).
Ashforth et al. (2008, pp. 672), Kish-Gephardt et al. (2010) and Burke (2009, 
p.3) built up taxonomies, why people in organizations behave unethically. Their 
findings can be synthesized as follows:
• bad apples: corruption is committed by individuals; however 
individual’s behaviour are influenced by group, organizational, and 
wider contextual forces and sometimes individuals bring groups 
within organizations to commit fraud “like one rotten apple can ruin 
the whole basket” (Bielgelman and Bartow, 2012, p. 38)
• bad barrels: if norms and practices within organizations serve the 
competitive interests of a country for profits at any costs, this may 
omit the interests of other stakeholders (e.g. larger societies)
• bad cases: no system can live without faith, which is undermined 
by corruption
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•  bad orchards: a whole industry participates in a shady way of 
operating (like the financial services industry in the 1990s and 
2000s)
• corruption over time: the long history of corruption in business 
(dating back 1500 years, already mentioned in the Talmud) 
suggests that it is naive to think that self-regulation of the problem 
can work.
Biegelman and Bartow (2012, pp. 37) describe with their “Potato Chip Theory” 
that committing fraud can become addictive and as soon, as the fraudster has 
once been successful with his wrongdoing, it gets harder and harder for him to 
stop that activity like people not being able to eat just one potato chip. The 
quality of information and the manipulation, concealing or simply suppressing of 
information received by the principal can help growing and concealing 
corruption (Tirole, 1986). According to the Corporate Crime Reporter (2007), 
corporate crime is under-prosecuted and corporate crime prosecutors are 
underfunded. As a result, many corporate criminals do not have to worry about 
prosecution. If corrupt individuals are left unchecked, corruption and fraud can 
“spread to other individuals, magnify in scope and finally become embedded in 
the very culture or an organization and industry” (Ashforth et al., 2008, p. 671).
Collins et al. (2009) found out that executives, which have close social ties with 
government officials, or rationalize the practice of corruption as a normal part of 
doing business are more engaged in corruption whereas top managers who 
belong to professional industry networks are less likely to engage in corruption. 
Biegelman and Bartow (2012, p. 5) add, that a culture of noncompliance 
combined with a lack of accountability and transparency will encourage rogue 
employees to commit fraud. Del Castillo and Ampudia (2005) have done a 
survey among 1376 Mexican SMEs and list the following four factors which 
foster corruption in companies: (1) lack of internal control (43%), (2)
administrative and organizational failures (28%), (3) human failure (19%) and 
finally (4) organizational culture (8%).
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2.5.5. Motivations for companies and people to behave in a corrupt way
There exists a wide variety of common rationalizations, why people and 
organizations undertake and justify their corrupt behaviours (Noonan, 1984, pp. 
685-693; Hess and Dunfee, 2000; Ashforth et al., 2008; Miller et al., 2005; 
UNIDO and UNODC, 2006; Kaufmann and Wei, 1999; Batabyal and Yoo, 
2007), which are summarized as follows:
* money: personal greed, envy, avoiding taxes and duties
e pressure: bribes are necessary to obtain desperately needed 
business or services, people are in desperate financial trouble
* justifications like “everybody does it”, “I had no alternative” or it is 
enforced or tolerated by the company or third parties
* short term orientation: viewing short term profit of paying bribes to 
facilitate issues as more important than long term bad effects
* disguising bribes and corruptive actions: e.g. euphemistic labelling 
(facilitating payments instead of bribes) or circumventing the way of 
payments (e.g. indirect bribes paid over agents)
* failing to conduct due diligence
Biegelman and Bartow (2012) describe a common way, how CEO’s defend 
themselves, why they have not done enough to detect and to fight against 
corruption and occupational fraud. They (ibid, p. 8-9) state that CEO’s defend 
their wrongdoing with strategies like “I’m just the CEO, What Do I Know about 
What’s Going on?” and describe this as the “Chutzpah Defence” (Chutzpah is a 
“Yiddish term meaning unbelievable gall, audacity, arrogance, or utter nerve”, 
ibid, p.8). Some people just have problems in distinguishing between unlawful 
and lawful actions because they lack the information (UNIDO and UNODC, 
2007). Other offenders think that they would do the right thing for society or for 
their company and assume that this would be a win-win situation for the briber 
as well as for the bribe taker because no one is injured by their conduct (Miller 
et al., 2005; Noonan, 1984).
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Corruption can be the result of a cost-benefit analysis. When the cost to 
eliminate corruption is higher than the benefits from its eradication, companies 
will tolerate bribing (Colombatto, 2003). Fisman and Miguel (2008) describe, 
that in the oil-drilling industry, it can be more favourable for the investor to bribe 
politicians instead of investing in cutting-edge technology to get new drilling 
concessions. However, according to Benfoddova et al. (2000), the majority of 
entrepreneurs do not want to engage in corrupt practice, because they find it 
costly, inefficient and risky. They behave in a corrupt way, because they lack 
public support in avoiding corruption and they cannot undertake normal 
business transactions without paying bribes (Sanyal, 2005; Ruhl, 2011). In 
addition, they do not follow internal or external anti fraud legislations, because 
“these legislations are apparently rarely controlled or enforced” (Hess and 
Dunfee, 2000; ACFE, 2008, p. 5).
Lee et al. (2010) present reasons, why some companies are more exposed to 
corruption based on the ownership of a company and the quality of corruption:
* The higher the foreign ownership of a firm and the more export 
oriented the firm is, the lower the vulnerability to corruption is (the 
companies have more resources and thus less need for 
government assistance and they can just walk away)
* The higher the share of state ownership of the firm is, the lower is 
its vulnerability to corruption
* The more pervasive corruption is (i.e. incidence of corruption for 
the firm), the greater the firm’s exposure to corruption is
e The more arbitrary corruption is (i.e. “rewards” for paying bribes 
are predictable) the smaller the bribes are paid by the firm
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According to Roaf (2000), corruption results from a combination of opportunities 
(i.e. the lack of control) and incentives (e.g. increasing personal gain). Albrecht 
et al. (2011, p. 168) and Wells (2007, p. 7) describe with “The Fraud Triangle” 
which has originally developed by Donald R. Cressey in the 1940’s three factors 
which enable individuals to commit fraud: (1) perceived pressure, (2) perceived 
opportunities and (3) rationalization of the fraudster.
Figure 4: The Fraud Triangle
“The Fraud Triangle’' developed by 
Donald R. Cressey in the 1940s:
Opportunity
The
Fraud
Triangle
Pressure Rationalization
Source: Wells (2007, p. 7)
Biegelman and Bartow (2012, p.36) have expanded the Fraud Triangle into a 
“Fraud Diamond” by adding a fourth element of “capability” into the model. They 
state, that a fraudster also needs to possess the capability to actually carry out 
the fraud (e.g. being creative enough to do so).
Albrecht et al. (1984, p. 6) explain in their “Fraud Scale Model”, that high 
situational pressure (e.g. unrealistic expectations), good opportunities (e.g. low 
level of control) and a low integrity of the employee (caused by tensions 
between the interest of the principal and interest of the employee) will increase 
the level of corruption and occupational fraud in a company. Biegelman and
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Bartow (2012) state, that greed caused through financial pressure is a very 
usual motive, but sometimes revenge and ego can be a justification for 
occupational fraud, for example, when employees feel anger and hostility 
against their employers.
Klitgaard (1998, p. 4) presents corruption in a formula |C = M + D -  A
“Corruption equals monopoly plus discretion minus accountability.”
Biegelman and Bartow (2012, p. 144) have developed the “RAC Formula” and
state, that power without accountability breeds corruption |P - A = C
Hess and Dunfee (2000, pp. 608) explain, that corrupt behaviour can be 
ethically justified by foreign investors, because they want to respect the local 
culture and want to avoid “moral imperialism” on the host country and therefore, 
they have chosen bribing as a sensible business strategy to stay competitive in 
the host market. Over the time, single undetected corrupt actions in 
organizations will be embedded in organizational practices, employees will be 
asked to behave unethically on behalf of the organization and newcomers will 
be socialized in existing structures with corrupt practices (Guerber et al., 2011; 
Ashforth et al., 2008). More and more rogue employees will act contrary to the 
announced policies of their employers and sometimes, personal threats, 
physical harm or extortion by other employees or third parties will increase the 
level of corruption (Hess and Dunfee, 2000). Finally, the whole organization will 
suffer from a corrupt culture, which fosters the growth of additional corruption 
(VDMA, 2010; Miller et al., 2005).
2.5.6. Reasons why SMEs are more exposed to corruption
Most of the anti-corruption programs focus on the public sector or on large- 
scale enterprise but not on SMEs, which make up about 90% of all established 
business worldwide (Benfoddova et al., 2000; UNIDO and UNODC, 2006). 
However, “SMEs have characteristics, structures, and potentials, that 
distinguish them from larger companies” and make them more vulnerable to 
corruption (UNIDO and UNODC, 2006, p. III). Webster (2005) underpins, that 
SMEs are more exposed to corruption than larger companies (40 % vs. 31 %).
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Compliance with regulations and red tape creates delays which in turn create 
financial costs for companies. In general, SMEs have fewer resources on time, 
finance, technology and personnel compared to larger companies and 
compliance costs are disproportionately high for SMEs (Tl, 2008; UNIDO and 
UNODC, 2007). As a result, SMEs try to speed up processes and bureaucracy 
with grease money and need to maximize their profit to survive among bigger 
competitors with corrupt activities (UNIDO and UNODC, 2007). Tanzi (1998, p. 
28) states that large enterprises can defend themselves better against 
corruption than SMEs, because they have specialized departments and 
“facilitators” which help them to manage the regulations and their size makes 
them more immune to extortion. UNIDO and UNODC (2006) found out that 
informal structures in SMEs and a short term vision of their business can lead to 
higher levels of corruption. Especially smaller companies are in desperate need 
for business and may bribe to survive, to increase their bargaining power, to 
compensate weak networks with officials and customers and to establish 
themselves in new markets (Sanyal, 2005; UNIDO and UNODC, 2006; Lu and 
Beamish, 2001). This pressure currently increases, because business is on a 
slow and fragile recovery and companies fear financial difficulties in the next 
few years (Ernst & Young, 2011).
Grey areas of corruption are more difficult to define for SMEs. They do not know 
the borderline between legal practices and corruption due to their lack of 
international knowledge and a lower level of cultural experience (Grisham, 
2010; UNIDO and UNODC, 2006; Tl, 2008). If inexperienced managers of 
SMEs perceive their environment as wholly corrupt, their likelihood of becoming 
involved in corruption is high (UNIDO and UNODC, 2007). In addition, SMEs 
have a lower degree of influence to oppose requests from officials and 
therefore, officials feel less resistance among SMEs when requesting for bribes 
(UNIDO and UNODC, 2007).
While the ACFE (2008) states that SMEs are especially vulnerable to 
occupational fraud because they have fewer or weaker controls in place than 
their larger counterparts, Colombatto (2003) and Kroll (2010, p.20) argue, that 
the level of corruption is lower in SMEs because “opportunistic behaviour is
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easier to detect, sanctions tend to be rather effective” and a lower staff turnover 
in smaller companies and less IT technology decreases the exposure to 
corruption and occupational fraud.
In summary, SMEs in general have to deal with higher rates of corruption. This 
makes an investment into El Salvador, which adds country based corruption to 
company specific corruption more risky with respect to corruption and 
occupational fraud.
2.6. Effects of corruption
2.6.1. Negative effects of corruption for economies
According to UNIDO and UNODC (2007), the cost of corruption is 3% of the 
World GDP (Gross Domestic Product) and corporate crime inflicts far more 
damage on society than all street crime combined (Corporate Crime Reporter, 
2007). In El Salvador, the costs for corruption, crime and violence are 
considerably higher and add up to almost 11 % of the GDP (The World Bank, 
2011). Corruption works like an inefficient tax on transactions (Gyimah- 
Brempong and Munoz de Camacho, 2006). However, “the illegality of corruption 
and the need for secrecy make corruption more costly than its sister activity, 
taxation” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993, p.2) and corruption can misallocate public 
funds and shift a country’s investments away from high value projects into 
potentially useless projects which offer better opportunities for corruption (ibid). 
In addition, corrupt practices are not legally enforceable and thus increase 
transaction costs (Gyimah-Brempong and Munoz de Camacho, 2006).
Corruption can discourage the development of economic activities, can lead to 
lower profitability of investments and weakens the economical and political 
advantages of the host country (Jordan Smith, 2007; Fisman and Miguel, 2008; 
Mauro, 1995; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Corruption lowers investment in the 
host countries because it influences the FDI decisions of potential investors 
negatively (Mauro, 1995; Wei, 2000). Investors are deterred because corruption 
produces bottlenecks, increases uncertainty and raises costs (Habib and 
Zurawicki, 2002; Wei, 2000). Therefore, the positive effect of corruption i.e.
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greasing the wheels of commerce and overcoming inefficiencies in the 
government is outweighed by its negative effects (Murphy et al., 1993; 
Kaufmann and Wei, 1999; Aidis and Mickiewicz, 2006). However, Egger and 
Winner (2006) found out, that corruption has a lower impact on FDIs 
specializing into vertical integration of production than on horizontal integration, 
because the level of corruption does not so strongly outweigh the locational 
advantages like low production costs for the vertical integration processes.
Gray and Kaufmann (1998, p.8) explain that corruption is unfair, because “it 
distorts sectoral priorities and technology choices” (e.g. it creates incentives to 
contract for large defence projects rather than rural health clinics) and it 
“undercuts the state's ability to raise revenues leading to higher tax rates being 
levied on fewer and fewer taxpayers”. Corruption in emerging economies 
contributes to poverty and destroys freedom and finally can result in the loss of 
credibility of the host state because foreign investors have no confidence that 
the legal system can protect their property and contract rights (Cleveland et al., 
2009; The World Bank, 2000).
Corruption leads to inefficient economic, social, and political outcomes, because 
“it [...] retards long-term foreign and domestic investments, enhances inflation, 
depreciates national currency, reduces expenditures for educational and health, 
increases military expenditures, [...], pushes firms underground, distorts 
markets and the allocation of resources, increases income inequality and 
poverty, reduces tax revenue, increases child and infant mortality rates, distorts 
the fundamental role of the government [...], and undermines the legitimacy of 
government and of the market economy” (Akçay, 2006, pp. 29-30). Especially in 
emerging market countries, corruption can have a large averse distributional 
effect on income, which negatively affects the GINI coefficient (Khamfula, 2007, 
Getz and Volkema, 2001). Murphy et al. (1993) as well as Gyimah-Brempong 
and Munoz de Comacho (2006) argue that corruption has the largest 
distributional impact in Latin America. This can lead to a vicious circle, since 
higher economic adversity in a country leads to more corruption and vice versa 
(Getz and Volkema, 2001). Biegelman and Bartow (2012, p.331) close, that 
corruption often occurs in the worst possible locales “like developing and 
emerging countries and regions that suffer the most from corruption’s evil
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consequences” and that “corruption fuels poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, 
contempt, and disillusion.” Corruption channels human resources into rent 
seeking rather than in productive activities; talented people become rent 
seekers which hinders economic growth and afflicts innovative activity because 
private rent seekers go after existing stock of wealth which otherwise could be 
used for economic growth (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Murphy et al., 1993). 
“Corruption breeds corruption and the longer it persists, the more endemic it 
becomes and the more people are involved in it” (Ali and Isse, 2003, p.451). 
Mauro (1995) states, that corruption will have a negative effect on FDIs and the 
greater the absolute difference in the corruption levels between the home 
country and the host countries is, the lesser the FDI inflow for the host country 
will be (Habib and Zurawicki, 2002). However, corruption has a smaller negative 
impact on FDIs in transition countries than in other countries because investors 
are more capable in handling corruption (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006).
Corruption does limit the availability of both consumer and producer goods in 
the country because the import is determined by corruption opportunities rather 
than tastes or technological needs and therefore, it raises the cost of goods and 
services (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Hindess, 2005). In addition, corruption 
distorts fair competition and the rules of a free market economy and finally has 
a negative impact on the quality and availability of public services and the public 
infrastructure (UNIDO and UNODC, 2007; Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997). 
Kaufmann (1997, p. 118) adds that “viewing bribes as a mechanism for 
equalizing supply and demand also messes the fact that many public goods 
ought not to be allocated to the highest bidder”. On the one hand, Tanzi and 
Davoodi (1997) argue, that corruption can lead to higher public investments; on 
the other hand, the expenditures for highly visible investment projects (e.g. 
roads, airports or power plants) may come at the cost of smaller expenditures 
for less attractive but also essential projects (e.g. schools) and insufficient 
expenditures on operations and maintenance.
Corruption has a negative effect on governmental capacity, because it wastes 
resources (e.g. capital, investment distortions and human skills) which then lead 
to poorer infrastructure and a loss of legitimacy and even threatens a 
government’s overall effectiveness (Nye, 1967; Hess and Dunfee, 2000;
Clissold, 2010). Hindess (2005) argues that corruption reduces productivity, 
contaminates the environment of the private sector and damages public 
respect. Corruption does not only affect the absolute size of government 
expenditures but also the composition of the expenditures; especially social 
spending for education and health, which is essential for developing countries, 
is adversely affected by corruption and hinders the formation of human capital 
(Mauro, 1998; Gupta et al., 1998).
And finally, corruption is a necessary facilitator for extensive organized crime 
and terrorist networks, can lead to instability in the country (social revolutions, 
military takeovers and upsetting ethnic balances) and even can harm 
international security e.g. “if visas can be bought, borders won’t be safe” 
(TRACE, 2009, p. 6; Orttung, 2006; Nye, 1967).
2.6.2. Positive effects of corruption for economies
While Krevert (2007) argues, that corruption can impede economic growth and 
can hurt foreign corporations because they have to pay bribes, Svensson 
(2005) found out, that corruption does not affect economic growth.
Nye (1967) discusses positive effects of corruption which can have an impact 
on growth and development of economies:
• Corruption can help to promote economic development ( it is a 
source for capital formation, it can cut red tape and it can foster 
entrepreneurship)
• Corruption can foster a national integration (it can help integrating 
elites and non-elites into society)
• Corruption can help to increase governmental capacity by 
empowering governments
The prevention of corruption is excessively costly since one needs additional 
bureaucrats and one has to pay higher government salaries to compensate for 
lost bribes and so, the second best and less expensive approach is to tolerate a 
certain amount of corruption (Acemoglu and Verdier, 1998 and 2000).
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Aidt (2003) argues that corruption can help foreign companies to operate in 
unknown environments in a more efficient way because it circumvents already 
existing competition, speeds up bureaucratic procedures and introduces 
competition for scarce government resources which then will be provided more 
efficiently. This view is supported by Ali and Isse (2003, p. 450) who state that 
corruption may be beneficial because it “circumvents inefficient and 
cumbersome government regulations” and finally can lead to less corruption. 
While “in most stable nations, the negative effects of corruption outweigh the 
positive by 50- to 100 fold”, corruption can have much larger positive effects in 
nations with weak governance because many corrupt activities substitute for 
missing or misguided law (Houston, 2007, p. 326). Colombatto (2003) argues 
that corruption in developing countries can be seen as a mechanism for market 
participants to circumvent inefficient structures, thus being able to operate in a 
more competitive way.
However, Kaufmann (1997, p. 118) refutes the view that corruption can equalize 
supply and demand of public goods and that “speed money” can cut red tape. 
Kaufmann (ibid) argues that “this view misses the fact that many public goods 
should not be allocated to the highest bidder”. He also displays, that managers 
who pay more “grease money” spend more, not less time with public officials. 
This view is supported by Doh et al. (2003) who state that companies suffer 
from monetary and opportunity costs of dealing with corrupt officials.
2.6.3. Negative effects of corruption for companies
Lambsdorff (2002) explains that corruption decreases the profitability of 
companies. Organizations lose between 5 % and 7% of their annual revenues 
to corruption and fraud and the median loss caused by occupational fraud is 
$175,000; more than 25% of the companies reported losses of at least USD 
one million (ACFE, 2008; Security Leaders, 2012). The relative costs of 
corruption for SMEs are even higher -  up to 10% of the annual revenues, 
because the expenses for regulatory compliance do not decrease in proportion 
of firm size and affect SMEs disproportionately (UNIDO and UNODC, 2006).
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According to Simmons & Simmons (2006), 43% of all companies worldwide 
think that they have lost new business in the last five years to competitors, 
which paid a bribe. Unfortunately, bribe takers will focus their demands on 
companies that have already paid bribes and will try to increase their demands 
over time, which will increase the investor’s operating costs in the long run 
(TRACE, 2009). During economic downturns, the companies mostly affected 
have been companies which depended on corrupt arrangements rather than 
open competition (Luo, 2002).
Tekin-Koru (2006) found out that corruption has a strong negative impact on 
joint ventures, particularly ones originating from developed countries, thus 
supporting the transaction cost approach which emphasizes an expected 
increase in costs for sharing ownership in corrupt environments. This view is 
supported by Gyimah-Brempong and Munoz de Comacho (2006), who add, that 
corrupt practices are conducted in secrecy and contracts emanating from them 
are not legally enforceable, resulting in higher transaction costs and financial 
loss. According to Luo (2004), corruption influences organizations in their 
development negatively because it is an evolutionary hazard and it can lead to 
organizational deficiencies which finally result in competitive disadvantages for 
the companies. Corruption can lower the productivity of capital since capital 
goods will be misallocated towards inefficient and overpriced competitors and 
therefore the quality of investments will suffer (Lambsdorff, 2003; Krevert, 
2007).
Corruption is an entrance barrier for potential investors into emerging 
economies, because lobbying power, which is accompanied by bribes is 
disproportionately held by those enterprises that need to be replaced by new or 
foreign firms and thus hinders the building up of new, competitive companies 
(Varese, 1997). In a survey undertaken by Gaviria (2002, p. 257), investors 
have seen corruption as a main obstacle for doing business; El Salvador scores 
very poorly with respect to the level of corruption (position 6 of 20 Latin 
American FDI destinations with the highest level of corruption) and has just 
slightly improved since then (Tl, 2008).
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PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2008) argues that besides economic losses, 
corruption has negative ethical outcomes for companies because it negatively 
influences the reputation and credibility in the society and therefore, the 
company becomes less attractive to new recruits and may even attract corrupt 
employees, which leads to additional corruption. Corruption within the company 
undermines trust, can cause personal and professional harm and it allows 
employees as well as third parties to rationalize stealing from the company, thus 
demoralizing management and staff (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2008; Miller et 
al., 2005).
Doh et al. (2003, pp. 116) describe that the cost of government corruption 
harms investor in two ways:
• Direct costs (e.g. bribes, red tape and bureaucratic delay, directly 
unproductive behaviour, engagement with organized crime)
• Indirect costs (e.g. reduced investment, reduced and distorted 
public expenditures, weak infrastructure, weak legal institutions, 
misdirected entrepreneurial talent and socio-economic failure)
In addition, corruption causes opportunity costs like not undertaking a FDI and 
hidden costs like sinking staff loyalty, staff involvement in fraud and damaging 
reliable supply chain relationships (UNIDO and UNODC, 2007). Contrary to the 
“efficient grease hypothesis”, which assumes that reducing red tape by paying 
grease money can help companies to become more efficient, Kaufmann and 
Wei (1999, p.1) found out, that bribes increase the time that companies have to 
spend with bureaucrats and that the bribe payer faces higher, not lower costs of 
capital.
The following figure explains the negative effects of corruption and fraud in the 
first step on the host country and in the second step on the level of FDIs in the 
host country. Initially, corruption hinders the economic strength of the host 
country. The economic growth and the purchasing power of consumers are 
lowered by corruption. Corruption negatively influences the government to 
operate in an efficient way and to provide an attractive framework for investors 
e.g. corruption fosters crime, leads to brain drain or unfavourable financing
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conditions. As a result the prospective host country becomes less attractive for 
investors, because they have to cope with a poor infrastructure. Investors will 
face higher operating costs for their businesses, since they have to pay higher 
transaction costs and in some cases even higher taxes than expected. These 
costs eat up the formerly granted tax incentives offered by the host country or 
the lower costs for labour.
Figure 5: Negative effects of corruption and fraud on the host country and on 
the FDI
Corruption and fraud
▼
hinder GDP growth of the host country and purchasing power of consumers
affect government expenditures (ineffective investment projects)
lead to low performance of the economy and less tax revenues
influences the investment climate negatively
distort bidding processes for government bidding
foster crime and weakens the legal foundations of the host country
lead to brain drain and unfavourable financing conditions
Host country
1 low attractiveness for the investor due to low growth rates (entrance barrier)
1 poor infrastructure lead to increased production costs 
1 bureaucracy and inefficient public administration processes lead to high 
transaction costs and increased administration (higher operational costs)
1 inferior education and high rate of sick days lead to low productivity 
1 less economic freedom (e.g. licensing restrictions) hinder sales growth 
1 low legal, economic and social stability lead to increased investment 
risks (e.g. low protection of property rights)
' higher taxes levied on fewer taxpayers (FDIs!) eat up tax incentives 
' legal restrictions hinder repatriation of profits or the investment back to the 
headquarters of the investor(exit barrier) ^ 7
Foreign Direct Investment
Source: by the author
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Del Castillo and Ampudia (2005) list negative effects of corruption, which have 
been disclosed by over 1300 SMEs within a survey in Mexico to evaluate the 
impacts of corruption and fraud on SMEs:
• Increased costs of operation (89% of the interviewees)
• Loss of contracts to more corrupt companies (83%)
• No access to public bidding processes (79%)
• Unstable planning process (56%)
• Restricted access to goods and services (37%)
Tl (2008) describes some negative effects of corruption for SMEs:
• Less attractive for acquisitions and financial organisations
• Less control over the business because corruption hinders 
reasonable business decisions
• Risk of legal penalties, loss of licenses and blacklisting
• Organizations will lose money on bribes, gifts and inducements
• Problems when working together with larger firms, because 
smaller firms which have to bribe to survive, will not be selected 
as reliable suppliers
• Lower chance to acquire government business
Besides poorer economic results, corruption can have nonfinancial negative 
effects on companies, because (1) it destroys good working relationships and 
lowers employee morale, (2) it results in a loss of local confidence, (3) it can 
harm the reputation of the company, (4) it negatively influences corporate 
transparency, (5) it can result in a loss of customer trust and adverse public 
opinion, and (6) it makes the company less attractive for prospective employees
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(Tl, 2008; TRACE, 2009; PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2008; Luo, 2008; Albrecht 
et al., 2011). An additional risk for corrupt companies can be the loss of 
insurance coverage like the insurance for directors and officers, the insurance 
for exports -  Hermes coverage or the loss of investment and property insurance 
abroad (VDMA, 2011; Kerkhoff et al., 2012).
The “vicious circle” of corruption explains how corruption is leading to a lower 
profitability and poorer financial results, resulting in lower investments into new 
technologies and products. Less advanced products will not be competitive in 
the market and sluggish sales will increase the production costs, because a 
company will lose economies of scales. In the last step, companies may 
consider bribing to sell obsolete and less advanced products to boost sales.
The vicious circle can be summarized as follows:
Figure 6: The vicious circle of corruption within companies
The "vicious circle" of corruption w ith in  companies
Urgent need"to  
sell obsolete 
products
Corruption
Lower 
profitability of 
the company
Loss of economies of 
scale
Lower cash flow  
in the company
Products are 
less
competitive in 
the market
Less advanced 
products
Reduced 
investment in R & D
Reduced investment 
in advanced 
production 
technologies
Higher production 
costs of the 
products
Source: by the author
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2.6.4. Positive effects of corruption for companies
According to Okpara and Koumbiadis, (2011) a high level of corruption in the 
host country does not necessarily discourage SMEs from undertaking FDIs; 
while corruption deters investors from home countries with a low level of 
corruption, it does not hinder investors from home countries with high levels of 
corruption because these investors know, how to deal with corruption. However, 
this may lead to an increasing agglomeration of corrupt competitors in such 
countries (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006).
Houston (2007) argues that corruption can have positive effects for companies 
operating in countries with weak governance because (1) it could lubricate the 
flow of commerce when few legal options are viable, (2) it permits the 
continuation of profitable activities that otherwise would decline, (3) it allows 
productive investments which otherwise would not occur, and (4) it circumvents 
licensing restrictions and administrative delays thus allowing firms to operate 
legally. However, Mauro (1995) refutes the widespread opinion, that “speed 
money” could help individuals and companies avoiding bureaucratic delay and 
red tape; in contrast, it is counterproductive to improve bureaucratic efficiency 
which then leads to even poorer government services for investors.
2.7. How to detect corruption and occupational fraud
Albrecht et al. (2011, pp. 179) and O’Gara (2004, pp. 28-29) recommend
watching for “red flags” in general as well as in areas and departments which
are more prone to corruption and fraud to uncover fraud in organizations:
• Items that should match but do not
• Items that should not match, but do
• Outliers and extremes
• Suspicious trends
• Accounting anomalies (e.g. low financial performance)
• Internal control weaknesses
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• Analytical symptoms in data
• Extravagant lifestyles of perpetrators and personal use of the fraud 
proceeds
• Unusual behaviour of individuals in the organization
• Decentralized and autonomous business units
• The amounts of the individual transactions in the affected areas
• Significant middlemen or cut-outs in the value chain
• An apparent belief that the fraud would not be prosecuted even if it will 
be detected
Unfortunately, a lot of risks like asset security, fraud or corruption are invisible, 
informal and consist of “sub rosa” (i.e. confidential and undercover) actions 
(Cleveland et al., 2009, p.200). This makes it difficult for investors to detect 
them, to evaluate them and to implement appropriate strategies to avoid them 
(Poole-Robb and Bailey, 2002; Luo, 2002).
2.8. Strategies how to fight against corruption and occupational fraud
Prevention is always less expensive than managing the damages of corruption 
and occupational fraud and therefore a proactive, strategic approach is highly 
recommended (German Chamber of Commerce, 2011). The compliance 
management has to include all parts of an organisation to be effective because 
“corrupt behaviours can occur everywhere” (Kerkhoff et al., 2012, p. 301). 
Biegelman and Bartow (2012) advise that the fraud risk management has to be 
continuously adjusted to any changes inside and outside of the organization. 
For them (ibid, pp. 383), a risk management based on a mere checklist is not 
helpful, because “fraudsters are very adaptive and imaginative in their 
schemes” and one has to bring fraud prevention into the “cultural-mind-set” of 
all employees. Ashforth et al. (2008, p. 676) state that, “given the long history of 
corruption in business and the understanding of human behaviour, it would be 
naive to believe that self regulation can work”. Wells (2007) and The German
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Chamber of Commerce (2011) advise installing internal controls which hinder 
employees to override company rules and continuously controlling employees 
However, cultural sensitivity of the management is required when implementing 
these controls (Holzmiiller and Stôttinger, 2001). Therefore, it is essential to 
send the best and most qualified employees of the home base already at the 
beginning of the FDI process into the host country and not when it is almost too 
late and they have to act as fire fighters (KPMG, 2006).
Corruption is often rooted in processes outside of the organization. Therefore, 
companies as a part of the society have an obligation to discourage and to 
prevent corruption outside their organizations (Sackmann and Horstmann. 
2010). Supporting social projects to improve local communities and to fight 
against corruption can help companies in many ways because (1) it supports 
employees to behave ethically inside of the company since their conditions of 
daily life outside of the company have improved, (2) it shows that corruption is 
not tolerated inside the company, (3) it supports the formal and informal 
corporate governance systems, and (4) it increases the image of companies in 
societies (Lin, 2010; Sackmann and Horstmann, 2010; Omazic, 2010). 
Engaging in corporate social responsibility is a way for companies to strengthen 
their bargaining power and therefore becoming more resistant to corruption 
(Kraemer and van Tulder, 2009).
Implementing a whistle-blower hotline is a good way to receive confidential 
anonymous information about questionable matters, since “the most common 
way in which workplace frauds of all kinds are uncovered is through tips” 
(Bishop and Hydolski, 2009, p. 78). Biegelman and Bartow (2012, p. 256) 
explain, that such tips are often exposed “by people with inside knowledge, 
including employees, vendors, customers, and others”. Miller et al. (2005) 
describe that whistleblowers are sensitive to wrongdoing before it is recognized 
by management. However, it is important to protect the identity of a potential 
whistle-blower anonymous and protect him against reprisals and discrediting 
(Martin, 2009). Whistle-blowing has to be made a part of the company culture 
(Soreide, 2006) and has to consider cultural issues (Poole-Robb and Bailey 
(2002).
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The elements of corruption risk management are “assessment, prevention, 
detection, and response” (Bishop and Hydolski, 2009, p. 10). Poole-Robb and 
Bailey (2002, p. 249) recommend implementing a “Crisis Management Team” 
CMT to assess the fraud risks within the company. Fraud risks can be mapped 
in a “Heat Map” (Bishop and Hydolski, 2009a, see Figure 7), where 
management has to map the likelihood and the significance of fraud risks. The 
CMT then has to evaluate the likelihood and the significance of individual fraud 
risks for their organization and must implement appropriate strategies to avoid 
them. Additional help from external consulting companies, which are specialized 
in corruption detection and prevention, can support the CMT to do so (Funk 
RMCE et al, 2011; Deloitte, 2007). However, Kriebel (2012) warns that risk 
maps are not always helpful because some risks may be forgotten in the risk 
map and other risks could be compensated or eliminated in other parts of the 
company. Therefore, Kriebel (2012, p. 3) suggests implementing a “risk and 
chance matrix”, since such a matrix will be more complete and therefore can 
help managers to evaluate their exposure to the risks of corruption and fraud as 
well as their ability to absorb them in a better way.
Figure 7: The Heat Map as a tool to evaluate the risks of corruption and fraud
HEAT MAP STRUCTURE
AREA TO 
WATCH
L O W  L IK E L IH O O D  
B U T  P O T E N T IA L L Y  
D E V A S T A T IN G S e n io r m a n a g e m e n t an d  
boards can b en e fit fro m  
p erio d ica lly  requesting
and  d iscussing fraud risk 
m aps. T h e  m aps d ep ic ted  
b e lo w  sh o w  h y p o th e ti­
cal assessm ents  o f fraud  
risks, prior to  m itig a tio n  
effo rts , in co m p a n ie s  fro m  
t w o  industries . W h ile
th e  red sec tions  (likely
u
z
<
u
an d  s ig n ifican t risks) w ill  
n atu ra lly  d ra w  you r a t te n ­
tio n , pay h eed  also to  th e  
up p er-le ft qu ad ran ts .
L I K E L I H O O D
»  W h a t  are th e  u n like ly  »  H o w  w o u ld  you k n o w  »  W h a t  is b e in g  d o n e  
b u t p o te n tia lly  m o s t if sch em es  w e re  a c tu - to  p re v e n t th e m ?
d an g e ro u s  fra u d  risks a lly  under w ay?
a t y o u r o rg a n iza tio n ?
Source: Bishop and Hydolski, (2009a, p.76)
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Bishop and Hydolski (2009, pp. 31) and the Center for Democracy and 
Governance (1999) recommend a variety of strategies to reduce or at least to 
minimize the risk of corruption and fraud within the FDI:
• Understanding the business is essential for investors to detect 
weaknesses
• Increasing awareness of the problem within management
• Assessing the risk within the company before entering the foreign market
• Strengthening transparency and open information
• Taking care of HR-issues (e.g. reference checks, assessment and terms 
of employment)
• Continuous controls within the organization
• Training employees, outsourced stakeholders and managers
• Implementing hotlines and whistle-blower-protection
• Installing top management as “illuminative good examples”
O’Gara (2004, pp. 22-23) suggests (1) centralizing foreign subsidies, (2) closely 
observing the value chain within the company, (3) assessing outsourced 
activities, (4) avoiding the significant use of middleman companies and (5) 
closely checking the overriding of local top management against established 
rules. Kinney and Moore (2008, p. 109) conclude, that it is essential for 
international companies to set up written codes of ethics as a guideline for their 
employees, because companies with written codes of ethics are less likely to 
accept bribery; especially firms which operate internationally are more likely to 
have implemented written codes of ethics. Transparency International (2008, 
pp. 19-20) recommends implementing clear internal rules, especially in “grey 
areas” like (1) gifts and entertainment, (2) charitable contributions and 
sponsorships, and (3) facilitation payments and political contribution, thus 
avoiding any confusing messages sent to employees and third parties.
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Data protection and security is a central element of the development for a 
company (Kerkhoff et al., 2012). The BSI (2007) favours the implementation of 
special hard- and software to detect fraudulent behaviour within an organization 
and to protect the IT infrastructure. The German Chamber of Commerce (2011, 
pp. 16-17) advises relocating sensitive functions like IT or Research and 
Development into separate buildings with restricted access.
Bishop and Hydolski (2009) suggest that it is essential for companies (1) to 
understand their own business, (2) to analyze its current environment, (3) to 
understand their past experience with fraud, and (4) to learn from others, how 
to fight against fraud and corruption. Doig and Riley (1997) recommend 
considering more universalisée strategies and including questions of culture, 
organization and the effectiveness of campaigns as well as timing and 
sequence when developing anti corruption strategies; these strategies have to 
be tailored to the social environment, in which corruption occurs. Luo (2004) 
argues that corruption is caused by an inadequate organizational structure and 
suggests improving the following organizational issues: (1) the organizational 
structure must fit to the needs and circumstances of the company, (2) corporate 
culture and values must be designed to oppose corruption, and (3) a 
compliance system including a code of conduct and an ethics programme has 
to be implemented. Business processes, which may hide corruptive actions, 
have to be analyzed and eventually to be redesigned (VDMA, 2010).
International organizations specialized in fighting against corruption and 
occupational fraud e.g. FCPA, OECD, IMF, Tl, World Bank or the EU can also 
support companies (Sandholtz and Gray, 2003). The Integrity Pact Tool (IP) 
was developed by Tl (Transparency International) to help governments, 
business and civil society working in combating corruption in the field of public 
contracting. Sometimes, even third parties can provide help. For example, 
corruption detection in Germany is of interest for the German Tax Authorities, 
because such wrongdoing is a crime not only in a legal, but also in a fiscal 
sense. During their regular tax audits, tax inspectors check companies with 
respect to corruption and bribing (VDMA, 2013).
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Hess and Dunfee (2000) recommend that (1) the implementation process has to 
be flexible and transparent, (2) the strategies have to fit for the company instead 
of being copied from others, (3) a problem-solving methodology rather than a 
blame-allocating one has to be implemented, and (4) all levels and functions of 
the organizations have to be involved into the process. Anand et al. (2009) 
advise that all strategies have to be implemented in a way that they are seen in 
a positive light which helps that they will be accepted by various stakeholders.
In summary, the strategies can be clustered into the following topics:
• Detection and assessing of fraud
• Ethics, company culture and leadership
• Organizational issues
• Personnel and HR issues
• Strategic issues
• Management of relations with other stakeholders and third parties
• Technologies
• Reporting/disclosure
The following table lists the variety of strategies for investors to prevent 
corruption and occupational fraud in FDIs as well as the authors, who discuss 
these strategies. To gain a better overview, all of the mentioned strategies of 
the literature have been clustered and summarized.
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Table 3: strategies how to avoid corruption and occupational fraud
Strategies how to avoid corruption and 
occupational fraud in FDIs
Authors
Detection of fraud **********
Assess!na fraud:
• Implementing a Risk Management to 
understand and to manage the 
company’s most important risks
• Knowing one’s business and identifying 
where one is vulnerable
• Categorizing, mapping, prioritizing and 
assessing any hypothetical fraud risks 
and manage these risks continuously; 
assessing likelihood and impact
• Including newer risks like pretexting or IT 
theft into consideration
• proactive fraud detection procedures like 
data analysis techniques
• IP and trademark monitoring programme
• Reputation monitoring (what are other 
stakeholders and third parties thinking of 
us?)
• Assessing past incidents of corruption 
and learning from them for the future
• Monitoring new requirements for being 
compliant with respect to new regulations
• Learning from past incidents and applying 
this knowledge to forecast future events
Doig (1998), Green (2004), Miller et 
al. (2005), Deloitte (2007), IAA, AICPA 
and ACFE (2008), Ashforth et al. 
(2008), Globalt Ansvar (2008), 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2008), 
Bishara and Schipani (2009), Bishop 
and Hydolski (2009 and 2009a), 
TRACE (2009), Kroll (2010), Ernst & 
Young (2011), German Chamber of 
Commerce (2011), Biegelman and 
Bartow (2012), Kerkhoff et al. (2012)
Detection techniques
• Implementing detection techniques (e.g. 
random audits, surveillance)
• Watching for “red flags” is essential
• Applying financial controls
• Implementing a whistle-blower hotline
• Implementing process controls e.g. 
reconciliations, independent reviews
• Closely observing the value chain
• Closely observing the purchasing, 
tendering and contracting processes
• Internal control is not a separate 
component but has to be embedded into 
the whole management process
• Controls have to break hierarchical 
structures
• Adjusting the fraud control to country 
specific issues, local environment and 
business models,
• Engaging with the results of the control to 
improve the detection techniques
• Regular stock checks
• Undertaking regular audits to foster 
continuous improvement
Center for Democracy and 
Governance (1999), Benfoddovâ et al. 
(2000), Huther and Shah (2000), 
Green (2004), O’Gara (2004), Del 
Castillo and Ampudia (2005), Miller et 
al. (2005), Deloitte (2007), Olken 
(2007), IAA, AICPA and ACFE (2008), 
Globalt Ansvar (2008), 
PriceWaterhouse Coopers (2008), Tl 
(2008a), Cleveland et al. (2009), 
Martin (2009), TRACE (2009), Kroll
(2010), VDMA (2010), Albrecht et al.
(2011), German Chamber of 
Commerce (2011), Biegelman and 
Bartow (2012), Kerkhoff et al. (2012)
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Detection of fraud (continued) Authors
Manaaina the detection activities:
• Implementing the right combination 
between monitoring and punishments
• Regularly checking the anti-corruption 
programmes and carrying out reviews 
and making plausibility checks
• Undertaking a cost benefit analysis of the 
fraud prevention activities
• Adjusting the control activities to the risks
• Confirming allegations and collecting 
evidence with the help of third parties and 
private investigators
• Undertaking the audits by unknown third 
parties to avoid any familiarization
• Balancing the level of control reasonably 
between rules and trust
• Carrying out strict and consequent 
prosecution and follow up of corrupt 
activities and therefore destroying 
confidence that corrupt activities are not 
reciprocated
e Prosecuting offenders as a fraud 
deterrent
e Avoiding non prosecution agreements 
with corrupt employees
• Selling these actions in a positive way to 
increase acceptance
• Including all parts of the company
Tirole (1986), Kaufmann (1997), 
Lambsdorff (2002), Glaeser and 
Goldin (2004), O’Gara (2004), Miller et 
al. (2005), Corporate Crime Reporter
(2007), Deloitte (2007), Olken (2007), 
DIHK (2008), Globalt Ansvar (2008), 
Hess and Ford (2008), IAA, AICPA 
and ACFE (2008), Fisman and Miguel
(2008), Lange (2008), 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2008), Tl
(2008), Anand et al. (2009), TRACE
(2009), VDMA (2010), Albrecht et al.
(2011), Tomlinson (2011), Biegelman 
and Bartow (2012) Kerkhoff et al.
(2012)
Ethical issues **********
Codes of ethics:
• Implementing clear written codes of ethics 
and corporate codes of conduct (e.g. the 
International Chamber of Commerce -  
ICC rules, the Sullivan principles or the C2 
principles developed by the Caux Round 
Table)
e Specifying the rules so that there are no 
grey areas for interpretation
• Determining which norm should 
predominate when there exist conflicting 
norms e.g. between the investor’s country 
and the host country
• Adopting norms regarding social 
responsibility
• Writing down code of ethics is not 
enough, an organization has to live them
e Adopting the codes to the culture
The Leon H. Sullivan Foundation 
(n.d.), Benfoddovâ et al. (2000), Hess 
and Dunfee (2000 and 2003), Doh et 
al. (2003), Luo (2004), Del Castillo 
and Ampudia (2005), Globalt Ansvar 
(2008), Kinney and Moore (2008), Tl 
(2008a), TRACE (2009), Biegelman 
and Bartow (2012), Kerkhoff et al. 
(2012)
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Ethical issues (continued) Authors
Comoanv culture:
• Finding ways to encourage effective 
self regulation and ways to improve 
the ethical culture of corporations
e Working on the social architecture of 
the company, namely the informal 
norms of behaviour within an 
organization 
e Anti-corruption must be made a strong 
part of the company culture 
e Fostering trust in organizations e.g. 
being a trustworthy employer, 
promoting employee benevolence and 
integrity, hiring honest employees, 
trust also promotes the formation of 
“horizontal networks of cooperation” 
among people which decreases the 
level of corruption
• Fostering self controls and social 
controls within the company
La Porta et al., (1997, p. 337), Hess 
and Dunfee (2000 and 2003), Poole- 
Robb and Bailey (2002), Luo (2004), 
Globalt Ansvar (2008), 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2008), 
Lange (2008), TRACE (2009), 
Albrecht et al. (2011), Tomlinson 
(2011), Biegelman and Bartow (2012), 
Kerkhoff et al. (2012)
Leadership:
e Implementing ethical leadership 
including a formal ethics programme 
and core ethical values in policies, 
processes and practices senior 
executives have to be involved into 
fraud control 
• Implementing top management as 
“illuminative good examples” 
e Implementing organizational 
leadership where the governing 
authority of the organization have the 
skills to implement a compliance and 
ethics programme
Tanzi (1998), Benfoddovâ et al. 
(2000), Luo (2004), Miller et al.
(2005), Deloitte (2007), Hess and 
Ford (2008), Kinney and Moore 
(2008), PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
(2008), Bishara and Schipani (2009), 
Bishop and Hydolski (2009, p.31), 
Ernst & Young (2011), Schwartz 
(2011), Biegelman and Bartow (2012)
Organizational issues **********
Location:
e Relocating sensitive functions like IT or 
R&D into separate buildings with 
restricted access or even outsourcing 
them
e Physical asset security (e.g. locking 
warehouses) 
e Physical limits of employee actions 
(limiting access to sensitive areas)
Miller et al. (2005), BSI (2007), Lange 
(2008), Cleveland et al. (2009), Kroll 
(2010), German Chamber of 
Commerce (2011)
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Organizational issues (continued) Authors
Processes:
• Implementing quality management and 
certifying processes
• Redesigning business process to 
eliminate corruptive actions and 
designing out corruption
• Tailoring the processes to fit the 
company’s needs and circumstances
• Taking care of transparent processes 
in the company
• Fragmentation of processes, 
separation of power and four eye 
principle, limiting authority
• Strict separation between business 
and private sphere
• Centralizing foreign subsidies with 
regard to decision making processes
• Implementing a transparent decision 
making process and transparent 
decisions
• Strong due diligence processes when 
one undertakes mergers and 
acquisitions of companies
• Reducing and scaling down 
regulations
• Working together in cross functional 
teams
• Eliminating opportunities to commit 
fraud i.e. “eliminating low hanging 
fruits”
Tirole (1986), Bartlett and Goshal 
(1987), Doig (1998), Tanzi (1998), 
Moran et al. (1999), Glaeser and 
Goldin (2004), Luo (2004), O’Gara
(2004), Del Castillo and Ampudia
(2005), Fink (2005), Miller et al. 
(2005), Ashforth et al. (2008), DIHK 
(2008), IAA,AICPA and ACFE (2008), 
Tl (2008a), Kroll (2010), Lingham 
(2010), VDMA (2010), Biegelman and 
Bartow (2012)
Resources:
• Early planning of resources for the FDI
• Allowing enough resources and time 
for the FDI process and the following 
periods of the operations
• Allowing enough resources for the 
corruption prevention activities
• Allowing enough resources for being 
able to be patient during the FDI 
process (no desperate need to bribe)
Kaufmann (1997), Poole-Robb and 
Bailey (2002), KPMG (2006), BSI 
(2007), Grisham (2010), Kroll (2010)
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Organizational issues (continued) Authors
Information:
• Information is relevant for 
management, therefore an extensive 
reporting has to be installed
e Informing about all relevant legal 
issues regarding corruption in the host 
country
• Implementing a whistle-blower-hotline 
to get insider information
e Getting enough background data (e.g. 
cultural issues) which can be 
correlated or have interdependencies 
with the level of corruption but are not 
visible in the first step
e Specifying policies regarding bribes, 
gifts, hospitality and donations to avoid 
grey zones
• Avoiding any confusing messages 
which can lead to grey areas and 
double standards (e.g. small bribes are 
allowed, but bigger ones are not 
allowed)
• Establishing a special association or 
NGO for SMEs to collect and to record 
information about corruption among 
SMEs
e Implementing non-disclosure
regulations within the company and 
non-disclosure agreements with 
externals
e Informing suppliers that they will be 
eliminated from consideration if they 
try to bribe company employees
e Collecting information from third 
parties (banks, media) and display the 
information internally
Klitgaard (1998a), Benfoddovâ et al. 
(2000), Poole-Robb and Bailey 
(2002), Hindess (2005),
McGregor (2005), Globalt Ansvar
(2008), DIHK (2008), Fisman and 
Miguel (2008), Tl (2008a), Martin
(2009), TRACE (2009), VDMA (2011), 
Kerkhoff et al. (2012)
Documentation:
e Documentation of fraud and corruption 
prevention techniques 
e Documentation of all relevant 
processes which can be hit by 
corruption
IAA, AICPA and ACFE (2008), VDMA 
(2011)
Intearation:
• Greater degrees of international 
integration and cooperation can foster 
the implementation of international 
norms
• Including all subsidiaries into the 
programme
• Including suppliers, agents and 
customers into anti-corruption activities
Klitgaard (1998a), Sandholtz and Gray 
(2003), McGregor (2005), Tl (2008a)
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Organizational issues (continued) Authors
Institutions:
• Implementing ombudsmen and 
compliance managers
• Implementing a crisis management 
team which has to assess the fraud 
risks and has to implement an d 
monitor appropriate strategies
• Implementing internal and external 
anti-corruption inspectors
• Establishing a special association or 
NGO for SMEs to collect and to record 
information about corruption among 
SMEs and to build coalitions between 
government agencies
• Implementing whistle blower hot lines 
(internal or provided by third parties) 
and whistle blower-protection, 
promising no retaliation for any reports 
about corrupt practices
• Implementing help lines for employees 
which supports them, if they have to 
deal with difficult ethical decisions like 
corruption
Doig (1998), Center for Democracy 
and Governance (1999), Benfoddovâ 
et al., (2000), Hess and Dunfee (2000 
and 2003), Poole-Robb and Bailey 
(2002), Del Castillo and Ampudia 
(2005), Hindess, (2005),
Deloitte (2007), DIHK (2008), Hess 
and Ford (2008),
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2008),
Tl (2008a), Albrecht et al. (2011), 
Ernst & Young (2011), VDMA (2011), 
Biegelman and Bartow (2012)
HR issues **********
People:
• Hiring trusted and competent 
managers and employees
• Screening employees initially in the 
recruitment process and later during 
the promotion process
• Continuous background checks of 
employees and regular performance 
reviews
• Exit management of employees (e.g. 
data audit to avoid data theft or 
conducting exit interviews)
• Reducing masculinity at the workplace 
(mixed teams, more females)
• Sending out the best and most 
qualified employees from the home 
base very early
• Working together in cross functional 
teams can promote ethical behaviour
• Immediately eliminating fraudsters
Tirole (1986), Swamy et al. (2001), 
McGregor (2005), Miller et al. (2005), 
Sanya! (2005), KPMG (2006), IAA, 
AICPA and ACFE (2008), Lingham
(2010), Kroll (2010), Burke (2011), 
German Chamber of Commerce
(2011), Biegelman and Bartow (2012)
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HR issues (continued) Authors
Pavment/comDensation/accountabilitv: Johnston (1998), Klitgaard (1998a), 
Tanzi (1998), Center for Democracy 
and Governance (1999), Moran et al. 
(1999), Hess and Dunfee (2003), 
McGregor (2005), Miller et al. (2005), 
Sanya! (2005), IAA, AICPA and ACFE 
(2008), Fisman and Miguel (2008), 
Lange (2008), Biegelman and Bartow 
(2012)
• Rewarding employees not only for the 
end result without considering the 
means (e.g. if they had paid a bribe to 
achieve the goal)
• Realigning incentives if they lead to 
unethical behaviour
• Employees have to sigh codes of 
ethics and have to confirm their 
participation of regular anti corruption 
trainings
• Paying acceptable salaries so that 
employees are not enforced to accept 
bribes but at the same time increasing 
the threat of punishment, if the 
employees behave corrupt
• Empowering employees
• Implementing stiff penalties (e.g. 
money) and punishment for corrupt 
employees
• Prosecuting wrongdoers rather than 
paying them to go away
• Increasing individual accountability for 
corruptive acts by transparent 
processes, audits and sanctions
• Overcoming the sense of impunity by 
“frying a few big fish,” but avoiding a 
“large-scale witch hunt” (Klitgaard, 
1998a, Box 2)
HR-control:
• One has to focus not only on corrupt 
processes and systems but also on 
corrupt individuals
• Implementing peer controls
• Asking managers to avoid social ties 
with politicians and government 
employees
• Assuming that especially in the 
procurement department, people are 
corrupt unless proven innocent
• Screening out dishonest (using past 
records, tests, predictors of honesty)
• Punishing perpetrators( frying a few 
big fish) to overcome the sense of 
impunity
• Controlling company policy violations 
continuously
Doig (1998), Klitgaard (1998a), 
McGregor (2005), Collins et al. (2009), 
German Chamber of Commerce 
(2011), Biegelman and Bartow (2012)
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HR issues (continued) Authors
HR -oraanization and manaaement:
• Rotating local staff and expatriates to 
destroy confidence and to avoid building 
up trusted networks
e Placing expatriates in key management 
positions instead of local managers
• Continuously controlling employees and 
managers to hinder them to override 
company rules and increase the risk of 
detection
e Eliminating unnecessary positions and 
reducing the number of employees
• Encouraging top managers to engage in 
professional industry networks
e Implementing clear internal rules and 
guidelines for employees, issuing codes 
of ethics and of conduct for them, and 
keeping these rules simple
• Training of executives and employees 
and facilitating access to information, anti 
corruption workshops which help to better 
understand corruption, executives also 
have to be trained
• Fostering social norms of open 
communication allowing employees to 
discuss their ethical concerns within the 
company
• Reducing the autonomy of employees
e Calibrating the possible penalties for
offenders in terms of deterrent effects
• Avoiding to mix personal and business 
issues (e.g. personal loans to directors)
Tirole (1986), Kaufmann (1997), Doig 
(1998), Klitgaard (1998a), Center for 
Democracy and Governance (1999), 
Hess and Dunfee (2000), Lambsdorff 
(2002), Doh et al. (2003), Del Castillo 
and Ampudia (2005), McGregor
(2005), Miller et al. (2005), Fjeldstad
(2006), Simmons & Simmons (2006), 
UNIDO and UNODC (2006), Deloitte
(2007), Di Rienzo et al. (2007), Wells
(2007), DIHK (2008), Globalt Ansvar
(2008), Hess and Ford (2008), IAA, 
AICPA and ACFE (2008), Lange 
(2008), PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
(2008), Tl (2008a), Bishop and 
Hydolski (2009), TRACE (2009), Kroll
(2010), Ernst & Young (2011), 
German Chamber of Commerce
(2011), Biegelman and Bartow (2012)
Strategic issues **********
e Implementing a fraud risk management 
including written policies and strategies
Deloitte (2007), IAA, AICPA and 
ACFE (2008),VDMA (2011)
• Implementing robust strategies i.e. to stay 
current with local, national and world 
events; continuously adding new 
strategies
Biegelman and Bartow (2012, p. 233)
• Avoiding the market entirely or adjusting 
the entry mode (e.g. joint ventures are 
more adequate, if the level of 
arbitrariness of corruption is high but if the 
level of pervasiveness of corruption in a 
host country is high, a wholly owned 
subsidiary is more adequate). In addition, 
a company may consider selling certain 
segments of its businesses, reorganizing 
its business or stopping their business in 
certain locations to mitigate fraud risks.
Smarzynska and Wei (2000), Doh et 
al. (2003), Rodriguez et al. (2005), 
Tekin-Koru (2006), 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2008), 
Biegelman and Bartow (2012)
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Strategic issues (continued) Authors
• Avoiding the lack of an overall strategy 
and coordination by implementing anti 
corruption programmes to prevent and to 
detect corruption and making them a top 
strategic management issue with active 
commitment of top management,
Klitgaard (1998a), Benfoddovâ et al. 
(2000), Doh et al. (2003), Miller et al. 
(2005), Simmons & Simmons (2006), 
Deloitte (2007), DIHK (2008), Kinney 
and Moore (2008), 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2008), 
Kroll (2010), VDMA (2010), Albrecht 
et al. (2011), Ernst & Young (2011)
• Strategies have to be tailored to the social 
and cultural environment to be effective 
and to be accepted by all stakeholders
Doig and Riley (1997), Hess and 
Dunfee (2003), Deloitte (2007), 
Fisman and Miguel (2008), Biegelman 
and Bartow (2012)
• Implementing multiple strategies to fight 
corruption instead of focusing on just a 
few aspects
Ashforth et al. (2008), Kinney and 
Moore (2008), Lange (2008)
• Implementing concrete actions instead of 
refining theories and processes
Doig (1998), Center for Democracy 
and Governance (1999)
• Safeguarding against unforeseen risks Kroll (2010)
• Buying insurance coverage against 
possible and likely risks
Kerkhoff et al. (2012)
• Not keeping with the FDI at all costs but 
also thinking about an early exit if 
problems become too severe
KPMG (2006), Biegelman and Bartow 
(2012)
Dealing with other stakeholders and third 
parties
**********
Cooperation:
• Working closely together with authorities, 
external counsels, prosecutors and non­
governmental organisations (e.g. 
Transparency International) to control, to 
verify, to assure and to improve the 
programmes -  national and international 
cooperation
• Participating in joint activities by groups of 
corporations to support government 
efforts in fighting corruption
• Building up integrity pacts (e.g. with 
government and other bidders to refrain 
from bribery and collusion
• Benchmarking with other companies, 
following the leaders
• SMEs should seek to receive support 
from larger companies and should work 
together with them
• Engaging in CSR (corporate social 
responsibility)
• Running workshops with other 
stakeholders
Tl (1990), Klitgaard (1998), Klitgaard 
(1998a), Robinson (1998), Center for 
Democracy and Governance (1999), 
Moran et al. (1999), Benfoddovâ et al. 
(2000), Doh et al. (2003), Hess and 
Dunfee (2003), Sandholtz and Gray 
(2003), Hindess (2005), UNIDO and 
UNODC (2006 and 2007), Globalt 
Ansvar (2008),
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2008), Tl 
(2008a), Cleveland et al. (2009), Hess 
(2009), Kraemer and van Tulder 
(2009), Kroll (2010)
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Dealing with other stakeholders and third 
parties (continued)
Authors
Manaaement of third parties:
• Imposing anti-corruption standards 
and integrity procedures on business 
partners, agents and other commercial 
intermediaries
• Including codes of conduct and non 
disclosure agreements into purchasing 
and selling contracts
• Communicating to vendors and 
business partners about fraud and 
training them
• Closely observing outsourced activities 
within the value chain and assessing 
other stakeholders (e.g. background 
checks of suppliers)
• Selecting agents carefully (screening 
out dishonest ones, circumvent 
nepotism, use networks to find honest 
ones)
Klitgaard (1998a), Hess and Dunfee 
(2000), Doh et al. (2003), Hess and 
Dunfee (2003), O’Gara (2004), Miller 
et al. (2005), Simmons & Simmons 
(2006), UNIDO and UNODC (2006 
and 2007), Deloitte (2007), DIHK
(2008), IAA, AICPA and ACFE (2008), 
Tl (2008a), Bishop and Hydolski
(2009), TRACE (2009), Ernst & Young 
(2011), VDMA (2010 and 2011), 
German Chamber of Commerce 
(2011)
Manaaement of local authorities / 
qovernment/the public:
• Gaining an understanding of the 
robustness and the behaviour of local 
government
• Reducing the number of transactions 
involving public officials
• Making social contributions and public 
donations instead of bribes, which 
helps to obtain the needed services 
without braking law or ethics and 
which helps to strengthen civil society
• Community or grassroots participation 
in the monitoring of corruption
• Implementing CSR (Corporate Social 
Responsibility) with the society outside 
the business environment)
• Avoiding that the business is 
dependent on one individual for 
access to government officials
Johnston (1998), Huther and Shah 
(2000), Doh et al. (2003), McGregor 
(2005), Svensson (2005), Olken 
(2007), Kroll (2010), Lin (2010), 
Omazic (2010), Sackmann and 
Horstmann (2010)
technologies **********
• Using technology in fraud detection 
and monitoring (e.g. IT security, 
computer forensic examinations)
Deloitte (2007), IAA, AICPA and 
ACFE (2008), Kroll (2010)
• Sharing knowledge of trends and 
history of incidents and risks (e.g. with 
a Microsoft Sharepoint System)
IAA, AICPA and ACFE (2008),
• Improving IT and communication 
strategies and technologies across all 
affiliated companies of the investor
BSI (2007), Di Rienzo et al. (2007)
• Installing CRM software and other 
technology solutions to promote data 
control and transparency
McGregor (2005)
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Technologies (continued) Authors
• Implementing an accounting system 
which cannot be altered to hide 
fraudulent activities (e.g. with a 
document management system)
Cleveland et al. (2009)
• Fighting against corruption with
transparency (e.g. the use of electronic 
sources like the FCPA Blog)
Cleveland et al. (2009)
Reporting/disclosure **********
• Implementing a documented reporting 
process to solicit input on potential 
fraud and other risks
IAA, AICPA and ACFE (2008)
• Open and transparent financial
disclosure, implementing a voluntarily 
disclosure programme and publicly 
reporting on the anti-corruption policies 
including sustainability reports
Center for Democracy and 
Governance (1999), Cleveland et al. 
(2009), Hess (2009)
• Accurate records and record keeping 
of funding of third parties (e.g. 
donations to organizations)
Marquette and Doig (2004)
Doh et al. (2003, p. 125) conclude that firms have to consider the above
mentioned whole range of strategies, because none of them alone
comprehensively addresses corruption and occupational fraud, “but at best, 
each reflects a partial solution”. Lange (2008, p. 722) adds, that “corruption 
control types are complex constructs best viewed in the multidimensional
context of organizational corruption control overall” and cannot be viewed
isolated. Urcuyo Fournier (2008, p. 12) discloses, that all of the above 
mentioned strategies “have to be embedded in the reality of Central America” 
which faces increased violence, organized crime, maras (youth gangs), poverty 
and drug consumption and drug trafficking.
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2.9. Problems which can arise during the implementation process of the 
strategies
Williams and Beare (1999) criticize the four main weaknesses of current anti­
corruption concepts in the following way: (1) the concepts are disconnected 
from the social, political and economic context and from conditions of nations, 
states and local communities, (2) the concepts exclusively have an economic 
focus, (3) the concepts are mostly based on Western business initiatives (e.g. 
privatization and liberalization) as the key solutions to the problem regardless of 
national circumstances and contexts, and (4) the corruption issues are 
oversimplified. Rose-Ackerman (2006, p. XXXVII) argues that “too much 
moralizing can lead into empty rhetoric” and that one has to address the 
underlying conditions that create corruption to have a long lasting effect. Doig 
(1998, p. 99) recommends that “one needs a thorough practical understanding 
of corruption” and not only theoretical knowledge.
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2008) explains that in many companies, the 
awareness of the problem has increased but they still underestimate their risk of 
future fraud exposure. This “highlights a dangerous gap between perception 
and reality”, because “the corporate focus has moved away from the risk of 
fraud” which makes managers feeling comfortable and thereby neglecting future 
oriented proactive actions (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2009; Ernst & Young,
2011, p.16).
Hess and Ford (2008) warn that there exists a limit of deterring corruption 
through enforcement and explain, that whole companies or corrupt managers 
try to hide information about corruptive acts and hinder disclosure of violations 
because they fear prosecution. Tirole (1986) adds that corruption is growing fast 
when the information needed to fight corruption is not given to the principal or is 
manipulated. When corrupt employees are not willing to stop corruption, it is 
very difficult to change their habit (Aidt, 2003). While it is relatively easy to 
improve the infrastructure of an organization, it is hard to reduce the risk caused 
by “the human factor” (Stachowicz-Stanusch, 2010, p. 43).
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Hess and Dunfee (2000) explain that the implementation of anti-corruption 
principles may provide little guidance to firms because they are very general 
and they neglect real life. O’Higgins (2006, p.249) brings in that “codes of 
conduct are likely to be effective only if all industry competitors adopt and 
enforce them and that the diversity of companies and cultures in some sectors 
makes it difficult to impose the discipline and consistency of approach 
necessary to combat corruption”. Schwab (1996, p. 499) argues, that good 
ethics are not always good for business because “business behaviour of 
questionable ethical standards is common” and not taking part in them can lead 
to competitive disadvantages since they are costly and they take away choice 
and flexibility in decision making.
VDMA (2010) argues that corruption prevention is very often managed as an 
operative issue instead of a strategic one, which results in a low degree of 
sustainability of the activities because they are not properly implemented in the 
regular working processes. In general, underfunding, time constraints, financial 
pressures and conflicts between competitive and ethical interests are the 
greatest barriers for companies (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008). Especially 
SMEs face human, financial and managerial constraints and they frequently 
have difficulties in accessing information on anti-corruption legislation which can 
limit their implementation capacity for successful anti corruption strategies 
(UNIDO and UNODC, 2006; The World Bank, 2000). A confusing message to 
employees arises from applying double standards when a company on the one 
hand pays grease money and allows small payments but on the other hand 
does not tolerate large bribes (TRACE, 2009).
Soreide (2007) explains, that it is very difficult for private companies to fight 
against corruption in public tendering processes because the competition of the 
market works against it and one needs a much broader approach than just 
focusing on bribes; she summarizes that there exists a grey area between 
corruption, lobbying and political pressure which is very difficult to separate. 
Svensson (2005) states that most anti corruption initiatives focus on the public 
sector, therefore neglecting to monitor and to fight corruption between private 
companies or in private organizations. UNIDO and UNODC (2007) and the 
Center for Democracy and Governance (1999) list organizational constraints for
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SMEs in the implementation process of effective anti corruption strategies: (1) 
there exists no work split and the separation of responsibilities, (2) the 
owner/manager tends to assume all management responsibilities in one person, 
and (3) reporting mechanisms and whistle blower hotlines are difficult to 
maintain due to the relatively high degree of informality and financial 
constraints.
According to Glaeser and Goldin (2004), the separation of power which can 
create incentives to prosecute corruption is overstated, because in cases, 
where there exists a high degree of corruption, the separation of power is 
difficult to maintain. The World Bank (2000) adds that a high concentration of 
power by vested interests can hinder the separation of powers. The World Bank 
(2000) lists hurdles for companies during the implementation process like (1) 
risk of complacency and back stepping after the successful implementation of 
the strategies (2) cronyism and conflict of interest (3) weak structures for 
monitoring and accountability or (4) powerful groups block further reforms to 
preserve their advantages. On the one hand, Varese (1997) warns that the 
costs of learning new concepts to reduce corruption and the implementation of 
these ideas in the organization should not be underestimated. On the other 
hand, TRACE (2009) argues that expected difficulties during the implementation 
and transition period of anti-corruption-strategies have proven to be short lived 
and pay out well in the long run.
Additional threats can arise from internal and external stakeholders. Third 
parties can hinder the company’s anti bribery strategies (Cleveland et al., 2009) 
or employees and management try to override anti corruption control 
mechanisms (ACFE, 2008). While a lot of companies have formal processes to 
assess agents and other commercial intermediaries, some managers express 
scepticism about the value of such due diligence checks because 
intermediaries are too valuable to be deeply checked (Simmons & Simmons,
2006) and especially SMEs lack the negotiation power and do not get enough 
support from the government, the civil society, the media and their customers to 
impose anti-corruption standards on business partners (UNIDO and UNODC,
2007). The solution chosen by many companies is to engage consulting firms or 
agents who act as middlemen in corrupt transactions and the foreign executives
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preserve their sanity by not asking “unnecessary” questions -  “don’t ask, don’t 
tell” (McGregor, 2005, pp. 120-121). Clissold (2010) discloses that even 
governmental organizations fighting against corruption as well as even police 
can be corrupt.
Employees generally are reluctant to implement new routines. According to 
Lazorenko (2010, p. 284), only 15% of people are supporting innovations, while 
85% resist, criticize or sabotage them. Kerkhoff et al. (2012, p. 84) state, that it 
takes years to implement a well working “compliance culture” within an 
organization. Once companies have lost contracts to corruptive competitors 
almost half of them think about adjusting to “the local business culture” the next 
time which in many cases can include the option of active bribery (Soreide, 
2006, p. 401). Clissold (2010, xxii) states that “the age-old problem of corruption 
in the middle ranks persists” and politicians have to make huge efforts to 
transmit anti-corruption policies to the local level and into the organizations.
It is important to encourage many different actors participating in whistle blower 
activities because no specific actor dominates the revelation of fraud (Dyck et 
al., 2007) and one has to consider the “paradox of whistle blowing” when doing 
so (ibid, p.36): those with weakest incentive to blow the whistle are the most 
active and they must be well protected to continue whistle-blowing. Dyck et al. 
(2007) also argue that stronger incentives to whistle blowing can result in an 
excessive amount of false claims. And finally, audits may sometimes not have 
detected sufficient evidence to find out corrupt activities or may not have had a 
larger impact since the punishments have been relatively weak (Olken, 2007).
Fortunately, Ryan (2000, p. 332) concludes that although “corruption in 
economic and political life is a key challenge of the 21st century”,[...] there is a 
new and growing consensus that corruption can be confronted, curbed, 
contained and, perhaps, in the forthcoming millennium if not fully conquered, at 
least greatly minimized.” Klitgaard (1998) advises that not all strategies can be 
implemented at once and one has to do a cost-benefit analysis to eliminate the 
greatest economic costs of corruption with limited funds and resources. Finally, 
McGregor (2005, p. 122) summarizes that “as corrupt countries become more 
wealthy and sophisticated” it is getting easier to avoid corruption.
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2.10. Summary of the literature review and implications for this research
This section will condense the main critical aspects of the literature review with 
respect to corruption and occupational fraud and will also transmit them to the 
economic environment of El Salvador.
Corruption and occupational fraud have been existent in many cultures in the 
world and are not new social problems. However, they became more important 
in recent years, since many businesses are forced to expand their operations 
and have to globalize to stay competitive. In doing so, they have to deal with 
cultures, which are different to the one they already know. A lot of SMEs are not 
yet well prepared for “going international” since (1) their organizations do not 
poses profound knowledge of establishing and operating abroad, (2) they 
underestimate the cultural differences in the host country and (3) they are in 
general very tight on resources e.g. personnel, finances and time to support 
their FDIs. Additional threats arise in the host country itself. Especially emerging 
market economies like El Salvador still lack (1) a well developed infrastructure, 
(2) suffer from weaker governments because these organizations have not yet 
adopted to democratic structures (3) in general have a shortage of skilled and 
honest workforce and (4) the ethical standards are well above of the ones in the 
home base resulting in a higher level of crime in general and corruption and 
occupational fraud in particular.
Investors have to expect a higher level of corruption in emerging economies like 
El Salvador, since this investment destination has to suffer from a colonial past, 
which is strongly influenced by the Spanish culture. As a result there exists a 
collectivistic culture in Central America, accompanied by a high degree of 
uncertainty avoidance, Catholicism, a high level of “machismo” and power 
distance. In addition, El Salvador underwent a difficult process of transformation 
from its colonial past, followed by a totalitarian regime and a long lasting civil 
war. Since the beginning of the 1990s, democratic governments have been 
installed, but such massive political and social changes make the country more 
prone to corruption. A low level of income, high rates of crime and a poor 
infrastructure are additional factors, which foster corruption in El Salvador. And 
finally, corruption in general is a cultural phenomenon, which is still well
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accepted as a way of “doing business”. Within a FDI, corruption is fostered by 
corrupt individuals, which can operate in a company’s or industry’s environment 
(e.g. infrastructure projects) that does not control and prosecute corruption. 
Unfortunately, the longer corruption exists, the more difficult it is to eradicate it.
Cressey’s fraud triangle depicts the three factors which influence the level of 
corruption and fraud: (1) the opportunity to commit the criminal act e.g. there 
exists a lack of controls in the company, (2) the pressure of the wrongdoer e.g. 
severe financial pressure of the wrongdoer and (3) the rationalization of the 
wrongdoer i.e. it is socially acceptable for his to commit the criminal action 
because it is a well accepted behaviour in El Salvador and everyone born in El 
Salvador grew up with corruption.
All investors have to suffer from high levels of corruption, because corruption 
makes their investment destination less attractive for investors (e.g poor 
infrastructure resulting in higher operating costs). Especially SME’s are more 
exposed to corruption and occupational fraud, since they lack the internal 
resources (e.g. time, money, knowledge) and they are in a weaker position 
when dealing with government agencies to obtain essential services or to get 
new business. As a result, SMEs lose considerably more money on corruption 
than bigger companies, resulting in a lower overall profitability of their business, 
which sometimes can even result in the loss of the whole investment in El 
Salvador. Any positive effects of corruption for SME’s are controversially 
discussed in the literature. While some authors suggest, that corruption can 
“grease the wheels of commerce” others state, that it would be 
counterproductive.
SME’s are advised to map any possible exposure to corruption and occupation 
fraud and to implement strict controls throughout the value chain to detect any 
red flags. However, in doing so, investors need to know their business very well. 
In addition, management has to establish a culture, which makes anti corruption 
and anti-fraud a top management issue and a part of the company culture. This 
must also be written down in a code of ethics of the organization.
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HR management is one key strategy to avoid employing “bad apples” in the 
company. During the recruiting process, one has to scan employees in depth; 
one has to control employees continuously and has to fire prosecutors 
immediately. Maintaining a good business climate, paying and treating people 
fair, training them and taking care of them are additional HR strategies to 
reduce the level of corruption, since employees will become more loyal towards 
their employers. In addition, many authors suggest implementing whistle blower 
hotlines, where loyal employees can anonymously report any corruptive acts. 
Due to the fact, that HR is closely related with the culture, where an 
organization is embedded, all strategies have to be adjusted to the cultural 
environment of El Salvador.
Processes have to be streamlined and well designed to become effective, which 
can reduce corruption and occupational fraud. Installing trusted employees into 
key positions will support management to supervise the whole value chain. 
However, all this cannot be accomplished without installing continuous controls, 
which have to be updated based on past incidents as well as on knowledge, 
which should be shared with peers, NGOs and governmental institution fighting 
against corruption and occupational fraud.
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3. Methodology
3.1. Research question: aims and objectives
Foreign direct investments into developing countries are riskier and have a 
higher degree of uncertainty and unknown challenges compared with 
investments into developed countries which fulfil more or less the same 
standards as the investor’s home country. This research problem derived from 
professional experience because a lot of companies currently undertake FDIs 
into developing countries and have to deal with corruption and occupational 
fraud as major threats for the existence and the profitability of their FDIs. The 
outcome of this study was to identify critical success factors and relevant 
problems as well as “practically oriented solutions” and thus helping managers 
of German SMEs and even investors from other countries to implement and to 
operate FDIs in El Salvador and other Latin American countries successfully.
3.2. Qualitative vs. quantitative approach
Finding strategies to detect and to avoid the threats of corruption and 
occupational fraud was a real world problem, which could be solved through 
qualitative research (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Finding and investigating 
suitable strategies for SME’s was preferably done qualitatively because “it is 
conventional to correlate investigation with a qualitative approach” (Girod- 
Séville and Ferret, 2001, p. 79) Qualitative data have been collected and 
analyzed to create a theory that explained relationships between the facts and 
allowed the production of management knowledge “for the sake of knowledge” 
(Patton, 2002, p. 10). Corruption and occupational fraud were very difficult to 
explain and have been very complex phenomena. Qualitative research methods 
were “well suited to explore complex research problems with high levels of 
uncertainty and a need to act flexible and to deal with fair amounts of ambiguity” 
(Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p. 14).
During their investment process, managers have to make decisions based on 
their subjective evaluations. Within the fieldwork of this research, managers’ 
decisions based on the researcher’s subjective perception have been observed.
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Girod-SéviIle and Perret (2001, p. 81) state that a qualitative approach “allows 
both the subjectivity of the researcher and that of the subjects at the same time” 
because it offered the researcher an opportunity to confront multiple realities.
There existed many varieties of corrupt behaviour and multiple factors were 
contributing to corruption (de Graaf, 2007). Therefore, identifying and managing 
anti-corruption and anti-fraud strategies in companies were not single actions 
but a process which took different steps till a company had successfully 
implemented them. Patton (2002, p. 159) highly recommends qualitative inquiry 
for studying process due to the following reasons:
• Depicting processes required detailed descriptions of how people 
engaged with each other e.g. how managers cooperated within the 
organization and with external stakeholders when they have been 
confronted with corruption, occupational fraud or other types of crime.
• The experience of processes typically varied for different people, so their 
experiences needed to be captured in their own words e.g. an HR 
manager faced other problems than a CFO or a sales manager
• Process was fluid and dynamic; different departments of an organization 
were involved in the process in different times: e.g. first, one needed a 
permission to start a business in El Salvador and the owners have been 
faced with bribes towards authorities; after the establishment of the 
business, employees in the purchasing department have been offered 
bribes to prefer a corrupt supplier
• Participants' perceptions were a key process consideration: different 
managers had different perceptions as well as other stakeholders and 
people from different cultures.
Corbin and Strauss ( 2008, p.13) add that qualitative researchers “are drown to 
the fluid, evolving, and dynamic nature of this approach in contrast to the more 
rigid and structured format of quantitative methods” since the researcher had to 
interact with the people involved into corruption to find out behavioural patterns.
Prospective investors were interested to learn from the experience of German 
companies which have already successfully managed to reduce or to eliminate 
corruption within their companies. Patton (2002, p. 161) states that qualitative
research was a good method for implementation evaluation, because 
“implementation evaluation told decision makers what was going on in the 
programme” e.g. the implementation of a whistle blower programme, how the 
programme had developed and “how and why the programme deviated from 
initial plans and expectations” (ibid). Such deviations had been quite common in 
FDIs into emerging economies like El Salvador due to a high level of uncertainty 
and companies needed to know such deviations in advance to avoid them. In 
addition, corruption could have been attributed to almost anything and “the 
degree of corruption varies widely among individuals, public agencies, 
administrative cultures, and geographic regions” (de Graaf, 2007, p. 42).
Quantitative data are described by Saunders et al. (2009) as numerical data or 
data that have been quantified (e.g. by scaling). Quantitative approaches are 
correlated to verification and testing of theories and they offer a higher degree 
of objectivity (Girod-Séville and Ferret, 2001). However, the necessary 
strictness and the lower degree of flexibility with a sensitive topic like corruption 
made a quantitative research less suitable for this research question (Saunders 
et al., 2009) because the quantification of data was not a priority for the 
development of anti corruption strategies and “controlling variables to measure 
their effect” has not been the primary concern of this research (Hammersley et 
al., 2011, p. 4). In addition, the collection of quantitative data would not have 
answered the “how question” -  how can SMEs avoid the threat of corruption 
(Yin, 2009; Pratt, 2009). A quantitative survey would “have missed the powerful 
way that current experiences were shaped by the organizational history 
especially through myths and stories” (Lànsisalmi et al., 2004, p. 249). De Graaf 
and Huberts (2008, p. 640) add that quantitative research could not have 
accounted for contingency which was very important for this research caused 
by the complexity of the phenomena of corruption and occupational fraud.
Questionnaires are very often used to collect quantitative data (Saunders et al., 
2009). Corruption and occupational fraud have been sensitive topics. A 
weakness of a questionnaire for this research could have been that words or 
questions within the questionnaire were loaded, which could have resulted in “a 
social desirability bias” of the answers or even wrong answers and could have 
offended the interviewees (Oppenheim, 1992, p. 138). In addition, the use of
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questionnaires could have missed the huge continuum of problems and 
problem solving strategies related with corruption and occupational fraud in 
companies (Patton, 2002). A questionnaire may have restricted the interviewee 
to think in the box and not to reflect about additional ideas how to fight against 
corruption.
Furthermore, questionnaires could have hindered an unfolding research. Based 
on the fact, that corrupt activities in organizations were mostly hidden, the 
existing knowledge was more of a theoretical nature. Therefore, an unfolding 
research was better applicable than a pre-structured research because at the 
beginning of the research, it was not clear, what questions and what data will 
come up; since “these thinks will unfold as the study progresses” (Punch, 2006, 
p. 157). Finally, due to the small size of German companies, the sample size for 
implementing quantitative research methods would not have been sufficient 
(Oppenheim, 1992; Pallant, 2007).
3.3. Philosophical and epistemological underpinnings
3.3.1. Inductive Approach
The aim of this research was to develop successful strategies how to avoid 
corruption and occupational fraud by observing, how German investors deal 
with these problems in El Salvador. Saunders et al. (2009, pp. 127 and 593) 
describe that induction “involves the development of a theory as a result of the 
observation of empirical data” and that induction emphasises the collection of 
qualitative data. Hamel et al. (1993, p. 17) support this view and state that 
social life must be seen “as a process or a movement which could only be 
understood if the meanings assigned to it by its own actors were incorporated 
within it.”
By observing German FDIs in El Salvador and analyzing how they deal with 
corruption, it was intended to apply this knowledge for investors into other 
Central American countries where they have to deal with similar problems. 
Punch (2006, p. 153) therefore supports an inductive approach “because the 
research is moving upwards in levels of abstraction”.
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3.3.2. Interpretivism
It was important to understand managers in their role as social actors. 
Interpretivism advocates that this understanding was necessary because 
humans play an important part in the management process where “they 
interpret the situation in their own way and act in accordance with this 
interpretation” (Saunders et al., 2009, p. 116). The ontological view of 
interpretivists presumes that “the nature of reality is constructed, interpreted and 
experienced by people in their interaction with each other and with wider social 
systems” (Voce, 2004, p. 2). Voce (2004, p. 3) explains the role of interpretivist 
research as “to study mental, social and cultural phenomena -  in an endeavour 
to understand why people behave in a certain way” (i.e. why managers have 
made a specific decision to solve a concrete problem when dealing with 
corruption or occupational fraud).
The interpretivist way of reasoning and validation for this research was inductive 
(Girod-Séville and Ferret, 2001, p. 25). Saunders et al. (2009) recommend a 
qualitative data collection to investigate the management processes of German 
companies within the interpretivist research philosophy, using small samples 
and in depth investigations. This approach is supported by Mackenzie and 
Knipe (2006, p. 197) who state that interpretivists use qualitative data like 
“interviews, observations, document reviews and visual data analysis”.
3.3.3. Pragmatism
The researcher was interested to find out what could be suitable strategies to 
avoid the threats of corruption and occupation fraud when implementing and 
managing a FDI in El Salvador. Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) argue that the 
most important reason for undertaking a study is what is of value for the 
researcher and what he can apply to help others with his research. Pragmatists 
are problem centred and are interested in the consequences of actions e.g. the 
consequences of corruptive behaviour in organizations (Mackenzie and Knipe, 
2006). “Pragmatism argues that the most important determinant of the research 
philosophy adopted is the research question.” (Saunders et al., 2009, p. 598). 
Mackenzie and Knipe (2006, p. 196) add, that “pragmatists are not committed to
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any one system of philosophy or reality but focus on the research problem as 
central and apply all approaches to understand the problem”. Corruption and 
occupational fraud are very complex phenomena (de Graaf, 2007) and 
therefore, different perspectives have been required to collect and to interpret 
data. Pragmatists take these different perspectives as well as collective 
knowledge under temporal aspects (i.e. knowledge from different stakeholders) 
into consideration (Corbin and Strauss, 2008).
3.4. Data gathering
With respect to data sources “grounded theory as a base of case study often 
applies triangulation, namely combines different types of data collected by 
interviews, participative observation and analysis” (Lànsisalmi et al., 2004, p.
242). Corbin and Strauss (2008) add that one of the virtues of qualitative 
research is that there are many sources of data. Goulding (1999, p. 7) states 
that “grounded theory requires an understanding of related theory and empirical 
work in order to enhance theoretical sensitivity”. This position is supported by
Due to time and financial constraints, the researcher needed “the classic trade­
offs between breadth and depth” (Patton, 2002, p. 227) in finding the 
appropriate sample size of companies in El Salvador. Yin (2009, pp. 43 and 53) 
argues that “single case studies do not necessarily offer a poor basis for 
generalizing, but replicating the findings in a second or even third case will 
strengthen the research” and that “the evidence from multiple cases is 
considered more compelling and more robust”. For this research, just a few 
“illuminative” and “deviant” cases have been chosen, because “such cases 
were cases, one could learn most from” (Patton, 2002, pp. 230-233).
As a result about 20 in depth, semi-structured interviews had been 
undertaken. The small number of interviews allowed the researcher to find key 
informants e.g. CEOs of various companies within a reasonable time horizon. In 
contrast to a quantitative research where a minimum number of cases would 
have been necessary to generalize the research results, just a few cases have 
been required because even one good case would have illuminated the working 
of a social system (Mitchell, 2011; Yin, 2009). The interviewees have been
75
sampled in an opportunistic approach. Fieldwork often involves “on-the-spot 
decisions” about sampling to take advantage of new opportunities during the 
data collection which cannot be made in advance (Patton, 2002, p. 240). The 
German-Salvadorian Chamber of Commerce as well as close relatives of the 
researcher, who immigrated to El Salvador 45 years ago together with some of 
their friends, helped the researcher to gain access to companies and to find 
interview partners, which had been willing to talk honestly about this sensitive 
research topic. The fieldwork was accomplished during a two week visit in El 
Salvador. The multi-site qualitative research (about 10 sites have been visited) 
allowed a cross-site comparison and the generalization of the data which made 
the findings more robust (Herriott and Firestone, 1983).
3.5. Data sources
The following qualitative data sources for the research, which are also 
discussed by Yin (2009) have been used
• Interviews were a good method “to find out things that cannot be 
observed directly” (Patton, 2002, p. 340). Hintikka (2000) supports 
questioning as a useful model for many different types of knowledge- 
seeking. Corbin and Strauss (2008, p. 27) recommend that “the most 
data dense interviews are those that are unstructured and not dictated by 
any predetermined set of questions”. However, responses could be 
biased due to an expected social outcome (Klaiber, 2005) and it may be 
difficult to recruit busy people for interviews (Oppenheim, 1992). Based 
on the facts, that (1) there could exist a different understanding about 
corruption between the interviewer and the interviewee, (2) corruption 
was a very sensitive topic, (3) some interviewees had been hesitant in 
the first step to talk about corruptive activities and (4) corruption 
comprised a lot of activities which at the beginning of the interview have 
not been very clear, semi-structured interviews had been 
implemented. More open questions allowed the researcher a higher 
degree of flexibility and gave the interviewee the chance to discuss a 
greater variety of issues and bring in personal experiences. Semi-
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structured interviews helped the interviewer to act more flexible because 
each interviewee had his own understanding and had different 
experiences and encounters with corruption and fraud. The idea of such 
an interview was not primarily to gather data but to collect “ideas” how to 
fight against corruption (Oppenheim, 1992, p. 67). Girtler (2001, p. 147 
and 2009, pp. 106-107) describes this type of interview as an “ero-epical 
dialogue” where the researcher as well as the interviewee felt 
comfortable and both were interested to discuss possible strategies to 
reduce the corruption within organisations. Such a kind of dialogue did 
not bore the interviewee and the interpersonal communication allowed 
the interviewees to talk more freely about loaded topics like corruption 
and occupational fraud which they normally do not like (Girtler, 2001). 
Interviews had been written down but were not recorded, which 
encouraged the interviewees to talk more freely. Due to cultural 
differences, language problems and differences in the understanding of 
such a sensitive topic like corruption, it was necessary that the 
researcher as well as the interviewee had a common understanding of 
the information disclosed and obtained within the interview. Therefore, 
after having written down the interview, the researcher summarized the 
key findings at the end of the interviews for further discussion and gave 
the interviewee the chance to add comments or missing information.
• Literature, documentation and archival records have been additional 
sources of information for this research question; however access to 
internal data of the companies was mostly neglected or incomplete 
(Patton, 2002) and all documents had to be “critically evaluated to 
assess their value” (Wallace and Wray, 2006, p. 4). Yin (2009) 
recommends supporting textbooks and articles as additional sources of 
case study evidence. Corruption is embedded into organizations and 
“much can be learned about an organization, its structure, and how it 
functions [...] by studying its reports, correspondence, and internal 
memos” (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p. 39).
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• D irect observations provided a check on what was reported in 
interviews but were limited due to timely constraints for the research 
(Patton, 2002; Corbin and Strauss, 2008). However, Yin (2009, pp. 109- 
111) supports this method, because a case study should take place in 
the natural setting of the “case”, which could give a good opportunity for 
observations like company facilities or management processes. Direct 
observations helped the researcher to get a feeling about the context of 
the research. Corbin and Strauss (2008) argue that it is very important to 
know this context since it sets the conditions, in which corruption and 
occupational fraud arise and to which involved persons respond through 
some form of action. During the fieldwork, the researcher occasionally 
asked the companies for permission to take pictures, thus enriching the 
written documents.
Brainstorming about the results and generating additional ideals helped the 
researcher to seek clarification about the obtained research results (Saunders 
et al., 2009). Such an iterative process brought up a broad range of new 
perspectives and ideas to illuminate the research with new ideas. In addition, 
discussing the results with experts and asking questions about the findings of 
the results helped to triangulate the findings, allowed the researcher to include 
such new knowledge into future interviews and have been important tools to 
analyze the data because it enabled the researcher to probe the data, to 
become acquainted with the data and to “think outside of the box” (Corbin and 
Strauss, 2008, p. 69).
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3.6. Grounded Theory to analyze the data
“Grounded theory has been developed by Glaser and Strauss in 1967” and “is a 
specific methodology for the purpose of building theory from data” (Corbin and 
Strauss, 2008, p.1). Glaser and Strauss (2010) state that theory for any social 
units (e.g. FDIs in El Salvador) can be generated through a constant process of 
data collection and data analyses which finally has to be brought to a close 
“when the researcher is convinced that his conceptual framework forms a 
systematic theory” (ibid, p.224). Grounded Theory depends on methods that 
take the researcher into and close to the real world (i.e. the world of investors in 
Central America) “so that the results and findings are grounded in the empirical 
world rather than in the laboratory” (Patton, 2002, p. 124). The theory from this 
fieldwork was inductively generated and “emerged from the researcher’s 
observations and interviews” (Patton, 2002, p. 11). Royer and Zarlowski (2001, 
p. 114) describe the data analysis of Grounded Theory as an “iterative process 
with interaction between data, analysis and theory”. The data collection and 
analysis are iterative processes which “allowed a theory development which 
was grounded in empirical evidence” (Hartley, 2004, p. 329).
Smythe and Giddings (2007, p. 44) define Grounded Theory “as a methodology 
of asking questions about processes” and therefore helped to evaluate 
management processes in El Salvador. Patton (2002, p. 127) states that 
Grounded Theory “is meant to build theory rather than to test theory”. Grounded 
Theory fitted very well for the data analysis of this research question because 
the research has been done in the real world of German investors operating in 
Latin America and the outcome of this research was to generate practical 
knowledge for prospective investors in El Salvador to prevent corruption and 
occupational fraud. This approach is supported by Lànsisalmi et al. (2004, p.
243) who highly recommend Grounded Theory in organizational research 
because “it produces descriptions of organizational reality, which forms a basis 
for positive organizational development trends”. Royer and Zarlowski (2001, p. 
114) state that the main objective of Grounded Theory is to “construct an 
explanatory theory about a social phenomenon based on the identification of 
regularities” i.e. to find successful strategies based on gathering information 
from companies which have already invested in El Salvador.
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The five stages of analyzing the collected data for Grounded Theory of this 
research have been summarized as follows (Corbin and Strauss, 2008; Glaser 
and Strauss, 2010; Saunders et al., 2009, pp. 490-491):
1. Coding the key points and themes of the collected data
2. Grouping the codes into similar concepts
3. Forming categories from the concepts
4. Drawing and verifying conclusions
5. Generating anti corruption strategies for German SMEs in El Salvador 
based on the categories, discovered patterns and relationships
Glaser and Strauss (2010, pp. 105) describe these analytic steps as the 
“constant comparative method” because “the comparison and the integration of 
the categories and their properties and the following delimitation and generation 
of theory is a continuously growing process where each step is transformed to 
the next and earlier steps do remain in operation simultaneously”. Goulding 
(1999) supports this approach by advising that, as soon as the data have been 
collected they have to be analysed simultaneously by looking for all possible 
interpretations. The more interviews have been done, the better the research 
results became because the knowledge from former cases helped the 
researcher to gather additional knowledge and to triangulate former results as 
well as the results from the literature review. “The intimate interaction with 
actual evidence often produces theory which closely mirrors reality” (Eisenhardt, 
1989, p. 547) and therefore the research produced practically oriented 
strategies for SME’s, which have been already tested to work in El Salvador.
Some authors e.g. Patton (2002), Yin (2009) or Saunders et al. (2009) suggest 
using software to analyze qualitative data. However, a cost-benefit calculation 
for applying these tools (handling of the software, quality of the analysis and 
cost of the software) did not support to use such software. Instead, coding the 
research results from the semi-structured interviews with colours, post-its and 
text markers to look for common patterns has been more appropriate.
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3.7. Limitations
• Klaiber (2005) describes this research question as very complex. 
Depending on different personalities, strategies varied and it was 
sometimes difficult to summarize. However, Flyvbjerg (2006, p. 241) 
opposes, that “the difficulty in summarizing is due to the properties of the 
reality studied and not depending on the research method”. The focus of 
this research was to develop practically oriented knowledge which would 
be immediately applicable. Gray (2009, p. 251) argues that “while 
analytic generalization is appropriate, statistical generalization is certainly 
not” and Patton (2002, p. 582) refers to Cronbach (1975) who states that 
“generalization becomes obsolete and decays within time”. Therefore, 
generalization was not appropriate for this research question because 
managers had to deal “right now” with corruption.
• The qualitative study was limited by the sensitivity and integrity of the 
researcher who was the primary instrument of data collection and data 
analysis (Internet Blog: Tomorrow’s Professor Blog, 2010). Hamel et al. 
(1993, p. 23) describe “this problem of lack of rigor in the collection, 
construction, and analysis of the empirical materials as one of the 
problems in any sociological study”. However, training in observing and 
interviewing people helped the researcher to reduce these limitations. In 
addition, the researcher had to behave ethically in the selection of the 
cases or the information from the cases because an unethical researcher 
could have developed anything from the cases he wished by selecting 
what he needed to do so (Guba and Lincoln, 1981).
• Some corrupt activities were unobservable because they have been 
committed secretly, so just their results were observable. While 
positivists argue that theories that contain unobservable should not be 
judged because they cannot be empirically verified, realists state that 
theories cannot be rejected “just because they contain key constructs 
that are unobservable” (Godfrey and Hill, 1995, p. 527). Therefore, 
dealing with unobservables in the research on corruption and 
occupational fraud still enabled the researcher developing strategies how 
to avoid their negative impacts on organizations.
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3.8. Ethical considerations
Corruption and occupational fraud are sensitive topics and are mostly 
accomplished “sub rosa” i.e. secretly (Cleveland et al., 2009, p. 200). Observing 
and interviewing people in different cultures was difficult because the cultural 
background of the observer and that of the observed differed. As a result, the 
researcher had to understand the different culture that consists of different 
values, symbols and rituals (Hofstede et al., 2010).
The researcher had to take ethical issues into consideration during the fieldwork 
(Girtler, 2001):
• He had to respect the people he was working with and did not regard 
them as “mere suppliers of the required data for his research” (ibid, p. 
170).
• He really had to understand the people involved and felt sympathy for 
them. This included that he had to use any sensitive information about 
corruption and occupational fraud reasonable and he avoided harming 
his informants because he did not want to disturb the life in the field.
• The researcher had to put last his own values during the research. 
However, he did not lose his own moral values during the research.
As a result, the researcher did not disclose his informants or any information, 
which could have harmed the informant. In addition, the researcher had to be 
careful not to be harmed because he got access to information that contained 
dangerous contents. The consultation with the Faculty Ethics Committee of The 
Faculty of Business, Economics and Law at the University of Surrey agreed that 
no ethical approval for this research project was required, because the 
interviewees and the companies they work for were kept anonymously. 
Therefore, such information will be kept confidential in the thesis.
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3.9. Interview process and evaluation of the data
At the beginning of the research, the researcher was well aware, that a 
research topic including corruption and occupational fraud in a country where 
there exists a considerably higher level of corruption and fraud compared with 
the researcher’s home country could result in a lower willingness for prospective 
interviewees to agree talking to the researcher in general and openly talking 
about these loaded issues in specific to a person from a foreign culture, which 
at the time of the first encounter would be unknown to them. As a result, the 
researcher would require help from individuals as well as institutions to get 
access to informants. Close relatives of the researcher had been willing to 
support him in getting informants. Together with his relatives and the local 
German-EI Salvadorian Chamber of Commerce in El Salvador, the researcher 
got access to the database of interesting companies. Before starting the 
fieldwork, the researcher selected prudently about 30 companies and the 
Chamber of Commerce was willing to contact these prospective interviewees 
and asking them to participate in the fieldwork. It was intended to do about two 
interviews per day within the two week period, which was set for the fieldwork, 
summing up to about 24 interviews and allowing a satisfactory number of 
interviews to be taken.
However, when the researcher arrived in El Salvador and had his first meeting 
with the Chamber of Commerce, just four appointments have been made. The 
director of the chamber excused himself by stating that (1) a lot of companies 
were not willing to talk about this topic (2) the prospective interviewees had not 
time for interviews (3) the researcher was unknown to them, (4) they felt a bad 
reputation and (5) “manana” -  everything will be done tomorrow. This was an 
unexpected obstacle, because the researcher had not only to prepare himself 
for the interviews but also had to find interview partners. Fortunately, his 
relatives helped him in finding additional interview partners and after talking to 
some of them, the interviewees felt confident and recommended the researcher 
to others. This “snowballing” approach finally allowed the researcher to find 22 
interviewees willing to talk about corruption, occupational fraud and other 
crimes in El Salvador.
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Within his first interviews, the researcher started the interviews with the loaded 
topic of “corruption”. However, the researcher felt, that it was difficult for people 
to talk about corruption, since this was always regarded as being active in that 
process, thus undertaking a criminal act. To ease the conversation, the 
researcher changed his tactics and started with the topic “occupational fraud”. 
As a result, managers and owners of companies in El Salvador started to talk 
openly how they have been betrayed by employees, because they felt that 
occupational fraud was a topic, where they have been the victims instead of the 
perpetrator. They felt comfortable and when the researcher switched to the 
topic “corruption”, the interviewees continued to talk openly about this topic.
The researcher had prepared a guideline for the semi-structured interview (see 
Appendix A) so that he could follow a structured sequence of relevant 
questions. However, after the first interviews, he found out, that this guideline 
was not helpful for him in various ways, since (1) each interviewee had his/her 
own personality, which did not always fit to the questionnaire, (2) each 
interviewee had different experiences and so, he/she was not able to answer all 
topics, (3) the wording of the questions could have been loaded, thus offending 
the interviewees, (4) the sequence of the questions could have misguided the 
interviewees into a predefined direction, (5) the questions could have forgotten 
issues which the researcher was not able to anticipate (e.g. the issue of mara 
crime) and (6) sticking to the questionnaire disrupted the interviewees in their 
individual flow to disclose their personal information. As a result, the researcher 
discontinued sticking to the questionnaire after his first interviews.
The data obtained during the interviews comprised a huge continuum of 
information. At the beginning, the researcher made clear, that he would not 
record the interview with any type of electronic device or film the interview with 
a camera, because this would have made the interviewee feeling uncomfortable 
and his information could be traced back to him. The researcher collected the 
data by writing them down onto paper. He did not use a notebook, since 
opening the screen of a notebook would have built up a physical barrier 
between the researcher and the interviewee, which could have made the 
interviewee feeling uncomfortable and not being close to the researcher.
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As soon, as each interview has been accomplished, the researcher typed his 
information into his computer, supported by his latest memory and the notes 
taken. He then started coding the information (see Appendix C), grouping the 
codes into similar concepts, forming categories and drawing and verifying 
concept (Glaser and Strauss, 2010; Corbin and Strauss, 2008). He carried the 
information given in previous interviews into the following interviews to 
triangulate the previous information and to refine the questions in the following 
interviews.
In the following chapter, the strategies and tactical approaches for German 
investors, how to avoid corruption, occupational fraud and the threat of mara 
crime will be distilled.
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4. Findings of the interviews
4.1. Introduction
“Nitimur in vetitum semper cupimusque negate.11
We always strive for the forbidden and desire what is denied to us (Ovid, 43
BC - AD 17, Amores III, 4, 17).
This chapter displays the huge continuum of information displayed by the 
interviewees. El Salvador is a considerably small country, where a lot of 
entrepreneurs know each other. Talking openly and honestly about sensitive 
topics like corruption and occupational fraud could bear the risk of harming the 
informants. As a result, the quotes within this chapter are not openly attributed 
to protect the security of the interviewees.
Most of the interviewees stated that, in comparison to El Salvador, the level of 
corruption and occupational fraud is higher in Mexico, Guatemala and Honduras 
and is lower in Nicaragua and Costa Rica. The majority of them felt, that the 
level of corruption in the government of El Salvador has increased within the 
last few years. “There are not any government employees who are not corrupt” 
stated a businessman. The growing level of corruption is fostered by the fact 
that the number of government employees has increased by more than 20% in 
the last years and the level of red tape and bureaucracy has become worse. 
Some experts explained, that “These developments are also supported by 
poorer rankings of El Salvador by Tl and LATINOBAROMETRO recently. The 
people of El Salvador have changed their attitude towards bribing and want 
more transparency in political processes.” Another interviewee added that the 
poorer rankings are a result of a growing amount of information about 
corruption, which increased the awareness of corruption and occupational fraud 
in society.
While grand corruption on the executive level has decreased, local 
municipalities and their mayors are seen as being very corrupt since they 
frequently ask for “mordidas” (bribes), otherwise they are delaying services. A 
businessman stated, that “bribing and paying kickbacks has increased within 
the last few years, especially in the energy sector, which is an essential service
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for everyone”. Some corrupt municipalities even “invent” special permits one 
has to get but which are not allowed and are not legal to ask for. “As a result, 
between 3% and 10% of the investment sum has to be added for such 
commissions, which makes the whole investment more expensive” had one of 
the interviewees consulting prospective investors in El Salvador calculated.
Within the bidding processes of governmental tenders exists a lot of corruption 
and the country is losing competitiveness due to corruption and red tape. Public 
services like energy, water, construction, health care or waste management are 
regarded as being very corrupt and it is sometimes necessary to bribe officials 
to get essentially needed services and to speed up processes. Other 
interviewees illustrated, that doctors in public hospitals are poorly paid, so they 
ask for bribes from patients or they maintain a private doctor’s office, where 
they can provide better service, but the patient has to pay additional fees for this 
service. Local police officers are in general very corrupt, because they are not 
well educated, poorly equipped and not well paid. The officers’ salaries are just 
above the minimum wage, so they are in desperate need for additional income. 
They earn about 300 USD and can make an additional income of 200 USD per 
month with extortion. A highway officer told one of the interviewees that “The 
more I control the more money I can earn to support my family”. Additional 
corruption exists among tax and customs inspectors and as a result, almost 
30% of the official tax revenues are lost to corrupt officials. An entrepreneur 
stated that he once had to bribe a corrupt tax officer, because the inspector 
audited his small company for almost 6 months; on the one hand, the inspector 
did not find major irregularities but on the other hand, he did not stop the 
investigation, hindered the business operations and “the only way to get rid of 
him was to give him some money”, disclosed the manager of this company.
Since about 2009, the government of El Salvador has done a lot to fight against 
corruption and occupational fraud and to foster transparency within its 
governmental processes. The government has installed a ministry for 
transparency, which closely monitors the executive part and it has passed a 
transparency law, which (1) allows everybody to ask for information about 
government processes; one has to file a petition to a central office which then 
gathers the information from the various ministries (2) requests that all
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subsidies to private companies have to be disclosed and (3) encourages the 
public to ask for budget plans as well as budget spending of any ministry. 
However, this office does not yet operate; the board of directors has not been 
elected because the congress blocks it. Therefore, just in the construction 
business, a small effort in reducing corruption has been achieved. The 
construction business has in former years been very corrupt; about 15% of the 
volume of each tender was eaten up by corruption. The managers in the visited 
companies also feel an increasing threat by occupational fraud and organized 
crime and some of them have calculated the damage caused by fraudulent 
employees up to 5% of the revenues. In addition, the costs for operating their 
business (e.g. for transportation and security) have tremendously increased by 
the growth of various mara gangs.
The following forms of corruption and occupational fraud have been discussed 
during the interviews:
Figure 8: Forms of corruption and occupational fraud discussed during the 
interviews
Forms of corruption and occupational fraud
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Source: by the author
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4.2. How to avoid corruption
The following figure summarizes the strategies of the interviewees to eliminate 
or at least to reduce corruption. These strategies will be discussed in more 
detail in this chapter.
Figure 9: Main strategies how to avoid corruption
Main strategies how to avoid corruption
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4.2.1. Avoiding business with the government
19 interviewees agreed that one has to avoid doing business with the 
government to evade being involved into corruption. The first answer when 
asking private businesspeople was always the same: “If you do not want to get 
involved into corruption, avoid doing business with the government.” and “When 
one bids for public tenders of higher volumes, it is normal to bribe.” As a result, 
a lot of private companies do not work together with governmental institutions, 
do not sell to the government and do not bid for tenders of the government; so 
they do not get in touch with corruption. The majority of these companies focus
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on business with smaller, private owned companies. One interviewee explained, 
that corruption in the private sector has decreased within the last few years and 
“is not longer a big issue to worry about because the awareness of corruption 
within the companies has increased”.
A few companies work together with governmental agencies and bid for public 
tenders. They felt, that the high level of corruption is possible, because public 
officials have discrete power to make decisions since they are not adequately 
controlled. These entrepreneurs stated, that bribes and kickbacks are essential 
for the quotation process, because “one has to bribe to get the information 
about the competitors' prices” and when one gets the order, one has to pay a 
commission to the officers so that they approve the quality of the goods 
delivered and allow that the invoices will be paid”. One company sells sporting 
goods to public customers and the owner explained that “When one does not 
comply with that game, one does not get the orders”. The tenders’ volumes for 
sporting equipment are between 5.000 USD and 400.000 USD. The owner 
reported that when he started his business, he did not bribe and he had always 
lost his tenders although his products have been of a higher quality and offers 
have been about 30% lower than his competitors’ prices. He admitted that he 
started “to play the game” and since then, he got some nice orders.
And finally, some interviewees warned to be very careful in supporting 
governmental institutions e.g. in the form of donations or gifts, because this is 
frequently correlated with corruption. One entrepreneur openly sponsors a 
school, which is good for his company’s image and also reduces the rate of 
illiteracy in the country. The owner of gas stations once supported an “anti-drug- 
campaign” from the government with T-shirts and drinks, but not with money. 
Both managers advised, that “sponsoring has to be made public and so, 
everyone knows, that this has not been done in exchange for a favour”.
4.2.2. Management offering a good example
17 interviewees agreed that management has to give good, illustrative and 
honest examples in the organization to reduce corruption and occupational 
fraud, because this will also convince their employees to behave in the same
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way. The majority of interviewees assumed, that they would be good managers 
and that they would be successful in giving good examples for their employees. 
“Ethics, honesty and anti corruption is a top management issue and he as well 
as his top managers act as good, illustrative examples” disclosed one of the 
interviewees.
Another interviewee stated that managers and superiors should not turn their 
heads away from corruption and occupational fraud, because in doing so, they 
would give bad examples to their employees. For her, it is very important, that 
owners and upper managers have “to start their anti corruption activities from 
inside the company”. She explained, that “the only way to change the culture in 
an organization is that management gives good examples to their employees -  
otherwise, any anti corruption activities will not work”. A manager of a private 
company stated that ethics, honesty and anti corruption are top management 
issues and that he asks his top managers as well as his team leaders to act as 
illustrative good examples for his employees. Behaving in an honest way and 
acting as an illustrative example is very easy for the owner of a conglomerate of 
businesses, because he is a religious man. In his various businesses, he has 
employed a lot of trusted manager from his parish, which share the same 
ethical values and therefore behave in the same way as he does. He has 
spread this culture of honesty and mutual trust to all of his companies and as a 
result, he has no problems with corruption and occupational fraud in his 
companies.
4.2.3. Strictly saying no to corruption
All interviewees initially stated that they do not tolerate corruption, but during the 
interviews, half of them admitted, that they would consider small bribes to get 
desperately needed services from authorities and to speed up governmental 
processes. One interviewee recommended considering the following scenario: 
“When undertaking the cost-benefit calculation of a corruptive behaviour, an 
organization must be aware that paying bribes can result in “being on the front 
page of a newspaper and being accused of corruption”. Does the organization 
want this and want to live with that?” A manager in the real estate business
91
added that getting access to water and electricity was always a process 
peppered with a lot of red tape for him, but finally, everything could get achieved 
without bribing. And he really questioned if bribing could have been helpful for 
him to speed up the process, since some of his problems had been technical 
ones, where “[...] an engineer, the right technology and an adequate 
infrastructure were more helpful than money to get things done”.
The owner of a conglomerate of companies explained that he owns the 
reputation, that “whenever he is faced with corruption, he will not pay and in the 
worst case will stop the business.” Based on his reputation, the propensity of 
any official asking him for a “mordida” is very low. He summarized that “avoiding 
bribes in getting business does not necessarily result in less business. Some 
customers explicitly want to do business with him because they know that he is 
“clean” and not corrupt.” This strategy was supported by a wholesaler for 
technical equipment who in former years had bribed a lot to get business from 
the government with a high profit margin and to avoid losing any business to 
corrupt competitors. However, bribing did not pay out financially for him in the 
long run, because his business has only low profit margins and so, he stopped 
paying “mordidas” and increased his profit.
Bribing does not always result in a good deal for the briber. A real estate 
manager once had been approached by a corrupt manager of one of his 
tenants. He was asked to pay a “mordida” and in exchange that corrupt 
manager would help him to switch to a cheaper supplier for electricity, which 
could have saved his business a lot of money. The real estate manger declined 
and did stay with his current supplier for electricity. A few weeks later, the 
corrupt manager was blown up by the police, which found out, that the 
prospective supplier for the utilities had also been approached by that corrupt 
manager to pay a commission for getting a new customer.
The owner of a trucking business reported that a few years ago, he desperately 
wanted to get the transport business for a big supermarket chain. He was asked 
for a bribe of 50.000 USD to get the business. He insisted that this was “his first 
and last bribe, which he has paid”, because someone else got the business and 
he lost the 50.000 USD. He had no chance to sue the corrupt purchasing
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manager who betrayed him, because he himself behaved illegally. He 
summarized, that “This was an expensive lesson, he had learned from” and 
now, he strictly says no to corruption, because “corruption does not pay out in 
the long run”.
And finally, corruption is always a two way game. “Nothing is for free” explained 
one of the interviewees. He reported that close friends of the current president 
always win bids or the bidding processes are facilitated for them by lowering the 
size of the tenders, so that no official bidding processes are required. He 
thought, that “On the one hand, these friends make a lot of money, because 
they can get business with high profit margins but on the other hand, they owe 
the president a favour and it would not be wise for them to reject any wishes of 
the president, no matter what these wishes are and when they will be 
demanded”. The interviewee added that these projects could be windfall profits 
for them, when the president’s term is finished, because they have to fear that 
their corrupt activities will be uncovered and that they will be prosecuted by the 
new government.
4.2.4. Tolerating a certain level of corruption
At the beginning of the interviews, most of the managers stated, that they have 
denied paying any bribes, which resulted in the loss of business to a corrupt 
competitor or the delay of desperately needed permissions from the 
government. However, when the interviews proceeded and the interviewees 
became more comfortable with the researcher, many of them committed, that 
they sometimes bribe to get desperately needed services from governmental or 
public organizations. They distinguished corruption in the form of actively 
bribing to get business from bribing in the form of managing a company and 
getting access to essential services. The majority of the interviewees agreed, 
that the latter form of corruption is tolerable for them. They explained, that one 
cannot eliminate corruption and occupational fraud completely but has to live 
with a certain level of it and that this is a “cultural thing all over Latin America, 
which cannot be eradicated”.
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One company was once controlled by a corrupt tax auditor. The auditor did not 
find any major irregularities but anyway went on with the audit for several 
months. In doing so, he kept the accounting department and the management 
busy by his mere presence in the premises and by asking questions to 
everyone and requesting copies of documents he slowed down regular 
operations. After some time, the owner cautiously offered some money. As 
soon, as the “mordida” was paid, the auditor left the company. Another 
entrepreneur excused himself with having undertaken a cost-benefit calculation 
when paying a bribe to get a desperately needed permission to build his new 
warehouse. For him, paying a few hundred Dollars to speed up the process 
versus the loss of a not having the new warehouse in operation was 
“acceptable and a business risk, he can live with”. The manager of a NGO 
fostering transparency within the government described that “In a lot of 
government institutions, the clearing of expenses, travelling costs and other 
smaller payments are very opaque and any codes of ethics are ignored by 
companies to get their desperately needed services.” A developer reported that 
he once wanted to expand his premises but it was difficult to get the building 
permit from the local government. The major did not ask directly for money but 
requested the repair of the roof of a public building. This was morally acceptable 
for the investor, since the public did participate from the improvement. In 
another location of his several businesses, the major asked him to repair a road 
that lead directly to a business, which was owned by the major. On the one 
hand, he did not agree because he did not regard this to be “acceptable” for him 
but on the other hand, he needed that special permit. So, he bargained with the 
major and finally, he agreed on paying the repair of a public school. He 
disclosed that “almost always, an agreement can be found, if the investor shows 
willingness and flexibility” and that “no one has to lose his face in doing so”.
Even a consultant working for a foreign NGO stated, that in former years, most 
of the bribes have been asked for personal gain; now, the majors ask for money 
upfront for building parks or playgrounds, repairing roads or funding schools. 
While she argued that on the one hand this is still corruption, she agreed on the 
other hand that “such a form of corruption is tolerable because it is 
comparatively transparent and helps society”. Her evaluation was supported by
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other entrepreneurs who stated that “this would be a “win-win-situation” where 
also third parties like pedestrians walking around in nice parks funded with 
money collected in exchange for a small favour could benefit from” and they 
accepted “paying small bribes as a strategy in a country where sometimes even 
basic public services are difficult to get”. Even the owner of a restaurant, who in 
general avoids paying any bribes, tolerates a certain level of corruption, as long 
as the bribes would give a benefit to the citizens of El Salvador.
The owner of a conglomerate of businesses, who maintained to be very strict 
against corruption, admitted that it is sometimes absolutely necessary to pay 
small fees to get urgently needed permissions or papers from the government. 
He referred to the Pareto Principle and explained that “95% of the permissions 
can be achieved without paying any bribes, but in 5% of the cases bribing small 
amounts up to 100 USD are the rule”. The real estate manager added that 
labour unions in companies operating in his business parks are very corrupt. He 
knew that his tenants have to pay bribes, because otherwise, the unions would 
harm their businesses, which would be more expensive for them. Paying small 
fees to the unions were described by him as a kind of “cheap insurance for the 
companies, because the unions will help them to reduce occupational fraud and 
other crime in their companies.”
One interviewee added that a certain level of corruption will not harm society 
because it will not nourish additional corruption and it will help him “to grease 
the wheels” in doing business and to live a better life. This statement was 
supported by a manager who argued that “Although it would be better to avoid 
any bribes and to live with red tape and delays instead, therefore setting a sign 
against corruption, he has to take care of the family business and as a result 
cannot be that straightforward”. At least, he encouraged, that “one should tell 
people asking for bribes that they will harm their country and finally themselves 
when doing so”. Another manager explained, that paying a small sum of bribes 
to get special permits would be o.k. because otherwise, he would harm his 
business and “one has to be realistic, when doing business”. The owner of a 
trading office for steel accepted a certain level of corruption and occupational 
fraud in his company (i.e. the theft of office supplies, stationery, coffee or even 
toilet-paper for private use), because “these are small issues which are not
95
worth being controlled and have to be accepted”. He maintained that the theft of 
small items could prevent his employees from stealing more expensive things 
that would harm his business severely. And as a result, he stays with the 
“Pareto Principle” and does not prosecute small thefts but sees them as a cost 
for operating his business.
Even organizations fighting for transparency agreed, that “eliminating all 
corruption is utopia”, because people of El Salvador grew up with corruption 
and had to survive the Civil War in the 1990s. Therefore, “corruption is inside 
the people of El Salvador which results in a higher tolerance towards corruption 
in contrast to people living in Europe”. A German born businessman explained 
that on the one hand he does not tolerate a certain level of corruption within his 
company, but he sometimes gives fraudsters a second chance. 30 years ago, 
he found out that an employee had stolen merchandise. He gave him a second 
change and that employee never betrayed him again and did work for him as a 
trusted employee till he retired.
Four interviewees completely disagreed that a certain level of corruption and 
occupational fraud is acceptable. The president of a NGO stated that “the first 
step to fight against corruption is to fight against the thinking that a certain level 
of corruption is tolerated” so she maintains a zero tolerance policy towards 
corruption. Another entrepreneur did not want to live with a certain level of 
corruption because he wanted to protect himself, his family, his business and 
his friends from being harmed by corruption. He brought up the following 
questions: “What is a certain level of corruption? Will the level of tolerance 
towards corruption grow within time? Is a low level of corruption the seed for 
increasing corruption in the future?” and he disclosed, that “society will finally 
get the bill for even tolerating a certain level of corruption (e.g. poor 
infrastructure)”. He maintained that that it would be essential “to fight against 
corruption and occupational fraud immediately, so that there is no chance that 
these things will grow”. His view was supported by a multinational company, 
which in former years has been hit hard by corruption and therefore does not 
tolerate any level of corruption worldwide, because top management assumes 
that existing corruption can foster additional corruption. The compliance 
manager of that company explained that it would be too difficult for any branch
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worldwide to decide, in which country which level of corruption is still tolerable. 
And as a result, the company does not accept the slightest level of corruption 
and occupational fraud worldwide. The manager of another multinational 
company disclosed that any form of corruption has to be eliminated because 
“bad examples of presidents, ministers and other governmental officials are 
contra productive to reduce the level of corruption in El Salvador” and that “such 
wrongdoing will directly insult especially the poorer parts of the population, 
which in general are very religious, do not bribe and try to maintain high ethical 
values despite their own, poor economic situation”.
4.2.5. Patience and being in a favourable position not to bribe
Ten interviewees agreed and supported being patient, because this is the most 
successful strategy in the long run. One of the interviewees, a native El 
Salvadorian who operates a conglomerate of businesses stated that patience 
would be always a good strategy to circumvent corruption. He owns a holiday 
resort for surfers at the beach. A few years ago, he has bought additional land 
at the beach adjacent to his lot, but separated through a small gravel road 
gaining public access to the beach. The owner wanted to buy that gravel road to 
have both lots connected. He explained that there is no need for that road, 
because people can access the beach via another path, which is located just a 
few meters away. He has been negotiating with the municipality to acquire that 
road for a long time, but they always postponed the decision and asked for 
money. In the meantime, the governing party was not re-elected; the new 
government increased the price again and some governmental officials even 
asked for personal bribes. The manager of the resort, whose main principle is 
never to bribe, denied. He offered donating money for public healthcare and 
supporting public schools in the area. However, the corrupt officers wanted the 
money for themselves and their political party. The owner stated that he will 
wait, till he gets the chance to buy that road. In the meantime, he is expanding 
his hotel on the existing lot. He advised German investors providing sufficient 
financial funds and allowing a realistic time schedule for the installation of their 
investment so that they will not be in desperate need to bribe.
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Patience also helped other entrepreneurs from Germany to finally reach their 
goals without corruption. One entrepreneur was asked for a bribe, when he 
wanted to build his own warehouse. He refused and stayed in the rented space 
covering the time of the delays to get the permission to build. He stated that 
paying a few more months rent has been less expensive and more predictable 
than paying bribes, because he was not sure about “how much the bribes would 
finally sum up”. Another company had problems in getting their equipment 
through customs clearance and obtaining several permissions to start their 
operations. Management did not speed up the process by paying bribes. This 
caused a delay of about 8 months and resulted in losses of almost 100.000 
USD for the investor. This company was in a favourable position to back up its 
investment with additional funds from Germany. Finally, the owner asked the 
embassy of Germany to get things solved. The investor reported that the 
ambassador helped him “because he knew that this investment was “clean” and 
that no bribes had been paid”. Both German investors advised that it is 
essential to back up a planned investment with sufficient funds and a realistic 
time frame, so that one can accept a few months of delays. They explained that 
otherwise, companies may face a situation where they have “to bribe to get 
things settled”.
Sometimes, the expertise, the products and the reputation of a company can be 
helpful to avoid bribing. A German importer of sporting gear is a specialist in the 
trade of unique sporting equipment and explained that “the niche he is in and 
his expertise in that field gives him a competitive edge to get business with the 
government without bribes and reduces his risk of being involved into 
corruption”. Another entrepreneur disclosed, that “in the long run, it is more 
important for companies to maintain a good reputation and to offer competitive 
prices, good products, superior quality and excellent customer service than 
paying any bribes”.
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4.2.6. Always following the rules
Three interviewees stated that one can protect oneself just by always following 
the legal and official rules. Some managers exporting to neighbouring Central 
American Countries stated that they never had any problems with customs, 
because they prepare their customs declarations very well, so, there is no need 
for them to bribe to get their merchandise through customs. The owner of a 
jewellery production who also operates an electroplating plant for jewellery had 
to improve his fire extinguishers, his exhausting system and the wastewater 
treatment of his plant. He fulfilled the requirements and passed the follow-up 
inspection without problems. As a result, he was not exposed to corrupt officers 
and he had improved the fire and safety situation for himself and his employees. 
He argued “that in the long run, that investment into improved equipment was 
less expensive than paying bribes on an annual base” and he feels comfortable, 
when the annual inspection takes place. In addition, he explains his customers, 
that the production of their jewellery has been taken place in a sustainable way, 
which is a USP for his products. A wholesaler for pharmaceutical products and 
cosmetics pays bonuses to the salespeople of his retailers for promoting his 
products. He also invites doctors and owners of beauty parlours for fun trips; but 
in doing so, he always “sticks to the rules and to the law” because in recent 
times, the government monitors such things very closely.
Three interviewees disagreed with this strategy and mentioned that they could 
not reach their business goals (e.g. winning the bids or getting special 
permissions) without bribing and therefore “they have to play the game to keep 
their business”.
4.2.7. Using intermediaries to do the dirty work and lobbying
Using intermediaries to do “the dirty work” for them is a business strategy for 
companies, which otherwise would lose any lucrative government orders to 
corrupt competitors. These companies on the one hand want to get a share of 
well-paid government business but on the other hand do not want to get 
involved into corruption. One manager explained that whenever he wants to sell 
goods to the government of El Salvador or within the MCCA (Central American
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Common Market), he works together with agents who manage the business 
with these government agencies. He sells to the intermediate companies and 
they deal with the rest. He never asks “unnecessary questions” but is always 
happy to get the deal. The intermediates bribe the right people to obtain the 
orders, deliver the goods and collect the money for him. They get a fixed 
commission for providing this service and that commission is already included 
as an additional cost in the calculation of the sales price. This is the least 
expensive way for him, he admitted.
A wholesaler selling sports equipment to governmental institutions offers his 
bids not directly but involves a third party, which does the bidding process for 
him. He admitted that the intermediaries bribe the officials to get the tenders. He 
calculated that the intermediaries' mark-ups are up to 300% on his price, 
because they have to pay the bribes. The “brokers” bribe the officials, deliver 
the goods and also collect the money from the government, because the 
collection process can take a long time, if the appropriate people are not well 
enough bribed. He disclosed that the intermediaries charge an additional fee for 
the collection of the money, but “ jEso vale la Pena!” (It is worth it!).
Another strategy has been implemented by a pharmaceutical company. They, 
as well as other competitors have employed lobbyists in the public and in 
politics to influence decision makers (e.g. purchasing departments in hospitals, 
doctors, pharmacists and ministries). For example, lobbyists work to influence 
the decision makers to favour a special kind of package (e.g. glass tubes, bags 
or blisters) or the packaging size of the medicine. As soon as such 
specifications have been implemented into the purchasing specifications of 
hospitals, competitors offering another kind of packaging will be automatically 
driven out of business. Pharmaceuticals have to fulfil various medical and 
technical requirements, but lobbyists can help to favour specific products or 
companies. The commission for the approval of new medications and 
agricultural chemicals does not only consist of ministers and governmental 
officials, but also of representatives from the pharmaceutical industry and their 
lobbyists. As a result, it is very important for companies to have “trusted” people 
installed in these commissions.
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4.3. How to avoid occupational fraud
The following figure summarizes the strategies disclosed by the interviewees to 
reduce or to eliminate occupational fraud. Their strategies will be discussed in 
more detail in this chapter.
Figure 10: Main strategies how to avoid occupational fraud
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4.3.1. “Tropicalizing” the strategies to the cultural environment
All interviewees agreed that investors have to adjust their anti-fraud strategies 
to the social, cultural and economic environment of El Salvador. While this is 
done intuitively by native El Salvadorians, it has to be learned by foreign 
investors. The owner of a conglomerate of companies summarized, that “one 
has to tropicalize the activities to fight against corruption and occupational 
fraud, because a lot of strategies which work in the “first world” will not work in 
emerging market economies or in societies with a different cultural background 
than that of the investor’. The president of a governmental agency fighting 
against corruption stated that activities to reduce occupational fraud in
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companies have to start by changing the culture in the families of the 
employees, since “this is the place, where people get the values for their life 
and unfortunately a lot of people grow up with corruption and occupational fraud 
as being a part of their daily life”. However, she also admitted that this is outside 
of the scope of the employers and has to be accomplished during the 
educational process of the people. She advised that companies can help their 
employees changing their attitude towards occupational fraud by offering 
trainings with a lot of practical examples correlated to the daily life of El 
Salvador, so that employees understand the negative effects of their 
wrongdoing. The compliance officer of a multinational company added, that his 
company adjusts its anti fraud activities to the cultural and legal environment in 
which the specific subsidiary operates.
4.3.2. Hiring trusted people and installing trusted people in key positions
Employing well-trained and trusted people in general is the most important 
strategy to reduce occupational fraud when operating a business in El Salvador. 
Almost all of the interviewees stated, that one needs to hire trusted people and 
must install trusted people in key positions to reduce occupational fraud in 
organizations, because it is almost impossible for top managers and owners of 
companies to control all business activities without support from trusted people. 
One manager stated, that “the enemy comes from inside the company” and 
therefore, it is essential to employ honest people in the company, which support 
him to uncover wrongdoers. In addition, key positions like accounting, 
warehousing, IT or purchasing have to be filled with very trusted managers or 
family members. The wholesaler of steel explained, that “he counts his 
warehouse twice a year and no major discrepancies have come up the last few 
years, because the warehouse manager is a trusted person, who himself 
employs and supervises trusted people". The owner of a restaurant has a very 
low rate of fluctuation and the damage caused by employee theft in his 
restaurant is negligible, which is very unusual in the restaurant business. He 
explained that he has a “trustworthy number of people who work since many 
years in the restaurant”, because he hires trusted people, treats them very well, 
and pays them well (he leaves the tips with the employees and does not charge
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them for broken dishes). The majority of the interviewees pay their employees 
very well and take care, that they stay long with the company. However, one 
manager objects that employing trusted people for a long time in key positions 
can also be a threat, because “it is difficult to control them since they know any 
hidden weaknesses in the company” and “the longer an employee stays in a 
company, the lower is the level of control for that person”. The importer of 
machinery, who grew up in Germany, has employed German managers that are 
very trustworthy because they have a similar cultural background. However, he 
explained that also well-educated El Salvadorians (some of them went to 
Universities in the USA and therefore have been experienced another culture) 
have a lower propensity to betray him because they earn good money in his 
company, so they do not need to commit any fraud.
A lot of the companies stated, that it is difficult for them to find skilled, qualified 
personnel, which fits into the position, because the labour market is 
considerably small and the educational level of prospective employees is 
considerably low. Due to the fact, that “El Salvador is a small country where 
everybody knows each other, there exist few secrets about a potential 
employee in the market” stated a former manager of a chemical company. Most 
of the applicants bring with them a personal recommendation from business 
partners, friends or trusted employees and managers also recommend people 
to other companies. “Personal connections are very important in El Salvador 
and if someone has failed, the word will spread out quickly and he will be 
burned for the rest of his life.” disclosed the importer of sporting goods. Getting 
a new job without a letter of recommendation is very difficult, reported one of 
the interviewees. When the daughter of his housemaid desperately needed her 
first job, he helped her, because otherwise, she would not have been able to 
find a job. However, the managers of a NGO objected, that “personal 
recommendations are not always a panacea for companies to hire trustworthy 
people” because one could be influenced by the recommendation letter and 
neglects profound crosschecks of the applicant. Sometimes, the applicant is not 
the best choice for that specific job even with a fine recommendation”.
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All employers reported that the CV’s of their applicants are properly scanned 
and cross-checked and that former employers as well as third parties are asked 
for references to verify the CV’s. In depth cross checks are essential for all of 
the interviewees, because the quality of the application forms and the CV’s are 
in general very poor or are even faked. The majority of managers and their HR 
departments ask applicants for their “solvencia” (certificate of conduct) and a 
“solvencia policia” (police clearance certificate) and some of them even scan 
the applicants’ credit history. The level of background checks increases with the 
intended level of occupation for the applicant. While some of the companies 
apply a polygraph test or a voice stress recording test during the interview, 
others objected, that “this would offend good people and especially high level 
managers in a country, where skilled people are scarce anyway”. Therefore, 
one company applies the polygraph testing just for lower level employees like 
warehouse workers or production personnel. A HR manager admitted that he is 
not satisfied with the tests, because skilled applicants could train how to cheat 
the polygraph. However, he still applies the polygraph test, because “at least, it 
has a deterring effect on corrupt applicants and fraudulent employees”. Another 
manager prefers voice stress recording tests, because these tests are more 
reliable than the polygraph testing. He explained that “applicants who have to 
pass the polygraph test in general know where to buy pills, which can help them 
to pass the polygraph test”. The wholesaler of steel, who lives in El Salvador for 
more than 50 years, disclosed that “he has a gut feeling when hiring people and 
about corrupt people in his company, which is based on his long work- and life- 
experience in El Salvador”. He does not employ any apprentices or trainees, 
because he once had a bad experience with a trainee, who stole some of his 
business secrets during his training his training in the company and then started 
working for a competitor.
The owner of a conglomerate of companies is a religious man. The majority of 
his managers are also church members and so, he knows them very well and 
trusts them. These trusted managers recruit their staff mainly from his parish. 
“Based on their strong religious belief, such employees are less prone to 
corruption and occupational fraud and there exists a high degree of peer control 
among them, because they meet twice a week for the Mass.” the owner argued.
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He recommended hiring educated, skilled and smart people, which are in 
general less prone to corruption. However, he also admitted that there is a 
second side of that medal, because “corrupt and smart people can hide their 
wrongdoing better than corrupt and dumb people”. He summarized that one has 
to be aware that a certain risk of corruption and occupational fraud cannot be 
avoided when employing and managing people, because “one has to deal with 
individuals and not with machines”. As a result, even the most sophisticated 
checks will not completely insure managers from hiring “bad apples”. The owner 
of a gas station reported, that he once had hired a corrupt manager, who 
betrayed him during the application process with a faked resume. He employed 
the manager and did not control him properly when the corrupt manager hired 
new people. The corrupt manager replaced good people step by step with 
corrupt friends and finally, there grew a big “basked of bad apples” in the gas 
station. Since then, a single manager is not allowed to hire a complete team 
without the approval of the owner and the teams have to consist of a mix of new 
hires and already trusted people to maintain a certain level of peer control and 
to maintain a healthy mix of employees.
4.3.3. Knowing one’s business and its processes
All interviewees explained that it is essential to know one’s business, because 
this will allow managers to evaluate where they are vulnerable and finally to 
implement successful strategies to avoid occupational fraud. One interviewee 
illustrated, that he once was operating a coffee plantation and got the chance to 
buy a travel agency for a good price. He did not know the processes in the 
travel agency very well. As a result, he did not personally work in the travel 
agency but let the business run by “trusted employees”. They betrayed him, 
because he did not know, how to implement proper controls. Even his 
accountant was not able to detect any fraud in the beginning, because the 
accountant did not know that kind of business either and he just came in for an 
audit twice a year. When both of them found out, that the company has been 
betrayed, it was almost too late. Finally, the owner sold the business suffering a 
big financial loss and learned “that it is essential to know ones business, its
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processes inherent as well as its weaknesses and its numbers”. In contrast, he 
possesses profound knowledge in his coffee farm and therefore was quickly 
able to detect, that one of his managers betrayed him by stealing fertilizer for 
his private plantation. The owners of a hotel have developed a sophisticated 
system to check if any food is stolen in the kitchen or taken away by their 
service personnel. They described, that they have calculated the exact quantity 
of food needed to prepare a serving including the scrap. At the end of each 
week, they cross check the quantity of food and the expenses for the purchases 
with the servings prepared and the turnover in that week. They disclosed, that 
this procedure “not only allows them to detect any theft, but also helps them to 
calculate accurate prices for their menus more or less in real-time”.
Some entrepreneurs explained that they know their business very well, since 
they have learned from past incidents. One manager has once been betrayed 
by his accountant and now, he undertakes random checks in the accounting 
department and “he knows where he has to look for”. His strategy is supported 
by other managers who stated, that especially in the accounting department, 
one has to watch for red flags “because sooner or later red flags resulting from 
corruption and occupational fraud like a low profitability will pop up in the 
accounting numbers”. The majority of entrepreneurs have developed 
sophisticated measures based on their specific knowledge that help them to 
detect any corrupt activities in their companies. The owner of a conglomerate of 
small businesses stated, that it is very important for him to control accounting 
numbers like turnover, cost of goods sold, gross margin and overheads 
because in doing so he can discover corruptive activities very easily. He asks 
his accountants to prepare these numbers very quickly each month and he 
benchmarks the numbers within his companies. “To be able to develop such 
controls and measures requires knowing one’s business as well as the whole 
industry very well.” disclosed a consultant.
Profound knowledge can also help evaluating and redesigning processes with 
respect to the exposure to corruption and occupational fraud. “However, the 
evaluation and the design of transparent processes without red tape require that 
management knows its business and possible weak areas very well” added the 
director of a governmental organization fighting against corruption. Another
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manager admitted that he has not systematically analyzed, where his 
companies are vulnerable, but he knows his business very well. He does not sit 
in his office but walks around in his companies and asks his employees what 
they are currently working on. This helps him to better understand the business 
processes and gives him the chance to uncover fraudsters. He advised that an 
organization has to understand not only its own business but also that of all 
companies involved in the value chain like suppliers, agents or customers.
Sometimes, management has to be very deeply involved into daily business 
processes to develop successful anti corruption controls. The owner of a 
pharmacy chain analyzed, that the reimbursement of coupons in former years 
allowed his employees to betray him, because they were able to deduct the 
discounts from the sales price without authorization and put the discount in their 
own pockets. Based on this knowledge, he has implemented a reporting- 
software in his electronic cash registers, where all price changes or discounts 
can be traced, so that no unauthorized discounts are possible. He also found 
out, that in his manufacturing facilities for cosmetics, employees stole raw 
materials and packaging materials separately, smuggled them out of the factory 
in backpacks or black trash bags, “reassembled” them into finished products 
and sold them on the black-market. He disclosed the gap by not allowing 
employees to bring backpacks with them and replaced black trash bags with 
transparent ones, so that any stolen items are more visible by his guards.
4.3.4. Paying and treating employees fair, training them and taking care 
of them
This strategy is regarded as being a key strategy for almost all entrepreneurs, 
because it can foster loyalty towards the employer by releasing the burdens and 
the problems of everyday life. It is a very successful strategy to avoid corruption 
and occupational fraud in the long run, because it directly changes the attitude 
of potential fraudsters and can take away financial pressure.
All employers stated that they pay their employees well above the minimum 
wage that is currently 224 USD, while they pay on average about 400 USD for 
low level jobs. The companies also pay for the social security and some of them
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offer bonuses, pay fringe benefits and reimburse tuition fees for their 
employees. “Smaller companies, especially in the informal sector, are not able 
to afford such expenses and therefore have to live with a higher rate of 
occupational fraud in their companies” stated the president of a local chamber 
of commerce. He explained that especially German owned companies are 
renowned for treating their employees very well, paying them well and paying 
the social security for them, which is not the rule in El Salvador. He disclosed 
that “German companies just apply the same standards like in Germany with 
respect to payment and treatment of their employees and in exchange 
experience a lower level of corruption and occupational fraud in their 
companies.”
A private person, who employs a local “muchacha” (a housemaid) from the 
countryside, stated that good payment is essential, because “whenever a 
person is in desperate financial need, that person will take any opportunity to 
escape that uncomfortable situation”. Muchachas work in environments that are 
well above their own standards of living, so it is important that these employees 
earn enough money, so that they will not become jealous, because jealousy can 
be a driver for occupational fraud. The owner of a restaurant added, that 
“treating his employees fair and leaving the tips to them is essential in his 
business, because otherwise, he cannot expect a good service for his 
customers”. Another interviewee stated that the treatment of his employees has 
to fit into the culture of the people of El Salvador. He explained that small gifts 
are very important in El Salvador because this is a part of the local culture. The 
agent for shipping lines has introduced “special days” for his employees. For 
example, once a year is the “day of the secretary”, where each secretary gets a 
small present and a half day off with full payment. However, even some of the 
supporters objected, that good payment and other fringe benefits do not 
automatically avoid occupational fraud if there are bad apples among their 
employees or people are in desperate financial need to betray their employers.
The majority of companies offer trainings to foster a professional as well as a 
personal growth of their employees. Some employers pay the fees for evening 
classes for their employees, because “investing into his employee’s education 
can help them to get better jobs and to reach higher positions in his companies
so that they can earn more money and do not need to betray him” stated the 
owner of a conglomerate of companies. He argued that training his employees 
is necessary, because in general, the level of education is low and each 
company has to support its employees so that they will be able to fulfil the 
company’s specific needs. Some interviewees reported that, in addition to a 
professional training, it is important to teach employees, how they can grow 
personally. The owner of a wholesaling company coaches his employees on a 
monthly base how they can stay healthy and how they can successfully manage 
their own life. Two other managers have lately invited bankers to train their 
employees how they to manage their personal finances without getting 
indebted, how to budget their private expenses and how to use a credit card 
without falling into tremendous debts. One of the managers disclosed, that 
“such trainings help his employees to avoid financial trouble which makes them 
less prone to corruption and occupational fraud and supports them managing 
their private live”. In addition, some employers help indebted employees to get a 
loan from the bank or to get better rates for their loans. “Helping employees who 
have private problems or are in desperate financial need” is also essential for 
another interviewee, because people in such a situation suffer a high pressure 
and the probability to betray him is very high. When they have to lay off 
personnel, some companies offer generous severance payments well above the 
legal requirements, so that these people can cover the time till they find a new 
employment. One manager explained that “governmental social security is very 
scarce and such a big-hearted severance payment is a kind of insurance 
premium against the theft of goods or business secrets by leaving employees”.
While a lot of companies offer professional trainings, just a few companies train 
their employees with respect to reduce corruption and occupational fraud. “All 
new employees will get an intensive one day training about corruption, codes of 
conduct, ethics and compliance; this training is done worldwide but the contents 
of the training is accustomed to the Central American Culture”, stated the 
compliance manager of a multinational company. The employees have to 
refresh their knowledge on an annual base and have to sign a renewal that they 
will follow the codes of conduct within the company. The compliance manager 
reported that, at the beginning, the anti corruption training was not well
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accepted among his employees, but now, the employees begin to understand 
why avoiding corruption and occupational fraud is very essential, because “the 
training includes a lot of practical examples from El Salvador and is adjusted to 
the culture of this country.”
Several companies have established cooperatives, where their employees can 
get loans or can save money for rates, which are more favourable than offered 
by commercial banks. Some cooperatives support indebted employees when 
their credit scoring is too bad to get a loan from the bank and help them bailing 
out when they are highly indebted. In addition, the cooperatives bargain special 
rates and discounts for their members e.g. when they want to buy a TV set and 
some of them even organize travel and vacations for reasonable prices. One of 
the interviewees has bought a cottage in the countryside, which he rents out for 
free to his employees. The wholesaler of drug and cosmetics has opened an 
internal counter for his employees where they can buy medicine and cosmetics 
at very favourable prices. The interviewees who operate cooperatives reported 
that the majority of their employees are members of these cooperatives. The 
managers calculated that the investment and the effort in maintaining a 
cooperative pay out very well, because employees are less prone to commit 
fraud. “His employees are well aware that they will be fired and will no longer 
enjoy such fringe benefits when their wrongdoing would be uncovered” 
disclosed the manager of a freight forwarder.
4.3.5. Strictly prosecuting offenders
All interviewees stated that it is essential to strictly prosecute offenders, 
because this would show any prospective fraudster, that his wrongdoing will 
have negative consequences for him. The interviewees made it clear, that there 
exists zero tolerance in their companies with respect to corruption and 
occupational fraud and that any perpetrator will be fired immediately. The owner 
of a real estate business reported that he strictly prosecutes offenders and “that 
management just has to be strict in fighting against corruption which will help 
them to prevent their employees from being corrupt”. He admitted that he has a 
certain tolerance towards mistakes (e.g. if a janitor breaks something, the janitor
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will not have to pay for the damage) but there exists zero tolerance towards 
corruption and occupational fraud and that offenders are immediately fired “to 
set a sign”. Strictly prosecuting offenders is also necessary which is influenced 
by the cultural and social values in El Salvador. One manager found out that a 
salesperson has betrayed him with faked invoices. He described that the sales 
price of the copy, which was kept in the bookkeeping department was lower 
than the original of the invoice. The fraudster then collected the higher amount 
from the customer, forwarded the lower amount to the accounting and kept the 
difference. When the manager found out about this, he immediately threw out 
the employee. He argued “not firing that person immediately would have 
resulted in a loss of his personal reputation as a manager in front of his 
employees. Due to the fact, that El Salvador is a very small country and that 
words go around quickly, his reputation would be damaged in front of his 
customers, suppliers and even among competitors.”
While most of the supporters would fire fraudsters immediately, some of them 
have displayed a certain tolerance against first time offenders. They explained 
that fraudsters will get a written warning for a first time offence, are closely 
observed and will be fired, when any incident will happen again. The owner of a 
tire repair shop stated that he accepts one mistake, but fires that person when 
the same mistake occurs again. He is a very religious man but excused such a 
strict behaviour because “he has to protect his company from weak or 
fraudulent employees, which are also a threat for other employees, since 
wrongdoers lower the morale in the company, reduce the productivity and harm 
the company financially, which can result, that even loyal employees lose their 
job.” Two bigger companies have implemented an ethics commission. 
Whenever a case of corruption or occupational fraud comes up, the ethics 
commission, which consists of the CEO, trusted mangers, the compliance 
officer and a spokesperson of the employees will decide about that case.
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4.3.6. Controlling employees and continuous controls within the company
Twenty interviewees agreed that it is essential to control employees and to 
implement various controls within the company to avoid occupational fraud. 
Some of them added that companies must regularly evaluate and adjust the 
controls, so that they are always one step ahead of the fraudsters. The 
companies which have implemented internal and external controls have 
undertaken a cost-benefit calculation for their controls and agree that the 
controls are worth it. Just one of the interviewees admitted, that he does not 
control his employees very strictly. He owns a restaurant and argued that strict 
controls are de-motivating people; they are contra productive to a good working 
climate and will finally lead to a poorer service for his guests. He stated that the 
level of occupational fraud will increase with the level of controls and that “it 
becomes a sportive game for employees, how to circumvent the controls”.
Several interviewees summarized the importance of controls with two popular 
sayings in El Salvador: “En area abierta hasta el Santo peca” -  in front of an 
open vault, even a saint will sin and “Puerta abierta al Bueno tienta” -  an open 
door will lead even a good guy into temptation. For them, checking their 
employees and their processes is essential to successfully operate their 
businesses in El Salvador. According to a consultant, regular external and 
internal audits are absolutely necessary to reduce corruption and occupational 
fraud. The president of a government agency added that “it is not enough to 
establish rules, ethical values and guidelines, but one has to implement strict 
controls and harsh consequences for offenders, so that these rules are 
followed”. One entrepreneur complained, that smart people know every trick to 
betray him and that strict controls are inevitable. As a consequence, he 
recommended that trusting people is not a good idea and described his strategy 
as “I trust my people -  that is why I control them”.
One interviewee advised that “managers should walk through the company with 
open eyes, checking business operations and always questioning any 
irregularities or unusual activities”. He, as well as other managers 
recommended that controls have to be implemented and monitored by top 
management or a compliance manager. However, the majority of the
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companies explained, that they do not have installed a compliance manager 
due to their small size, so the compliance management is done by top 
managers or the owners. Others explained that a compliance manager would 
be contra productive and would spoil a good business climate. However, the 
manager of a multinational company opposed this view. He reported that his 
employees see “the compliance officer not as a policeman or spy in the 
company but more like a friend, who helps them to accomplish their goals”.
All managers undertaking controls agreed that controls have to be undertaken 
by trusted employees or externals. Some managers audit their companies with 
the help of externals e.g. their accountants because in general external auditors 
are very skilled to detect fraud and are less “narrow sighted when undertaking 
the audits”. However, one interviewee objected that internal auditors are the 
better choice, because “they know the business, its processes and the parties 
involved better than people from outside”. Internal auditors have to be randomly 
checked with respect to overriding the controls because otherwise “one gets 
stuck in a vicious circle” the proprietor of pharmacies stated. The owner of gas 
stations reported, that he maintains a good relationship with the local police, 
offers policemen coffee for free and allows them to use his bathrooms. As an 
exchange for these favours, the policemen help him to check his employees 
and even volunteer to work as hidden spies in his business to cross check his 
employees and to test his implemented controls.
The majority of managers stated that, due to the small size of their companies, 
there exists a high level of peer control among their employees which helps 
them to reduce occupational fraud. One manager added that additional peer 
control exists in his companies, based on the fact that the majority of his 
employees are very religious. This attitude prevents them from committing fraud 
and encourages them to convince peers behaving in the same way. Peer 
control is also essential for another interviewee, who reported, that he once had 
employed an accountant, who was not very well loved in the company. Most of 
the employees in the company avoided any contact with the “loner”; due to the 
lack of peer control, the accountant had been able to embezzle money. The 
manager who has been betrayed, admitted that he had “completely ignored the 
red flags in this situation” i.e. a loner in a critical position lacking any peer
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control. The real estate manager explained that he looks for red flags; if an 
employee spends more money than his salary would allow, he starts an 
investigation. However, he also objected, that this is sometimes very difficult, 
because “corrupt people are in general smart enough to hide any additional 
income and they know, how to spend their haul without attracting attention”.
Another interviewee advised that one has to consider the cultural and legal 
environment of El Salvador, when implementing and executing controls. For 
example, controlling employees in front of peers is not a good idea, because 
people will lose their face in the company. He controls people separately and 
cross checks his employees through third parties without attracting attention 
e.g. he asks truck drivers of his external freight forwarder by chance, if there is 
a word around, that any of his employees have received kickbacks. While some 
companies overhear the telephone lines of their employees, which is legal in El 
Salvador, the compliance manager of an international company denied doing 
so, because this would collide with the ethical values of his company.
The owner of a jewellery production checks the stock keeping with two 
independent IT-systems and he has invented very smart controls to reduce the 
loss of gold and gems during the production process: whenever a goldsmith has 
broken a gem, he has to return the broken gem and the gold completely in 
exchange for new raw materials. All goldsmiths have a “gold account”, which is 
checked each month. The owner explained that “The raw gold is weighted when 
it is handed out to the goldsmith. The jewellery inclusive its scrap is weighted 
again, when the goldsmith returns the finished jewellery. Based on past 
experience and calculations, the percentage of missing gold should not exceed 
a certain percentage of the weight”. The owner of a conglomerate of companies 
illustrated, that his controls mainly focus on financial results like costs of goods 
sold, margins and overheads. He stated, that these three factors “allow him to 
detect and to control corruption and occupational fraud very easily and quickly 
because “red flags caused by corruption and occupational fraud will finally pop 
up as poor accounting numbers”. He therefore asks his accountants to prepare 
these numbers quickly at the end of each month for all of his entities, so that he 
can benchmark his various businesses with respect to profitability and the 
potential damage caused by corruption and occupational fraud.
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Additional critical functions, which have to be continuously controlled, are 
accounting departments and salespeople, because both of them deal with 
invoices, goods, cash and cheques. According to the majority of entrepreneurs, 
purchasing and marketing departments are also prone to occupational fraud in 
the form of kickbacks, gifts and other favours from their suppliers. All of the 
interviewees reported, that they do not allow their employees to accept any gifts 
or kickbacks and the majority of them require at least three quotes for each 
purchase. Some businesses explained that purchasing is done by trusted family 
members. Other companies stated that bigger volumes have to be approved by 
trusted top managers and employees have to explain, when they do not favour 
the lowest offer. In addition, each payment to a supplier is cross checked with 
the purchase order, the delivery note and the invoice.
Without exemption, the premises and especially the warehouses of the 
companies are guarded 24 hours, 7 days a week. The majority of companies 
have employed external security guards, since the management of internal 
security personnel is very time consuming e.g. regular background checks. The 
real estate manager explained that there exists a lot of job rotation among the 
guards, that each guard has to be trained in handling a gun and that it requires 
a lot of red tape to get the permission for owning firearms. As a result, he has 
installed external security guards and “so he does not have to deal with these 
problems and he gets reimbursed by the security company, when a guard has 
stolen something -  which is unfortunately the rule and not the exemption, 
because security guards are not very well paid and therefore a lot of security 
guards are corrupt.” The owner of a cosmetics production added that external 
security guards which are regularly rotating prevent his employees from 
becoming friends with them and therefore reduces the risk that both of them 
cooperate and betray his company.
The interviewees which have implemented internal and external controls have 
also undertaken a cost-benefit calculation and agreed that employing additional 
internal or external auditors or counting their stock frequently is a good 
investment. The importer for machinery brought it to the point: “Personnel are 
not very expensive in El Salvador, so, it is worth employing additional people to 
control others and to make regular checks in the warehouse”. One of the
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interviewees has calculated that the overall cost for all these controls and safety 
issues sums up to about 3% of his overheads, which is o.k. for him. Yet, he 
complained that “these expenses are like an additional tax, because the 
government, which is paid by his regular taxes, does not do a proper job”. A 
multi-national company complained, that smaller companies, which spend less 
money for such controls have on the one hand lower operating costs but on the 
other hand a higher propensity to bribe. Therefore, they can bypass honest 
companies in getting business in the short run. “However, in the long run, 
customers will favour buying from a “clean” company and finally, smaller 
companies will be forced to implement more controls and higher anti-corruption 
standards to stay competitive” disclosed the anti-corruption manager. He 
summarized, that being more or less free of corruption is a USP (Unique Selling 
Proposition) for his company and highly distinguishes it from competitors; such 
controls also have improved the quality of the products (e.g. no missing parts) 
and resulted in lower production costs (lower costs for the materials based on a 
reduced loss by theft) for the company.
4.3.7. Learning from past incidents and continuously updating strategies
18 interviewees have learned from past incidents and as a result have 
implemented or adopted their strategies with the help of that knowledge. 
Several supporters mentioned that it is difficult for them to be always one step 
ahead of a perpetrator and described this as a “cat and mouse game”. An 
external consultant added that implementing and maintaining controls would be 
a vicious circle. As soon as one has implemented new controls, people try to 
circumvent them, so one has to improve existing controls continuously. One 
interviewee stated that “Fraudsters are very adaptive and creative. Nothing is 
impossible and people will always find ways to betray you in a manner, you 
would never have imagined.” The manager of a chemical company experienced 
that as soon as one has detected and eliminated a weak point in the company, 
employees will find another strategy to circumvent these implemented controls. 
His strategy is to continuously learn from past incidents because the “whole 
game is always being one step ahead of the offenders”.
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During the interviews a broad range of example came up, how entrepreneurs 
have been betrayed by their employees. One company was once in big trouble, 
because their warehouse suffered from a high rate of theft. The owner randomly 
checked his people, when they left the company but did not find any stolen 
goods. In the next step, he employed a special task force of auditors, which 
randomly controlled employees, audited departments and counted cash and 
stock. However, he admitted, that the auditors have not been skilled enough to 
find the perpetrators. Finally, he has infiltrated undercover agents as employees 
and was able to find the “leak”: smart employees put the stolen goods into black 
garbage bags, waited in front of the company, till the bags have been stacked 
on the streets for the garbage collection and took out their prey. The owner 
replaced the black bags with transparent ones whose contents were clearly 
visible. The owner of a trucking business found out, that his drivers have stolen 
diesel from the tanks of his trucks. First of all, he locked and sealed the lids of 
the tanks. However, skilled truckers sucked the diesel by opening various 
release screws and valves within the fuel system. As a result, he placed paint 
marks on these screws and valves to stop the theft. The owner admitted, that 
the fuel systems of trucks are very sophisticated and therefore are not easy to 
control and truck drivers continuously found new leaks to steal the diesel. 
Finally, he completely switched his strategy and started offering his drivers a 
premium for achieving a higher mileage per gallon than calculated by his fleet 
manager. In addition, he installed GPS (Global Positioning System) in all of his 
trucks, which helps him to calculate the exact mileage per gallon. He explained 
that GPS allows him to track his drivers if they have made any private trips with 
the trucks or if they “have taken a nap during working hours”. The system has 
software included, which allows his fleet managers to optimize the daily trips for 
each of their drivers based on past tours and the latest traffic news. The GPS 
also helps him and the police to track his trucks when they are high jacked. He 
summarized, that the implementation of such new technology was really worth 
it, because it helped him to reduce his operating expenses considerably in 
many ways and purchasing GPS became less expensive than a few years ago.
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4.3.8. Installing organizational and physical issues and external 
consultants
18 entrepreneurs have implemented organizational issues, physical controls or 
have asked external consultants for help. Most of these entrepreneurs have 
done a cost benefit calculation which favours the implementation of such 
strategies. One of the companies has implemented the four eyes principle and 
asks for the authorization of critical issues by different departments: one from 
the technical department and another from the finance department. Smaller, 
family owned companies explained that they require the authorization by a 
family member or a trusted employee, when the purchase volume exceeds a 
certain limit. The owner of a conglomerate of companies has separated power 
and control where applicable and he always tries to build up additional hurdles 
and controls to reduce occupational fraud. Three companies producing 
chemical and pharmaceutical products protect their secret production formulas 
and production processes by sharing this knowledge with just a limited number 
of employees. They explained, that “everyone gets exactly the information he 
needs, but not more” and that “just a few trusted people have access to the 
complete knowledge -  the rest of the employees just know fragments, which 
are worthless to sell to competitors”.
The owner of a chain of pharmacies has installed security guards in each 
pharmacy. The guards welcome customers, protect the shops against robbers 
and observe customers as well as employees with respect to shoplifting. The 
pharmacist reported that his customers are very smart in shoplifting. The 
guards, as well as surveillance cameras and special mirrors help him to detect 
shoplifters and “to give his personnel a good feeling of being protected”. The 
owner of several gas stations explained that his cashiers have to drop any 
excess cash in their cash registers through a slot into a built in vault. The 
cashiers cannot open the vaults themselves. If the shop is robbed, the 
maximum loss is limited to the remaining change in the cash register. He 
argued, that any information for potential robbers mostly comes from insiders in 
his companies and by installing vaults in his businesses “the words goes around 
very quickly that there is only little cash available in the cash register”. Other 
companies avoid cash deals in general, since they bear a risk of embezzlement.
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A trucking company has installed GPS on their trucks. The “ruteros” (truck 
drivers) can send an alert, when they are high jacked or robbed. The fleet 
manager summarized, that GPS helps him in many ways: (1) to plan the routes 
for each delivery van (2) to know exactly, where the truck is located (3) to avoid 
that ruteros take longer breaks / absenteeism from work (4) to track the truck, if 
it is high jacked (5) to control the gas consumption based on the routes driven 
(5) to calculate in advance when the truck has to be serviced (6) to know, where 
and how to circumvent dangerous areas and (7) to avoid, that the ruteros make 
deliveries for their private business. According to the fleet manager of the 
company, the risk of occupational fraud has been reduced almost to zero.
All of the companies interviewed have employed guards 24/7 to protect their 
premises. In addition, the premises are secured with burglar alarms, 
surveillance cameras, armed doors and barred windows. Sensitive functions 
like IT, HR, warehouses and accounting are located in secured areas with 
restricted access. Entering the premises for many businesses requires ID 
checks at the entrance gate, electronic keys for the employees and some of 
them even test visitors with respect to weapons, cell phones, cameras or 
laptops before they are allowed to enter the premises. Especially bigger 
companies have centralized sensitive functions like IT, check the IT systems 
regularly, make back-up tapes, check the E-Mail accounts of their employees 
regularly and restrict access to the IT and to the Internet with passwords or 
security cards. However, some managers admitted, that “although sophisticated 
IT and technology has reduced the threat of corruption and occupational fraud, 
it is almost impossible to maintain a 100% security level”.
The majority of companies do not work together with external consultants to 
evaluate and to reduce their risk of exposure to corruption and occupational 
fraud. They argued that “they know very well where they are weak” and 
therefore do not need help from externals. Just the owner of a trucking 
company explained, that he has worked together with a technical consultant to 
reduce his costs of operating the trucks like buying trucks with fuel efficient 
engines and by optimizing the repair costs for the trucks. During his work, the 
consultant also uncovered that some of his “ruteros” cooperated with corrupt 
mechanics in the maintenance department. Since then, the owner has changed
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his mind and advised entrepreneurs working together with external experts. He 
summarized, that “This is less expensive than anticipated, because such 
professionals have a broad knowledge in their area, which justifies their 
considerably high consulting fees and they offer insights, one would not have 
taken into consideration without external help. “
4.3.9. Implementing written codes of ethics
While 13 interviewees stated that implementing written codes of ethics can help 
companies to reduce occupational fraud, just 10 of them have really 
implemented them. A consultant helping governmental institutions to foster 
transparency explained, that “establishing internal rules and principles within the 
organization and implementing a culture of ethics, respect and transparency are 
essential to reduce corruption and occupational fraud in companies”. In general, 
especially bigger and international operating companies have implemented 
written codes of ethics, which also have to be acknowledged and supported by 
their suppliers and subcontractors. Most of them have included very detailed 
codes of ethics and guidelines of behaviour into the employment contracts of 
their employees, so that these codes avoid any “grey areas of wrongdoing”.
The president of a NGO advised that “it is not enough to set up written rules and 
codes of ethics, but a company has to take care, that these rules are followed in 
reality, because otherwise, they are worthless”. A consultant stated that it is 
sometimes difficult for employees to understand these written codes of ethics 
and to follow them. She recommended that employers have to explain the 
regulations by using “illustrative examples from reality, because bare theory is 
not well suited for poorly educated people within another cultural background 
than that of their employers”. However, implementing written codes of ethics is 
not always a guarantee to avoid corruption and occupational fraud. One 
interviewee, who worked in former years as a sales manager for a big American 
company admitted, that on the one hand, he had to sign and to follow the codes 
of ethics but on the other hand he was urged to fulfil his sales goals and to 
generate new business, which in some cases required bribing. Finally, he
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circumvented these codes of ethics by employing agents and consultants, 
which have done the dirty parts of business for him and got a commission for 
their service. In doing so, he kept a clean west, achieved his sales goals and 
finally received his annual bonus.
The majority of smaller companies have not implemented any written codes of 
ethics, but some managers explained, that “everyone in their company knows 
the informal codes of ethics, which have to be followed”. The wholesaler for 
steel disclosed, that “there is no need for him to implement written regulations 
regarding the spending of money for leisure and entertainment because his 
company is very small and whenever a customer will be taken out for lunch or 
entertainment, at least one member of the his family is attending such an event 
and so, no misappropriation could be done”.
4.3.10. Working together and benchmarking with others
13 supporters of this strategy worked together with trusted friends or business 
partners, but some of them objected that the biggest problem would be to get 
honest answers from others, because peers are very concerned about losing 
their reputation when telling about corruption and occupational fraud existing in 
their organizations. A lot of the companies interviewed were family owned 
businesses. Their owners take care that no internal information gets outside of 
their companies and they do not see a benefit in working together with other 
companies, because “they do not expect getting true and open answers during 
such workshops, but just wasting their time”. They excused their attitude with an 
expected outcome, that prospective peers would not openly admit any mistakes 
and weak points, because this could harm their reputation. This behaviour is 
based on cultural issues like “machismo” in El Salvador and other Latin 
American Countries.
The compliance manager of an international company explained, that his 
company works together with the government as well as with other 
organisations like the TEG (Tribunal de Ética Gubernamental) and he attends 
conferences like the Anti-Corruption Conference for Central America and the 
Dominican Republic held in El Salvador in 2011. His management also
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promotes anti-corruption activities outside of their business. Therefore, “his 
company benchmarks with other companies in El Salvador, Central America 
and the Caribbean and he works together with customers, clients and their 
compliance officers as well as other stakeholders to reduce the level of 
corruption and occupational fraud in general”. The owner of gas stations 
networks with peer managers in the gas station business. In addition, he is a 
member of a local business circle. Next to discussing general management 
topics, they develop strategies how to prevent corruption and occupational fraud 
in their companies. The owner of a conglomerate of companies and his 
managers benchmark anti corruption strategies among the group members but 
not with third parties, because they do not trust managers outside of their group.
4.3.11. Maintaining a good business climate
All interviewees felt that the business climate in their companies would be good 
or even very good. Some of the companies have evaluated their working 
climate with the help of externals or they have taken part in local contests like 
“the employer of the year”. One company even took part in a contest evaluating 
the working climate in Latin America and the company graded very well. 
Maintaining a good business climate is for many companies an appropriate 
strategy to avoid occupational fraud in their organizations. In addition, a good 
business climate will make their companies more attractive for prospective 
skilled applicants, which are very difficult to find in El Salvador.
The owner of a conglomerate of businesses, who is a religious man, explained, 
that due to the fact that he employs a lot of people from his church, “Everyone 
applies the same standards how to treat each other, which results in a very 
good and honest working climate in his companies”. Other companies improve 
their working climate e.g. by undertaking trips with their employees or in 
organizing regular barbecues with them and their families. A manager explained 
that such events do not only improve the working climate in his company but 
also give him the opportunity to talk about private things with his employees, 
which helps him to manage the operations in a better way and to look for red 
flags. For the manager of a hotel, maintaining a good business climate is
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essential, because “just happy people are offering a good service to the 
guests”. Other interviewees explained that “a good business climate helps them 
to reduce the turnover of personnel, which is very important in a country, where 
skilled personnel is scarce”. The office manager of an agency for sea 
transportation reported, that his company is well renowned for its good business 
climate. His good reputation helps him to attract a high number of skilled 
applicants, who want to work for him explicitly for that reason.
However, some interviewees advised that one has to separate maintaining a 
good business climate from being too close with one’s employees, because this 
could be misunderstood by the employees (based on a different cultural 
understanding), which could result in being betrayed by them. One manager 
explained that he once paid the tuition fee for a low level employee and had 
invited him for regular dinners; as a result the employee felt free to betray him. 
Since then, he keeps a “healthy” distance to his employees and treats people 
based on the local cultural environment.
4.3.12. Focusing and streamlining the business
Focussing and streamlining the business and eliminating unnecessary positions 
helps 8 organizations and their managers to keep their structures simple and 
transparent. In doing so, they have been able to reduce the propensity of being 
betrayed by their employees. Four supporters added that downsizing a 
company and keeping it small can be helpful, since this allows managers to 
supervise their operations in a better way. Two consultants stated, that “It is 
essential to reduce any opportunities for people to make easy money. Making 
easy money is a threat for all organizations, because this is always the 
preferred choice for employees instead of working hard for their money. A good 
way to reduce such opportunities can be accomplished by reducing 
unnecessary positions in the company, to avoid discretionary power in key 
functions and to streamline processes”. Another manager advised that 
“Efficiency is the best way to reduce corruption and occupational fraud because 
efficient processes make it difficult for fraudsters to operate”.
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4.3.13. Downsizing the business and keeping it small
The importer for machines and tools from Germany founded and expanded his 
business for several years, started selling additional product lines and opened 
several new businesses and locations. A few years ago, he started downsizing 
his business, eliminated unnecessary products and focused on just a few main 
product ranges. He explained that the positive results helped him to reduce 
corruption and occupational fraud in his company in various ways and 
summarized them as follows:
* His business became more transparent and therefore easier to 
manage, since he has to focus on fewer products, suppliers, 
people, markets and financial numbers. As a result, it is now 
easier for him “to watch for red flags everywhere in the company”.
e Fewer suppliers and fewer products allowed him to control his 
purchasing department very closely and now, he can detect 
kickbacks and embezzlement better and faster than before.
* His salespeople have to manage fewer customers; however, the 
quality of the remaining customers has increased, so the 
propensity of bribing them to get the orders is reduced. In 
addition, he can control his salespeople better with respect of 
paying kickbacks, issuing faked invoices and the embezzlement 
of his accounts receivables.
• He was able to eliminate unnecessary positions, therefore 
reducing the chance to employ “bad apples”.
• He has to cover fewer overheads. As a result, the sales prices of 
his products became very attractive and there is no need to pay 
additional kickbacks to get the orders.
• He can focus on the USP (unique selling proposition) of his 
products because “products with a strong USP can be sold 
without paying kickbacks, but on their USP”.
* Employing fewer people increased the peer control among his 
remaining employees and therefore reduced the level of theft and 
embezzlement.
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“At the beginning of the restructuring process, I was not sure, if downsizing my 
business will work, but now, the numbers show me, that I have done the right 
thing. I increased my profitability and achieved a lot of side effects like reducing 
corruption and occupational fraud, which I have not expected. Sometimes, less 
is more.” he summarized.
Another manager has also streamlined his businesses and centralized 
important functions like accounting or warehousing for his businesses where 
each one works like a profit centre. He explained, that this helped him to better 
consolidate his businesses, to eliminate unnecessary positions and to realize 
where red flags caused by corruption and occupational fraud pop up. The owner 
of a chain of pharmacies and the production of cosmetics has centralised his 
purchasing department. He explained that this strategy helped him to reach 
economies of scale in the purchasing process resulting in better purchasing 
prices. He has been able to reduce the risk of occupational fraud in the 
purchasing department, because the purchasing processes became very 
transparent. Streamlining and shrinking his business helped his accountants to 
prepare the monthly financial reports faster than before. He argued, that “ In the 
accounting numbers, finally any fraudulent activity will pop up and the quicker I 
get these numbers, the higher the chances are to find the perpetrator”. A 
consultant helping companies to reduce internal fraud summarized, that the 
most important strategy to reduce the level of corruption in organizations is “to 
eliminate unnecessary positions, obsolete activities and red tape” and the 
quickest way to achieve these goals is to streamline the business and the 
processes within the business because “efficient companies have efficient 
processes and efficient processes hinder fraudsters to commit their crimes.”
The owner of a conglomerate of businesses has downsized his group and in 
doing so, he really increased his profitability because he became more flexible 
and achieved a better control of his companies. This helped him to detect red 
flags signalling corruption and occupational fraud earlier. He brought up a 
popular saying “sales are vanity, profit is sanity” and explained, that he focuses 
more on increasing his profit instead of increasing sales. The small size of his 
companies and a clear business focus in each company allow him to know, 
where each entity is vulnerable to fraudsters. After the successful consolidation
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process of his group, the management of his remaining companies became 
more efficient because he was able to control each business in more depth. 
And finally, he summarized that his companies became more flexible with less 
burdens of bureaucracy and red tape and he was able to eliminate unnecessary 
positions and to get rid of “bad apples”.
4.3.14. Implementing job rotation
Six companies supported job rotation as a successful strategy to reduce 
occupational fraud, but just three companies have implemented job rotation, 
mainly to train their personnel and to manage bottlenecks caused by 
absenteeism during holidays and sickness. The president of a NGO explained 
that rotating staff is a good way to reduce corruption and can help to share and 
to increase knowledge within the company. She stated, that “job rotation is 
sometimes the last chance to grow professional knowledge in a country with a 
lot of unskilled or poorly educated people and a low performing public 
education”. One company rotates jobs only to cover workload during vacation 
times. However, most of the companies interviewed are too small for job 
rotation and have not reached the critical size of employees to rotate their staff.
The managers of a NGO stated that rotating staff reduces long lasting alliances 
among corrupt employees and it allows rotating employees in their new position 
to detect fraudulent activities of their predecessor, as soon as they have started 
“to dig in detail into the daily business of their new position”. This strategy is 
also applied by the owner of a gas station. Whenever one of his team leaders is 
on holiday, not a team member, but a team leader from another team replaces 
him as a deputy. The owner explained that on the one hand, the deputy gets a 
chance to enrich his own working experience and on the other hand can cross 
check, if the manager on holiday has committed any fraudulent activities. The 
owner of a chain of pharmacies rotates external guards, which accompany and 
protect his drivers on their daily trips. He explained that the truck drives are less 
prone to commit fraud in cooperation with external guards, because both of 
them are not getting too close with each other and as a result, there exists a 
kind of peer control between them. A similar strategy is applied by the
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wholesaler of steel, who has employed an external security company to guard 
and to protect his premises. He asks the security company to frequently rotate 
their staff, so that they cannot cooperate with his employees, become friends 
with them and finally could betray him.
4.3.15. Certifying the company
A certification process like e.g. ISO 9000 or BASC (Business Alliance for 
Secure Commerce) is already done or planned in the near future by 6 
companies. As some of the companies stated, the certification helped them 
describing, evaluating and improving their internal processes. In doing so, they 
have also been able to detect any weaknesses with respect to corruption and 
occupational fraud in their companies and to implement appropriate strategies 
reducing their exposure to such risks. One interviewee explained that the 
certification process of ISO 9000 has helped him to understand his business in 
a better way, to eliminate unnecessary processes, to document his processes 
properly and to find out where he is weak with respect to any form of crime. He 
added, that “The certification has allowed him to review his internal processes 
from different, formerly unknown viewpoints. This helped him to implement 
appropriate controls and other strategies to reduce corruption and occupational 
fraud.” He disclosed that he has to recertify his company each year and 
therefore his organization has to update its anti-corruption strategies, which 
supports them to stay one step ahead of possible fraudsters.
Another company is a member of a conglomerate of businesses, where some of 
the businesses have already accomplished the ISO 9000 certification. The 
manager of that company reported that he currently prepares his business for 
the certification and stated that “such a certification in general helps companies 
to avoid occupational fraud, because their processes have to be documented, 
structured and in some cases streamlined”. In addition, his company complies 
with the rules of BASC (Business Alliance for Secure Commerce), which are 
required by his business partners in North America. He explained that “One has 
to evaluate and to certify key processes within the company to avoid crime, 
espionage, corruption and occupational fraud to reach the BASC certification.”
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The majority of the companies interviewed have not taken any kind of 
certification into consideration, because for some of them “it is not necessary 
and just a waste of time and money” and others brought in, that their companies 
would be too small and it would not give them a competitive edge against 
competitors in El Salvador.
4.3.16. Checking outsourced activities
A good strategy to avoid occupational fraud is to outsource activities within the 
value chain, but one has to closely check the outsourced activities. However, 
just three companies check their outsourced activities carefully. The manager of 
a pharmaceutical company reported that he has outsourced the warehousing 
and the physical distribution of his products to an external service provider. This 
strategy helped him to reduce his operating costs based on the following 
aspects:
• The external company and their employees are not closely embedded 
into the whole value chain, so there are fewer chances to betray him, 
since the externals do not possess profound knowledge to do so.
• The service provider rotates his personnel on a frequent base, so that 
external employees will not get too close with internals. This reduces the 
risk, that both of them cooperate and will commit any fraud together.
• The external company is responsible for any losses and damages of his 
merchandise and they have to reimburse the pharmaceutical company 
financially for damages e.g. caused by corruption and occupational fraud.
• External service providers are specialized in their service activities. They 
know their business and any areas where they are weak with respect to 
fraud, very well. In addition, they can generate synergies and economies 
of scale within their business, which makes the outsourced activity less 
expensive than provided internally.
However, the manager also advised, that essential and important processes for 
an organization like production, sales R&D or accounting should not be 
outsourced, because “one cannot completely avoid being betrayed by the 
service provider and it takes more effort to control external companies, which
increases his overheads”. The compliance manager of an international 
company stated, that it is very important to check outsourced activities not only 
for their quality provided but also with respect to corruption and occupational 
fraud. He explained that his company undertakes profound background checks 
including the financial situation of their suppliers, distributors, third parties, 
service providers and subcontractors for outsourced activities. With the help of 
a questionnaire, all of them are assessed for their potential level of corruption 
and occupational fraud including the existence and review of their code of 
ethics. Depending on their scoring, the business scope with each of them has to 
be approved by different management levels. His company strictly requires, that 
all companies which work together with them, have to comply with their internal 
rules of codes of ethics and even have to acknowledge that by signing a form. 
The manager of a chemical company stated, that “especially external guards 
are a weak point for companies, because these people are not very well paid 
and they lack any solidarity with the company, which makes them more prone to 
theft” and so, it is very important to check these externals closely.
Some interviewees explicitly stated that they do not control their outsourced 
activities because they do not want to know anything about their suppliers’ and 
customers’ corrupt activities and fear any bad reputation by disclosing others’ 
wrongdoing. A few companies admitted that they do not control external sales 
consultants and intermediaries, because they have exactly integrated them into 
their value chain to manage the dirty part of business for them.
4.3.17. Implementing a whistle-blower-hotline
Just a few organizations supported this strategy and only one of them has 
successfully implemented a whistle-blower-hotline. This company operates 
internationally and has been hit several times by corruption worldwide in the 
past. Now, top management strictly fights against corruption in the company. Its 
compliance manager explained that employees as well as business partners 
like distributors and suppliers as well as third parties can call a toll-free number 
to report any incidents. The hotline is operated by an external company, which 
reports the incoming calls directly to the headquarters without disclosing the
129
identity of the whistleblower. A global compliance department then informs the 
respective subsidiary about the incident and supports it to implement 
appropriate actions. The compliance manager disclosed, that “The whistle- 
blower-hotline in El Salvador was not very well accepted and no one used it at 
the beginning, but now, some calls are coming in.” The manager of a chemical 
company had also implemented a whistle-blower-hotline, but terminated it after 
a few years “because such a tool did not work in the cultural environment of El 
Salvador. People were hesitant to blackmail others and were not convinced, 
that their identity would be kept anonymously.” The majority of companies have 
not installed a whistle blower hotline. They stated that this will not work due to 
the cultural background of their employees i.e. employees are afraid, that their 
identity will be kept confidential and they are hesitant to grass on their 
colleagues in front of their employers. In addition, some managers brought in, 
that that they do not want to spend money for a hotline because they do not see 
any positive effects for their organization. Other interviewees explained that 
their companies would be too small, so that a whistle blower hotline would not 
work and they feared that employees could blackmail others by accusing them 
misleadingly just to harm them or to take revenge for other things. A few 
interviewees reported that in their organizations exists a kind of an informal 
whistle blower hotline, which will inform management about any fraudulent 
activities in their company. “There is no need to install a formal whistle blower 
hotline because whenever something illegal will take place in my company, I will 
be informed about it” disclosed another interviewee.
4.3.18. Insuring against occupational fraud
Just two companies reported that they have insured themselves against 
damages caused by corruption or occupational fraud. One company holds a 
robbery insurance, which covers the law suit costs as well as the damage 
caused by robbers and corrupt employees up to 80% of the damage. The 
manager of this company highly recommended such insurance, because “he 
knows a colleague who has been betrayed with more than 50.000 USD in small 
amounts by one of his employees and when he finally found out, he almost
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went bankrupt because he was not covered by any insurance”. Another 
entrepreneur has himself insured against D&O risks (Directors and Officers 
risks) as well as against damages caused by occupational fraud, but fortunately 
he never had to claim for the insurance. He explained that the organizational 
requirements asked for by the insurance company to get and to keep the 
insurance helped him to reduce his exposure to any management override of 
his controls. For the rest of the interviewees, this is not a suitable strategy 
because the insurance premiums are either too expensive or the requirements 
which are called for by the insurance companies are too demanding for them.
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4.4. Maras
4.4.1. Maras are an increasing threat for society and for the economy
The majority of the interviewees felt, that there exists less organized and violent 
crime in El Salvador compared with other Central American Countries like 
Guatemala and Honduras. However, maras became a growing problem within 
the last few years. These youth gangs extort money from bus drivers, small 
businesses, people operating in the informal sector and traders at the farmer’s 
markets. Maras also work as henchmen for drug dealers killing their competitors 
and enemies and their gang members are distributing drugs for the dealers to 
end users. Mara crime makes investments for locally owned SMEs in El 
Salvador less lucrative, because it increases the operational costs of the 
business. However, maras are not a threat for bigger companies and foreign 
investors, because such companies are rarely approached by the gangs.
The president of a governmental organization described the development of 
mara gangs and the forms of mara crime: “A lot of El Salvadorians left the 
country at the beginning of the 1980s to escape the civil war. Currently, more 
than 2 Million El Salvadorians live in the USA. Maras have initially been founded 
in Los Angeles and other bigger cities in California and Florida to protect El 
Salvadorian immigrants against attacks from Mexican immigrants already living 
there, who wanted to defend their occupied territory against newcomers. Since 
the end of the civil war in the early 1990s, refugees from El Salvador, including 
criminal mara gang members returned to El Salvador; the latter bringing back 
with them weapons, new criminal technologies and new types of drugs. The 
number of mara members has been growing steadily, because besides 
returning refugees, also poor native El Salvadorians joined the growing number 
of maras. Many refugees returning to El Salvador are illiterate and are stuck 
between two cultures; this situation makes it difficult for them to start a new life. 
Some mara members even have started consuming drugs and they behave 
very violently, since they are in desperate need for money to finance their 
consumption. They engage in drug smuggling from South America via El 
Salvador and Mexico to the final destination USA. They extort companies and 
civilians, produce and sell fake CD’s and videos, launder money, hijack cars
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and trucks, plunder containers and burglar homes. Maras steal cars and 
smuggle them to neighbouring countries supplied with new, faked identification 
papers.” Another interviewee described the mara problem as a “vicious circle”: 
drug trafficking and drug consumption in Central America fosters crime and the 
development of maras, which then engage in additional drug trafficking and 
other crime.
The US government wants to get rid of the gang wars in their country and 
forces convicted mara members to return to El Salvador. This steady inflow of 
criminals into El Salvador increases the mara problem, explained a consultant. 
Three interviewees did not share this view and referred to a peace agreement 
among the few bigger mara gangs, which is in operation since the beginning of 
2012; since then, no bigger conflicts, violence or killings have been reported. 
The owner of a restaurant, who supports imprisoned mara members explained, 
that “the life of the mara members and their families has really improved since 
then”. His view was supported by an interviewee working for a political party. 
She explained that a lot of mara members have been killed in the gang wars 
and she also referred to that peace arrangement among mara gangs, which 
helped people to escape that violence and allowed them to start a new life in a 
less lethal environment. At the time of the interviews taken, the treaty was 
working for more than five months and she disclosed that the violence has 
decreased and fewer gang members have been killed in gang wars. However, 
she also admitted that “the peace treaty is still very fragile and legally not 
enforceable”.
Most of the companies interviewed were SMEs, which have been owned by 
German families. According to their managers, maras mainly focus on small 
businesses in the informal sector, mom and pops, independent bus drivers or 
small transportation businesses which e.g. deliver bottled water to the 
neighbourhoods. As a result, the majority of the owners and their managers 
stated, that they would not be directly affected by maras. The owner of a 
jewellery production explained, that “the type of business is essential to become 
a victim of mara gangs. While mom and pops are more exposed to extortion, 
bigger businesses are not very attractive for maras, because such companies in 
general posses a higher level of security and surveillance”. In addition, the
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location of a business is very important. Most businesses of the interviewees 
were located in wealthier neighbourhoods or upper level shopping malls, while 
maras operate mainly in poorer neighbourhoods. However, a majority of the 
entrepreneurs made also clear, that all businesses in El Salvador are indirectly 
affected by mara crime, because they have to spend more money for security 
equipment like burglar alarms, surveillance cameras and they need to employ 
security guards to protect their property, which increases the operating costs of 
the business and therefore lowers its profitability.
Some interviewees complained that maras would also influence their personal 
life and their lifestyle, because “one has to be careful when disclosing personal 
information and one should lead a life without displaying any luxury to 
outsiders”. Some employers reported that their employees have been extorted 
by mara gangs and therefore asked them for higher salaries or loans to pay for 
the extortion money. One interviewee admitted that he would be personally 
affected by mara crime because the small transportation businesses delivering 
food and bottled water to his neighbourhood are extorted by mara gangs and 
therefore these service providers had to increase their service fees resulting in 
higher costs for the merchandise. In addition, he criticized that he had to 
increase the salaries of his muchachas, which commute from the countryside to 
his house because on their way to work, they have to pass “mara land”, where 
they have to pay a toll or have to provide the mara lords with food.
4.4.2. Avoiding an excessive life style and keeping information 
confidential
9 interviewees advised that investors should avoid leading a luxurious life and 
must not disclose any private information to the public, since this will attract 
maras trying to extort them, their families and their companies. An entrepreneur 
explained that his business has never been attacked by maras, because his 
office would not be very luxurious and he has not engaged bodyguards, 
because “such activities could attract maras”. Another manager maintained that 
“leading a live without creating envy from others is the best way to avoid any 
threats from maras and other criminals and to protect your company as well as
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your private live”. As a result, he drives a small car, does not spend a lot of 
money openly in the public, does not tell anybody about his personal wealth and 
has moved from his spacious villa into a well protected condominium. His 
approach is shared by the majority of the interviewees.
Another interviewee has once been extorted by maras and advised that in 
general, wealthier people should avoid disclosing any personal information 
outside of trusted people. He assumed that he became a mara victim, because 
he has neglected that strategy and therefore, a mara gang got access to the 
address of his family and to his credit card number. The gang approached him 
and pretended to kill his parents, if he will not pay a “fee”. He did d not give in 
and finally the gang stopped threatening him. Later, he found out, that this 
information was disclosed to the gang since he had not deleted confidential 
information like statement of accounts, credit card invoices or private letters 
properly before putting them into the trash bin. He imagined, that additional 
information was forwarded by "friends”, corrupt employees or neighbours and 
he summarized, that one has to be really careful when talking to other people.
4.4.3. Avoiding specific areas and business locations
All of the interviewees discussing this issue maintained that it is very important 
to carefully select the location of one’s business, because maras in general 
work locally. The real estate manager explained that maras predominantly 
operate in poorer neighbourhoods and especially in bigger cities. His business 
park is located outside of San Salvador, the capital and the biggest city of El 
Salvador and as a result, he is less affected by mara crime. The manager of a 
local chamber of commerce highly recommended selecting the location of a 
new business prudently, because otherwise, the company will suffer from mara 
crime, burglary and extortion. A businessman reported that a few years ago, he 
has operated a spare parts distribution centre in a city which is located about 
130 kilometres east of San Salvador. Burglars and maras have been a big 
problem in that location. He finally sold that shop to a local entrepreneur, 
because the losses caused by criminals had eaten up his profit margin. He 
summarized that “this was a good deal for him, because now, he sells his spare 
parts to the new owner and that person has to deal with the risk of mara crime”.
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4.4.4. Rejecting extortions and asking the police for help
Three interviewees strictly rejected extortions to deal with mara crime. One 
entrepreneur reported that he did not pay money to the maras when he was 
approached and after a while, the gang let off from him. Another victim reported 
that he once had been extorted by a mara gang. The gang called him by phone 
several times and asked for money. He did not give in and the gang threw a 
grenade into his house to terrify him and make him weak. He called the police 
and asked for help. The police observed his house, protected him, rerouted and 
overheard his telephone line and finally, the officers could arrest the 
perpetrators. The manager of a NGO explained that the government and the 
police, together with the Association of Chambers of Commerce in El Salvador 
have implemented a hot line, where companies can ask for help, when they are 
extorted. However, other entrepreneurs objected that police would be also 
corrupt and would not help them. Therefore, they could not trust them and 
would not ask them or other officials for help, because this “could make the 
whole thing even worse”.
4.4.5. Cooperating with maras
Just two interviewees admitted that they would cooperate with maras. One of 
them maintained a loose friendship with a mara gang in his neighbourhood. He 
once bought a piece of land for a new shop. His lot was adjacent to a riverbed, 
where underprivileged people lived in poor dwellings on his land. He did not 
dispel them, because he had no need for that part of his ground and finally, he 
found out, that some of them had been mara members. He still keeps a “good 
neighbourhood relationship” with them, supports them with food and small 
presents on special occasions like Christmas and receives a kind of informal 
protection for his premises. The gang protects him, his family and his property 
against attacks from other criminals.
The owner of a restaurant actively supports imprisoned mara members in 
finding a legal job, when they are released from jail. He explained, that “The 
government fights against mara gangs and imprisons a lot of their members 
instead of really helping them to change their life. Currently there are about
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25.000 people detained and about 14.000 of them are gang members. These 
detained people want to escape the vicious circle of crime, poverty and 
imprisoning because they feel that joining a mara gang has not helped them to 
increase their personal standard of living. The majority of these prisoners are 
highly motivated to become good citizens and want to take up a regular 
employment instead of being criminals. However, their chances to do so inside 
and outside of prisons are very poor and government does not provide enough 
funds to support them.” As a result, he highly recommended cooperation 
between the government of El Salvador, NGOs as well as businesspeople and 
the public in general to support these people. For him, the elimination of 
economic disparities between poor and rich people is the main key to reduce 
mara crime.
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5. Analysis of the findings
5.1. Introduction
Based on the findings of the interviews, the most important and most effective 
strategies, which have been implemented by the majority of companies will be 
distilled to give entrepreneurs in various industries practically oriented 
strategies, how to cope with corruption and occupational fraud, when operating 
businesses in El Salvador and other Central American countries. In addition, a 
lot of managers and individuals complained about an increasing threat caused 
by mara crime. As a result, this important point will also be discussed. For each 
of the three topics, main strategies as well as practically oriented ideas, how to 
implement and enforce these strategies will be displayed.
5.2. Strategies and tactical approaches to avoid corruption in FDIs
5.2.1. Implementing strict rules and procedures
In general, most of the interviewees stated that investors have to face the 
problem of corruption in El Salvador by implementing strict rules and 
procedures. This strategy will not necessarily lead to the loss of business but 
can result in an USP for companies, because business partners may explicitly 
want to do business with companies, which are not corrupt. This strategy can 
be accomplished as follows:
• Leading by example from the top of the organisation and the “right 
tone at the top” are the only feasible ways to convince employees, 
business partners and even third parties to avoid any corrupt activities.
• Making sure that FDI has sufficient time and resources it needs,
because companies which are in desperate need to acquire new 
business or which are under strong financial or temporal pressure to get 
permissions or public services to establish and to operate their 
businesses are more prone to behave in a corrupt way to achieve their 
goals than well funded companies.
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• Being in a favourable position based on the fact, that the FDI sells 
products and services with an USP can help companies to become more 
resilient against corruption, because such a position will enable 
companies “to follow the rules” without losing business.
• And finally, one has to avoid doing business with the government 
as long as the company does not have an USP with its products and 
services. Bringing the own company and its products into strong 
competition with other companies will result in being involved in 
corruption, because there exists a high degree of corruption in getting 
public tenders and competitors may be willing to pay these bribes.
5.2.2. Maintaining a certain degree of pragmatism in the business
During the interviews, some interviewees admitted that it would be very difficult 
to maintain a strict position against corruption, because this could hinder their 
business; as a result, they live with a certain degree of corruption and play that 
game similar to a popular saying “When in Rome, do as the Romans do”.
• Maintaining a certain degree of pragmatism when doing business in 
El Salvador is essential for investors. Foreign companies will not always 
be able to keep the same strict ethical standards in the host country like 
in the home base in Germany and entrepreneurs have to tolerate a 
certain, considerably higher level of corruption in El Salvador. However, 
this approach could be difficult for German investors, because they may 
find it unusual to accept even small corruption.
• Sometimes, it is essential to play that game to a certain degree and 
to “tropicalize” and to adjust the strategies to the cultural 
environment of El Salvador, because otherwise, doing business could 
be very difficult to maintain. In some cases, paying a small “mordida” to 
get a great benefit like a desperately needed permit or an essential 
service to operate the business instead of staying “clean” and struggling 
to get that permission is a pragmatic way for entrepreneurs.
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• Some businesses evade corruption by installing intermediaries, 
consultants or others to do the “dirty work” for them. Investors pay a 
fee or a commission and the “facilitator” helps them in finding the right 
people in purchasing departments, bribing them, selling and delivering 
the goods and even collecting the money from them.
• Other companies convince governmental entities to buy their products 
and services through lobby work. Lobbyists are financially supported by 
the investor or a group of investors with the intention, that they influence 
decision makers to favour the investor’s products e.g. through personal 
connections, paying bribes or doing other favours for them.
Key strategies how investors in El Salvador can manage their exposure to 
corruption when dealing with governmental entities can be mapped with respect 
to their degree of involvement in government business and their level of 
exposure to corruption (i.e. how much corruption they have to accept). Avoiding 
any business with the government will result in a low level of corruption for the 
companies; however, these companies will lose business to corrupt 
competitors. Another approach could be for them to be in a favourable position 
because the company sells very competitive products with a USP, so that these 
companies do not need to bribe to get the tenders. Other companies may chose 
to strictly say no to corruption and doing a kind of “cherry picking”, resulting in 
accepting just these tenders, where they are not forced to bribe and just sticking 
with the rules. Lobbying instead of bribing and tolerating a certain level of 
corruption will result in a higher exposure to corruption but can help companies 
to get some profitable orders. Using intermediaries to do the dirty work for 
investors will probably result in a higher level of corruption but can bring 
companies more business, since agent know, how to get the business for them 
and help them to do the dirty work. And finally, paying bribes and therefore 
playing the game like other competitors do will result in a considerable high 
level of corruption but can be a way to get more business with the government.
Investors have to make their individual choice which way they want to go. This 
decision will be influenced (1) by the industry they are in, (2) where their home 
base is located, (4) how competitive their products are, (5) how corrupt their 
competitors behave and (6) what a kind of attitude management has towards
corruption. Unfortunately, a higher level of corruption is accompanied by a 
higher risk of doing business as well as with higher costs for operating the 
business (e.g. bribes and commissions paid to agent will reduce their profit 
margins). The following figure maps these key strategies.
Figure 11 : Key strategies in the involvement of government business
Key activities in the interaction between corruption and 
involvement of government business
high
Paying bribes
CL3
Lobbying 
instead of 
bribing
Using 
intermediaries 
to  do the dirty 
work
Tolerating a 
certain level of 
corruption
low
Avoiding 
business with  
the government
low
Patience and /o r  
being in a 
favourable position
Always following 
the rules
Strictly ssymg 
no to corruption
Involvement in government business
h ig h
Source: by the author
5.3. Strategies and tactical approaches to avoid occupational fraud
5.3.1. Knowledge is essential
It is essential for managers to have profound knowledge of their business and 
its processes, their business partners and the industry they are in. They also 
need to be aware of third parties, which can negatively influence or even harm 
the company. This will help them to detect weak points, where their company is 
vulnerable to occupational fraud in its internal and external processes.
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• Managers have to know their internal and external processes very 
well and have to update their knowledge continuously, because this 
will help them to analyze their potential exposure to any corrupt activities 
and to implement appropriate controls. Investors have to constantly 
update their implemented controls and the design of their processes so 
that they will become more resilient against occupational fraud.
• Learning from past fraudulent incidents can help managers to enlarge 
their knowledge and to act proactively. Fraudsters in general are very 
adaptive and creative and as soon, as a company has implemented a 
new strategy to reduce occupational fraud, smart perpetrators will start to 
circumvent this strategy.
• External consultants and auditors can help companies to improve 
their processes. In general, external auditors have specific and profound 
knowledge when they undertake the audits. Flowever, externals do not 
always know the organization’s processes as well as internals. 
Therefore, the selection of externals with respect to their familiarity with 
the company and their industry specific knowledge is very important.
• A good opportunity to acquire and to share knowledge is to benchmark 
with other companies, trusted friends or within business reunions. 
However, it is difficult to get honest answers from peers because a lot of 
businessmen in El Salvador are very concerned that they will lose their 
reputation when they agree to discuss any fraudulent activities in their 
companies. Working together with governmental agencies in general is 
not very fruitful, since governmental officials are more interested in 
getting information than disclosing information.
5.3.2. HR Management
Managing human resources in various forms is a key strategy to prevent a FDI 
from being betrayed by its fraudulent employees.
• Investors need to hire trusted people and have to bring trusted 
people into key positions of the company, because it is almost 
impossible for managers to control all business activities without help. 
Therefore, management has to rely on trusted people in the company.
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The selection process for new applicants is essential, because it is very 
difficult to find skilled and honest personnel. HR managers have to ask 
applicants for references, they must verify the CV’s by former employers 
or other people and should check the credit history of applicants. The 
level of background checks has to increase with the intended level of 
occupation for the applicant. Some companies even apply a polygraph 
testing or a voice stress recording test during the interviews to verify the 
information given by the applicant.
• Investors have to take care of their employees to foster loyalty 
towards the employer and to reduce the risk of being betrayed by 
employees. Taking care of employees includes paying employees well, 
paying social security and offering fringe benefits for them, because this 
will reduce their propensity to betray the company to settle any personal 
financial problems. Professional training will help employees to get better 
paid positions in the organization. Some managers train their people to 
grow personally and to manage their finances and a few companies have 
even established cooperatives for their employees.
• Maintaining a good business climate is an additional way to reduce 
the risk of occupational fraud in the company. For employees, working in 
a company with a good business climate is almost as important as 
earning enough money. As a side effect, a good business climate can 
help companies to attract skilled applicants. Some managers do regular 
barbecues or weekend trips with their employees or give small presents 
for special occasions to increase the loyalty of the employees resulting in 
a lower propensity to betray the company. And finally, especially in the 
service industry, a good business climate is very important, because it 
encourages employees to offer a good service to their customers. 
However, based on cultural issues, managers have to keep a “healthy 
distance” to their employees. Being too close with employees could be 
misunderstood by them, that they can betray their employers without 
having to fear any retaliation or to ask for exorbitant salaries or benefits.
• Job rotation in the company can reduce long lasting alliances between 
corrupt employees and it allows the rotating employee in the new 
position to detect corruptive acts committed by his predecessor. Job
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rotation is also a good way to motivate and to promote employees and to 
enrich their working experience. However, job rotation is not always easy 
to maintain in small companies, which have not yet reached the critical 
size do so.
• Management must immediately and strictly prosecute offenders to
show any prospective fraudster that his wrongdoing will not be tolerated 
and will have negative consequences for him. Some of the companies 
have a higher tolerance for first time offenders. They take the costs for 
an additional personal search into consideration, because finding 
adequate personnel is very difficult in El Salvador. Others strictly lay off 
offenders and sue them for the damage. In addition, strictly prosecuting 
offenders is a cultural necessity, because it will foster the managers’ 
reputation as being in a strong position and will distract “bad apples”.
• And finally, management has to give illustrative and honest good 
examples to convince employees behaving in the same way. Top 
managers should not turn their heads away from occupational fraud 
because ethics and honesty are top management issues which have to 
come from inside the company to be successful.
5.3.3. Controls
It is essential to control employees and to implement various kinds of controls 
within the company to avoid or at least to reduce occupational fraud. The 
majority of the managers explained, that such controls also help them to run 
their business more profitably, since internal processes will be improved and will 
become more efficient.
• Controls do not only have a detecting, but also a deterring effect on 
employees. As soon as employees realize that there are not any strict 
controls established and enforced, they will try to betray the company. 
Strict controls are necessary to reduce the loss of property, theft of 
goods and merchandise, absenteeism from work and even espionage of 
business secrets and help investors to keep processes efficient.
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• Controls have to be focused on areas and functions, where fraud and 
corruption can result in a serious threat for the company. Such areas are 
e.g. accounting departments as well as other functions which handle 
cash, checks or merchandise and also marketing and purchasing 
departments which are prone to receive kickbacks. Regular stock counts 
in the warehouse and unexpected, irregular controls of employees help 
to reduce the loss of merchandise and goods through theft and 
embezzlement. The scope of controls should not only comprise internal 
processes but must also include outsourced processes.
• Controls have to be supervised by management, trusted employees 
and external or internal auditors. A lot of companies advise that one 
should prefer internal auditors. On the one hand, internals know 
company specific business processes better but on the other hand, 
externals can give additional input because they have broader insights 
into other companies, are not so narrow-sided, are in general well trained 
in their professional area and may not oversee red flags.
• When implementing such controls, investors have to adjust these 
controls to the cultural and legal environment of El Salvador, i.e. to 
“tropicalize” them. For example, controlling employees in front of 
others in not advisable, because people could lose their face. It could be 
a good idea to implement polygraph tests, voice stress recording tests or 
overhearing telephone lines to detect any corrupt activities. However, 
controls should not de-motivate employees and should not have a 
negative influence on the working climate in the organization.
• Managers have to control the efficiency of their implemented 
controls and have to update them continuously, because smart 
perpetrators will always find a way to circumvent established controls. 
Managers should be present and visible, walk through their premises 
with open eyes, check operations, question any irregularities or unusual 
activities and look for red flags. In addition, managers should learn from 
past incidents to improve and to upgrade existing controls.
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• In addition managers should think about implementing new 
technologies like GPS in delivery vans, electronic burglar alarms, 
surveillance cameras, RFID chips to monitor the access to their premises 
and other computer aided technologies.
• Companies have to undertake a cost-benefit calculation of their 
controls. Personnel are comparatively cheap in El Salvador. Installing 
additional guards and auditors in general pays out well and implementing 
the latest electronic technology is less expensive than a few years ago, 
because prices for such technology have tremendously decreased and 
offer an alternative towards expensive security personnel.
5.3.4. Set up, management and organization of the company
While native El Salvadorians intuitively adjust their anti-fraud strategies to the 
social, cultural and economic environment of El Salvador, foreign investors 
have to learn this approach. A lot of strategies, which work in Germany, do not 
work well in El Salvador. Investors have to understand that their employees and 
business partners live in families, where corruption and occupational fraud is a 
part of their daily life. The majority of El Salvadorians are poorly educated, the 
legal environment is less predictable for investors and there exists a lot of 
“machismo”. Investors have to deal with a lot of delays and red tape which can 
hinder their operations.
• It is very important to select reliable and trustworthy business 
partners or joint-venture partners. German investors in general do not 
have a close network in El Salvador, so it is difficult for them to find 
honest business partners. Chambers of commerce or business 
consultants can help them to find reliable and trustworthy partners. 
Nevertheless, German investors have to cross check their new business 
partners, must ask for references, have to make background checks and 
must observe them closely.
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• One should immediately stop doing business with “bad apples”
because otherwise, German investors will suffer from a bad reputation 
like employing corrupt employees or doing business with corrupt 
business partners. It is also recommended to have some clauses in a 
joint venture contract, which allows the investor to squeeze out his 
corrupt business partner immediately without harming the joint-venture.
• Investors should not “turn a big wheel” at the beginning of their 
business activities abroad but are advised to increase the size of 
investment, the business volume and the business scope step by step in 
accordance with a growing knowledge of the El Salvadorian market. 
Some entrepreneurs have increased the share of their local joint-venture 
partners step by step and it took several years, till these locals became 
equal and trusted business partners.
• Focussing and streamlining the company and eliminating 
unnecessary business help companies to keep their structures easy, 
simple and transparent. Processes without red tape allow them to detect 
any fraudsters quickly. One has to avoid discretionary power in key 
functions and must balance the workload in each position. Management 
has to centralize important functions so that it can control operations in a 
better way. Eliminating unnecessary positions and employing fewer 
people reduces the risk of employing “bad apples” and at the same time, 
peer control and loyalty among the remaining employees will increase.
• Streamlining processes can also be accomplished by reducing the 
business scope of the company and by eliminating unnecessary 
products in the product portfolio. The purchasing department has to 
deal with fewer suppliers and products and has to manage less purchase 
orders. Salespeople have to deal with fewer customers but of a better 
quality and solvency, so that the temptation to bribe customers is 
reduced. Finally, management can improve controls of its operations; red 
flags with respect to crime will pop up earlier and are better visible.
• Certifying and auditing the company is another way to reduce 
occupational fraud. A certification process requires, that companies have 
to describe, to evaluate and to improve their internal processes
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continuously. Organizations have to redesign their processes and must 
keep processes transparent. A certification process is supported and 
reviewed by externals, which bring additional knowledge into the 
organization. Finally, companies have to re-certify regularly, which 
requires reviewing their processes continuously, thus helping them to 
stay one step ahead of possible fraudsters.
• Implementing organizational issues can reduce occupational fraud, 
because in many cases, “the enemy comes from inside the company”. A 
lot of companies have put a “four eyes principle” into operation and they 
require the approval of at least two people for critical decisions; this 
reduces the risk of discretionary power and helps to separate power and 
control. Some entrepreneurs avoid cash transactions, because dealing 
with cash always bears the risk of embezzlement. Purchasing 
departments have to show at least three quotes before they can 
purchase goods. Managing the distribution of information in an 
organization allows, that each employee just gets the information which 
is required to fulfil his task -  but not more; only a few trusted people have 
access to the whole scope of information. Sensitive functions like IT, HR, 
R & D, warehousing and accounting should be located separately in 
secured areas with restricted access.
• Bigger companies could shrink or downsize their organizations, 
because smaller companies are in general more flexible and have to deal 
with less red tape. Downsizing a company can even result in a higher 
overall-profitability, since smaller companies in general are more 
efficient, easier to control and their management can get rid of “bad 
apples”.
• Controls can be supported by electronics and other technical devices
like observation cameras, burglar alarms and GPS tracking for delivery 
vans. RFID chips for doors control and restrict access to sensitive 
departments. Checking IT systems regularly, making back-ups of 
essential data, checking and scanning E-Mail accounts and changing 
passwords regularly increases the security level. However, organizations 
have to keep in mind, that it is almost impossible to maintain a 100% 
security level.
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• Establishing internal rules and principles within the organization, 
writing them down, and presenting them to the employees help 
companies to increase the sensitivity of their employees with respect to 
occupational fraud. Smaller companies still assume, that their employees 
know, how to behave in a “correct” way, even, if this is not written down. 
However, by not writing down rules and principles, these companies 
forgive a chance that their employees as well as related parities discuss 
and implement anti corruption activities, because written rules have a 
higher significance than just vague informal rules. Companies have to 
take care that these rules are followed by employees and related parties 
in the value chain. Therefore, managers and team-leaders have to 
explain these guidelines with illustrative examples from everyday life so 
that even poorly educated employees and business partners understand 
them and apply them. And finally, managers also have to follow these 
rules in an honest way, so that they act as illustrative good examples for 
their employees as well as their business partners.
• A few companies have implemented whistle-blower-hotlines in their 
organization, where employees, as well as business partners and third 
parties can anonymously call a toll-free number to report cases of 
corruption and occupational fraud related with that company. These 
hotlines are mostly operated by external service providers, so that 
incoming calls cannot be tracked back to the whistle-blower. However, 
some companies admitted that their whistle blower hotlines are not very 
well accepted. The majority of the interviewees objected, that a whistle 
blower hotline does not work satisfactorily in this country because whistle 
blowers are not well protected by law and people are anxious that their 
identity is not kept anonymously. In addition, El Salvadorians do not want 
to blackmail peers. Others stated that a whistle-blower-hotline can have 
a negative impact on the working climate of a company. Some 
companies rely on a kind of informal whistle-blower-hotline and get any 
information about fraudulent incidents directly from trusted employees in 
the company without a formal whistle-blower hotline.
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• Companies should insure themselves against occupational fraud, 
robbery, burglary or D&O (directors and officers) risks. Before doing 
so, they have to evaluate and to map the significance and the likelihood 
of that risk to find an appropriate insurance. Management should not 
underestimate these risks, which always result in a lower profitability and 
in the worst case can lead to the loss of the whole investment. It is 
almost impossible to avoid corruption, occupational fraud, robbery, 
embezzlement of money, burglary and espionage of business secretes 
completely and to get insurance for all these risks. Therefore, buying 
insurance for the most likely and severe risks is recommended.
5.4. Strategies and tactical approaches to manage mara crime
Maras became an increasing risk within the last few years for entrepreneurs in 
El Salvador. A lot of gangs rob and extort mostly smaller businesses in the 
informal sector owned by native El Salvadorians as well as “mom and pops” 
selling food or operating a restaurant, small transportation businesses or taxi 
drivers. Although maras are not a big threat for foreign owned and bigger 
companies, investors from Germany have to deal with a loss of profit caused by 
crime, burglary and higher overheads e.g. for security. Therefore, entrepreneurs 
have to implement adequate strategies to reduce their exposure to mara crime.
• Investors have to check the neighbourhoods before renting or buying 
premises for their foreign investments. Selecting the appropriate 
location for their business helps investors to reduce expenses for 
damage caused by burglaries, robberies and other kind of mara crime 
e.g. spraying of graffiti. Maras extort employees on their daily trip to the 
office, so employees may get in financial trouble and could betray the 
company. Entrepreneurs suffer from higher prices e.g. for bottled water 
delivered to the company because small transportation businesses have 
to increase their freight charges when they are extorted by maras on 
their delivery trips.
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• The selection and location of customers and suppliers is very 
important because in some areas, delivery vans have to pay a kind of 
entry fee to be allowed to deliver the investors' merchandise. 
Entrepreneurs have to plan the routes for their drivers cautiously to avoid 
such areas. In general, German investors in El Salvador have a different 
business focus, so the chance that their business will be harmed by 
maras is considerably low.
• Companies have to invest in security measures like burglar alarms, 
surveillance cameras or security personnel to protect themselves against 
attacks from maras. The best way to evade any extortion by maras is to 
avoid opulent offices and premises because this could attract all kind 
of criminals. Safer places to operate the business are secured business 
parks with restricted access for outsiders which are protected 24/7.
• Employers should support their employees financially to reduce any 
high situational pressure when they are extorted by mara gangs. 
However, higher salaries and loans with a high default rate will increase 
the operational costs of the investment, therefore reducing its profitability.
• Investors and managers should avoid leading a luxurious life, driving 
expensive cars or even engaging bodyguards. Private people and 
businessmen in general should keep any essential information 
confidential e.g. not talking to outsiders about their personal wealth and 
deleting written sensitive information like statements of banking accounts 
properly before putting them into the garbage.
• Whenever a company or a private person is approached by mara gangs, 
the victims should not respond on attacks, should reject any 
attempted extortions and are advised not to pay money. In addition, 
companies should call a “mara hotline”, where they can ask police 
and other experts for help. However, police and governmental institutions 
are still very corrupt and some policemen even cooperate with mara 
gangs, because they get a share of their profits. As a result, victims must 
be cautious when asking for help from them.
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• Investors have to tolerate maras and must accept a certain level of 
mara crime, because maras and other organized crime have been 
growing in recent years in all Central American Countries and became a 
part of everyday life in El Salvador, which cannot be evaded completely.
• And finally, in some cases, it could be helpful to cooperate with maras 
instead of fighting against them. Supporting mara gangs with small 
money and gifts in exchange for protection against other criminals is 
another way to manage mara crime. However, investors must be aware, 
that such agreements are weak, may not last forever and a proper 
fulfilment of such an agreement is not legally enforceable.
Key strategies how investors and private people in El Salvador deal with mara 
crime can be mapped with the level of their involvement in crime and the costs 
for the organization. Avoiding a luxurious life, opulent promises and not 
responding to attacks help companies and individuals to save money and 
operating below the radar of maras. A prudent selecting of business partners is 
another strategy to keep the involvement into mara crime low but is more costly 
(e.g. opportunity costs for lost business). The same applies for asking the police 
for help, since police is also corrupt and may ask for money to protect the 
companies. Selecting a safe location for ones business will increase the 
operating costs additionally since landlords in better locations will charge higher 
rents but on the other hand, less damage caused by maras is a positive effect 
for doing so. Investment into security equipment (e.g. burglar alarms, armoured 
entrance gates and additional security personnel) is even more costly but will 
help to reduce one’s exposure to mara crime. Offering financial support to 
employees who are extorted by mara crime increases the overheads of the 
company as well as its involvement in mara crime, since this will not stop maras 
to export employees and in the long run is not a good strategy. The most risky 
and most costly approach is to cooperate with maras and to pay them money, 
because investors are directly dealing with maras, they will have to pay fees 
continuously and any agreement with maras legally not enforceable. As a result, 
most investors prefer to lead an inconspicuous life, do not show any luxury in 
the public and do not drive expensive cars, since this is the most successful 
strategy for them in the long run.
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The following figure summarizes these approaches for investors as well as for 
individuals already living in El Salvador.
Figure 12: Strategies how to deal with mara crime
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6. Conclusions
6.1. Introduction
In this chapter, the empirical findings of the interviews and the analysis of the 
various topics will be clustered into the most important and most effective 
strategies, which investors from Germany and other countries should implement 
to avoid any threats of corruption, occupational fraud and mara crime in the 
business world of El Salvador. These strategies will be discussed and 
triangulated with the findings of the literature review. Common pitfalls, which 
can face investors will be explained as well as suggestions, how to avoid them. 
In summary, these strategies will help entrepreneurs in El Salvador to become 
more resilient against corruption and occupational fraud in their organizations 
and will help them to deal with an increasing threat of mara crime in an efficient 
way. The chapter will be closed by discussing limitations of this case study and 
by suggesting ideas for further research.
6.2. How to avoid corruption in a FDI in El Salvador
6.2.1. Implementing strict rules and procedures
El Salvador suffers from a higher level of corruption than Germany (Tl, 2012). 
Nevertheless, German investors should try to keep with the ethical standards 
they live in their home base and should implement the same rules in El 
Salvador. Anti-corruption must be made a strong part of their company culture 
worldwide (Albrecht et al., 2011; Globalt Ansvar, 2008) and anti-corruption has 
to be driven by top management (Hess and Dunfee, 2000 and 2003), because 
this is the only way to convince employees following the same strict rules and 
procedures. Albrecht et al. (2011) and DIHK (2008) recommend strictly 
prosecuting offenders, because this will send out a strong signal, that there 
exists zero tolerance towards corruption in the organization (VDMA, 2010). 
Kaufmann (1997) suggests implementing stiff penalties for fraudsters. Klaiber 
(2005) also recommends strictly saying no to corruption, openly explaining this 
attitude to all governmental employees a company is dealing with and being 
patient and pertinent to evade corruption and red tape. Poole-Robb and Bailey
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(2002, p. 96) summarize, that although the “short term advantage of ethical 
behaviour does not clearly translate into measurable financial advantage”, it is 
still worth it in the long run, because “falling foul of the ethical issues are threats 
to asset security” (ibid, p. 96) and will result in the loss of revenue in the future. 
They disclose that, companies which are not involved into corruption will be 
rewarded in the long run. Luo (2002) and Gaviria (2002) found out that 
companies which depended on corrupt arrangements rather than open 
competition suffered most, because they used corruption as a panacea to heal 
organizational, strategic and competitive disadvantages instead on improving 
such internal obstacles. TRACE (2009) discovered that none of the companies 
which refused to pay even small bribes reported any significant or prolonged 
disruption in their business activities. Hess and Dunfee (2003) recommend 
refusing contracts that require a bribe payment, because the long-term benefits 
in a corruption-free environment will outweigh the short-time profits. Investors 
need to establish social, ethical and environmental responsibility; otherwise, 
they will lose business in the long run because they rely on bribes instead of 
building up competitive advantages (Poole-Robb and Bailey, 2002; Porter, 
1985). Unfortunately, many companies have developed value statements, but 
few truly follow them to manage their business (Green, 2004).
Based on the culture of El Salvador, the size of the companies, the personal 
attitude of top management and the business they are in, it is sometimes not so 
easy to implement strict rules, since investors have to maintain business in the 
real world. As a result, tradeoffs between implementing strict rules and living 
with some grey areas have to be made.
6.2.2. Being in a favourable position
Webster (2005) as well as Lu and Beamish (2001) argue that especially small 
and medium sized companies are more exposed to corruption and occupational 
fraud than bigger companies because in general, they have fewer resources to 
eliminate them and they are in a weaker position to compete against more 
powerful companies. Kroll (2010) and Grisham (2010) advise starting an early 
planning process and allowing the FDI enough time and financial resources, so 
that investors will not be squeezed into a position to acquire desperately
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needed business with corrupt activities. Porter (1985) states, that being in a 
favourable position will help entrepreneurs to stay one step ahead of their 
competitors, because they have a competitive advantage, which can also 
reduce their exposure to corruption.
Unfortunately, especially SMEs are not always in the position to maintain this 
strategy, because they need essential services and are not always in the 
position to deny “mordidas”. The same dilemma pops up for foreign investors, 
who lack a network, when starting their FDI.
6.2.3. Avoiding business with the government
Poole-Robb and Bailey (2002) explain that public sector contracts are critical, 
because unfair competition hinders companies from exploiting their potential. 
On the one hand, intelligence is a good way to fight against unfair competition, 
but on the other hand, it is very often difficult to implement adequate security, 
because “the secrecy surrounding activities aimed at securing unfair advantage 
hinders the acquisition of such intelligence” (ibid, p.115). Doh et al. (2003) 
suggest avoiding these markets entirely, because public business partners in 
emerging economies in general have a higher level of corruption (Svensson, 
2005; Doig and Riley, 1997; VDMA, 2010). Especially infrastructure projects, 
mining, construction, healthcare and public services in Latin America suffer from 
a high rate of corruption and therefore, entrepreneurs should avoid these 
sectors completely and focus on the private sector instead (Kroll, 2010; 
Simmons & Simmons, 2006; Tl, 2010; O’Higgins, 2006).
Depending on the business scope of companies, it is sometimes not an 
appropriate strategy to avoid doing business with the government. The importer 
of sporting goods is a good example for this, since he explicitly focused on 
government business. He could not stay away from this market segment, 
because otherwise, he would have lost economies of scale.
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6.2.4. Maintaining a certain degree of pragmatism in the business
Culture is defined by Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (2011, p. 6) as “a way, 
how a group of people solve problems” and therefore cultural traditions have a 
big influence on how managers operate their business. Hall (1960) argues that 
one has to cope with different business attitudes, when working abroad. 
Investors have to consider the cultural environment and the ethical standards in 
El Salvador and have to adapt to a certain degree to them, which will inevitably 
result in “ethical conflicts” (Grisham, 2010, p. 29). Doig and Riley (1997) and 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2008) explain that it is sometimes necessary to play 
that game to a certain degree and to adjust one's business strategies to the way 
of doing business in El Salvador. Therefore, maintaining a certain degree of 
pragmatism instead of taking a strict position against corruption is a good 
advice for investors, because good ethics are not always good for business and 
can be even contra productive (Schwab, 1996; Miller et al., 2005). However, 
Hess and Dunfee (2003) and Grisham (2010) recommend trying to stick at least 
to some standards instead of operating the business completely the same way 
as El Salvadorians will do; now and then this could be a difficult task for 
German SMEs, because they lack the knowledge to do so (UNIDO and 
UNODC, 2007). Soreide (2006, p. 401) discloses, that “Adjustment to local 
practice can of course refer to legitimate ways of behaving and doing business, 
but also includes the option of active bribery.”
Caslione and Thomas (2000, p. 51) report from “the reality” of doing business in 
emerging markets and summarize, that everyone needs protection for his 
operations, “either government-sponsored or criminal-sponsored”. However 
Levin and Satarov (2000) warn entrepreneurs, that both forces are constantly 
trying to gain influence in an organization and management has to make their 
choice for one of the evils. Klaiber (2005) adds that it is reasonable paying a 
small sum to individuals to get desperately needed services and to speed up 
processes in Latin America; Bardhan (1997, p. 1334) supports that “there are 
many cases, where corruption is mutually beneficial resulting in an equilibrium 
for both parties.”
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Simmons & Simmons (2006) explain that some entrepreneurs use the help of 
intermediaries to circumvent the law and to avoid direct involvement into 
corruption. Varese (1997) found out, that lobbying is more existent in societies 
in transition like e.g. El Salvador to pressure the government into getting the 
intended support. Soreide, (2007, p. 3) describes lobbying as "a democratic 
business practice” of gaining influence which benefits a group, while corruption, 
is illegal and just benefits those involved. Soreide (2006) adds that some 
companies stay away from corruption by going through agents, consultants and 
joint-venture partners. And finally, social contributions and public donations can 
be another way for companies to obtain needed services without breaking laws 
or ethics (Doh et al., 2003).
A recurring problem in non-domestic markets is that established players apply 
illegal and unethical means to obstruct potential competitors; many new 
entrants do not know how to react or how to exploit that situation (Poole-Robb 
and Bailey, 2002). To overcome these problems, Poole-Robb and Bailey (2002, 
p. 117) recommend, that “intelligence is vital because of the detailed insight that 
can be achieved on competitors’ activities and the invisible risks present”.
Maintaining a certain degree of pragmatism is the most common strategy for 
SMEs operating in El Salvador. They tolerate small bribes to get essentially 
needed services but reject to pay bigger sums. Lobbying and working with 
intermediaries is another way for them to operate in an environment, which has 
a considerably high level of corruption.
6.3. How to avoid occupational fraud in a FDI in El Salvador
6.3.1. Knowing one’s business and the related industry very well
“Unfortunately, corruption is a complex phenomenon that is almost never 
explained by a single cause” (Tanzi, 1998, p. 30) and therefore, 11 A, AICPA, and 
ACFE (2008) recommend understanding fraud risks, so that an organization will 
be able to fight against these risks. According to Poole-Robb and Bailey (2002, 
p.7), “business strategy and operations in non-domestic markets involve risks” 
and “are very much a changing environment in terms of what one knows and is
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used to know” because they expose companies to risks outside their normal 
day-to-day experience. It is essential for managers to know their business, their 
business partners, third parties and the industry they are in very well (Bishop 
and Hydolski, 2009; Center for Democracy and Governance, 1999). Kogut and 
Zander (1992) found out, that deep knowledge and smart administration of 
information do not only help to prevent fraudulent activities, but are the reason, 
why some companies perform better than the market. Kroll (2010) highly 
recommends taking more effort and time in gathering information e.g. with the 
help of internal or external consultants, since a lot of essential information is not 
quickly available in developing countries. Such profound knowledge will help 
entrepreneurs to detect any weak points, where their company is vulnerable 
with respect to its internal and external processes. According to 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008), the majority of senior executives believe that 
a better understanding of fraud in its internal processes will help them to fight 
against deception by implementing appropriate strategies. O’Gara (2004) 
discloses that the knowledge about an organization is essential for detecting red 
flags arising from occupational fraud.
A lot of SME’s are tight on resources (UNIDO and UNODC, 2007; Lu and 
Beamish, 2001) and possess a low level of cultural experience (Cotae, 2009). 
Therefore, Cleveland et al. (2009) and Kroll (2010) highly recommend engaging 
external counsel in a review of all key strategies and asking professional service 
firms experienced in forensic accounting, investigations and compliance 
monitoring to reduce the level of corruption in the organization. Benchmarking 
with other companies, trusted friends or within business reunions (Center for 
Democracy and Governance, 1999; Globalt Ansvar, 2008) is also helpful to gain 
a better understanding and new insights "to realize the substantial benefits of 
reduced corruption” (Doh et al., 2003, p. 125). Bishop and Hydolski (2009, p. 
136) and (Albrecht et al., 2011) summarize that the better a company knows its 
business, the better prepared it will be “to proactively manage fraud and 
corruption risks and to deal with fraud when it occurs”. Green (2004, p. 60) 
recommends preparing a simple flowchart for each process “to get a graphic 
understanding of the process and the controls in place”.
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Bishara and Schipani (2009) state, that learning from past incidents will help 
managers to prevent future lapses. Spector (2005) supports, that drawing on 
lessons from past experience is essential to implement appropriate anti­
corruption strategies in the future. Unfortunately, Wells (2007, p. 405) explains 
that “surprisingly few organizations - especially the smaller ones - make any 
effort to gather historical, fraud related data" although this information is a good 
indicator of the real risks of fraud. The arrogance and ignorance of executives, 
who do not want to spend money on research and think that they knew better, 
are major threats to implement well working strategies to reduce fraudulent 
activities (Poole-Robb and Bailey, 2002).
This is a key strategy for all investors, since they know their business very well 
and they recognize where they are vulnerable. As an essence, one should 
avoid doing business in markets and industries, where an organization lacks 
profound knowledge. This is especially important for “newcomers” in El 
Salvador.
6.3.2. Hiring trusted, competent employees and keeping them in key 
positions
Good human resource management starts with transparent recruitment 
procedures based on qualifications to overcome nepotism (Child, 2007). Kroll 
(2010) and Albrecht et al. (2011) recommend that hiring trusted, honest 
employees reduces the level of occupational fraud in an organization. 
Entrepreneurs have to bring trusted and well educated people into sensitive key 
positions (Deloitte, 2007; Kroll, 2010) because these people will honestly 
support top management to control its business activities. The recruitment and 
the promotion of employees are key processes to prevent corruption (Miller et 
al., 2005; Bishop and Hydolski, 2009). Biegelman and Bartow (2012, p. 287) 
and DIHK (2008) state, that “vetting all employees through background checks 
is an absolute necessity today”, because fraud in the workplace has increased 
and checking them would be the only way to avoid hiring bad apples.
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Local attitudes are important when hiring senior managers for the FDI (Poole- 
Robb and Bailey, 2002). However, a lot of companies operating internationally 
have a shortage of people with sufficient international experience to understand 
different cultures, to analyse risk and to evaluate return (Poole-Robb and 
Bailey, 2002). Johnson et al. (2006) recommend that a company has to employ 
business practitioners with cross-cultural competence to manage the FDI. Hong 
and Doz (2013, p. 42) add, that managers with a multicultural background in 
general have the ability to act as mediators in the FDI, because “they possess 
the ability to switch between different cultures and forms of communication”, 
which helps them “to bridge disparities among the home base and the FDI” 
(ibid, p. 42). Reducing masculinity at the workplace through increased and non- 
discriminatory participation of women can reduce corruption and fraud (Sanyal, 
2005), because male employees in general are more likely to commit fraud and 
the damage they cause is more than twice as much as that caused by females 
(Wells, 2007) -  however, this is difficult to maintain in a country like El Salvador 
where there exists a lot of “machismo” (Wolf, 2009).
Companies should continuously check their employees. Martin (2012) states 
that a change of lifestyles (e.g. an extravagant style) of employees is a big red 
flag and he advises that a company should start background checks, when this 
happens. “Financial staff should be evaluated for compliance with accounting 
policies and standards, as well as with the company’s code of ethics” (Green, 
2004, p. 165). Companies should take care of a well designed exit management 
for leaving employees. DIHK, (2008) recommends that when an employee 
leaves a company, one has to check him properly to avoid any theft of business 
secrets, since the employee’s trust in that situation is very often disturbed which 
increases his propensity to betray his former employer (Burke, 2011).
Human resources management is a main strategy for all companies, because 
people run a company and not machines. This is also a key strategy supported 
by the interviewees since they take care, that they hire honest people, which fit 
to the culture of the company. Management regularly scans its employees for 
bad apples, thus avoiding to get a basked of rotten apples.
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6.3.3. Training employees and taking care of them
Albrecht et al. (2011, pp. 174) and Doig (1998) recommend educating and 
training employees properly, because this “will foster loyalty towards the 
employer” and therefore reduces their propensity to betray the company. “The 
fraud-educated workforce is the fraud examiner’s best weapon -  by far” (Wells, 
2007, p. 408). Training and education make policies clear and give employees 
practical examples how to grow personally and how to behave in a non-corrupt 
way (Doh et al., 2003). Biegelman and Bartow (2012, p. 307) explain that 
“Training reinforces a company’s commitment to ethical conduct and 
compliance with company policies, as well as government laws and regulations” 
and that “one has to use interactive, scenario based training at all levels o f the 
organization” (ibid, p. 307). Ernst & Young (2011) advise that it is essential to 
provide anti-bribery training especially for those employees who represent the 
greatest bribery risks e.g. in purchasing and accounting. Benfoddova et al. 
(2000) recommend workshops with employees and managers under the 
leadership of an expert consultant to create ethical codes and to teach these 
codes to the employees.
Pepys (2005) explains that one response to corruption and occupational fraud is 
to improve the terms of employment and to take care of employees. Wells 
(2007) advises paying employees properly and rewarding them not only for the 
end result without considering the means, how they have achieved their goal. 
For the evaluation of salaries, one should not only consider, what is “actually” 
justified, but also, what employees “perceive” to be justified; in addition 
employers should avoid unreasonable expectations from their employees, since 
employees will finally try to get their share by betraying the company (Wells, 
2007, p. 406). Child (2007) explains that addressing staff welfare will reduce 
staff’s inclination to corrupt practices e.g. when they experience periods of 
financial difficulties. Wells (2007) adds that even trusted employees can 
become violators, when they are facing a financial problem. Next to the size of 
their actual income, employees need realistic opportunities for career and 
income progression (Child, 2007).
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Stachowicz-Stanusch (2010) argues that an organization can reduce corruption 
and occupational fraud by developing and consequently managing positive 
corporate and organizational identity, thus maintaining a good business climate. 
La Porta et al., (1997, p. 337) and Hosmer (1994) conclude that trust in 
organizations promotes a formation of “horizontal networks of cooperation” 
among people and generates commitment, which finally will foster ethics in an 
organization. Tomlinson (2011, pp. 132) recommends rising trust within 
organizations with the following strategies (1) promoting employee benevolence 
and integrity (2) balancing trust and control of employees (3) attributing control 
to issues of risk, not of trust and finally (4) being a trustworthy employer. Wells 
(2007, pp. 18) refers to the Hollinger-Clark Study conducted in 1983, which 
found out, that “job dissatisfaction is the primary cause of employee theft.” 
According to Child (2007), employees regard their working environment 
particularly important for job satisfaction because this can send a signal, that 
they are valued. A good business climate fosters job satisfaction and helps to 
reduce a high staff turnover, which especially in Latin America is very common 
and which can lead to the theft of important business secrets by the leaving 
employee (Kroll, 2010).
All interviewees stated that one has to treat people fair and to take care of them 
in various ways, thus increasing their loyalty and increasing their propensity to 
betray the company. This approach is also in line with “tropicalizing” the 
strategies to the cultural environment of El Salvador, because soft factors like 
celebrating the birthday of an employee is very important for staff this country 
and also a USP for companies to find adequate personnel.
6.3.4. Organizational issues
Fink (2005, p. 149) explains, that it is dangerous to place a large amount of 
responsibility on one person because this can make a project vulnerable to 
fraud. Occupational fraud arises, when one person is handling all matters 
throughout the value chain (O’Gara, 2004). Biegelman and Bartow (2012) report 
that the lack of separation between power and control will lead to good 
opportunities for employees to betray a company in various forms. Therefore, 
Wells (2007) recommends job rotation and enforced vacations, because this will
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help to detect offences when the perpetrator leaves or is off duty and it will 
avoid building up trusted networks among corrupt employees (Lambsdorff, 
2002; Tirole, 1986). The rotation of administrative staff must be frequent, so that 
these employees cannot exploit any power bottlenecks or other weak areas 
(Kroll, 2010). Lingham (2010) found out, that teams crossing functions and 
levels can help organizations to generate an environment that fosters ethical 
behaviour and consequently reduces occupational fraud.
All companies have implemented various kinds of organizational issues to 
prevent occupational fraud. All activities have to fit to the company's individual 
set up and some of them cannot be implemented based on the companies' size. 
While even smaller companies separate power in various ways, rotating staff is 
almost impossible for them, because they do not have the critical size to do so.
6.3.5. Strictly prosecuting offenders
Management must immediately and strictly prosecute offenders, because the 
longer corruption and fraud exist, the more endemic they become and the more 
effort it takes to extinguish them (Ali and Isse, 2003). Omitting to do so will send 
a wrong signal to perpetrators, “because it could be understood by would-be- 
perpetrators of fraud that, if you are caught, you do not have to worry about 
prosecution” (O’Gara, 2004, p.57). Bishop and Hydolski (2009, p.67 and p.71) 
recommend “to provide discipline for violations of the code of ethics / conduct in 
written form”. The cooperation of employees in internal investigations is critical 
and therefore, a company code of conduct should include the statement that 
employees are required to cooperate fully with any authorized investigation 
(Biegelman and Bartow, 2012).
Wells (2007) found out, that the most common response of companies, which 
have been betrayed, was on the one hand to immediately fire the perpetrator 
(87% of the interviewees); however, on the other hand 76.5% of them avoided 
taking any legal actions, because they felt a bad publicity. The Corporate Crime 
Reporter (2007) supports the latter and summarizes that a lot of companies 
prefer non prosecution agreements instead of strictly prosecuting offenders.
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Poole-Robb and Bailey (2002) explain this behaviour with the circumstance, 
that many less-developed markets have corrupt judicial systems, which both 
increase costs and lengthen the time required to reach verdicts. Nevertheless, 
Ernst &Young (2011) advise that one should not tolerate any unethical conduct 
across all levels of organizations, because only consistency enforces sanctions.
When cases of corruption arise, it is essential to suspended suspected staff 
immediately so that no evidence is compromised and to ensure, that 
perpetrators are prosecuted and their outcomes are published (Child, 2007). 
Miller et al. (2005) advise that any punishment of offenders must be done 
immediately to be effective, because this is the direct logic of a reactive anti­
corruption system where the perpetrator, as a direct result, should be 
apprehended, tried, and if found guilty, punished in some way. Olken (2007) 
and Luo (2008, p. 139) warn that audits and controls are sometimes not as 
powerful as one would believe, because the punishment of offenders is 
relatively weak and “the organization tolerates long term corruption practices”. 
Klitgaard (1998a) argues, that just “frying a few big fish”, especially those, which 
are already identified is not enough, but one has to prosecute all offenders and 
management must reprimand such corrupt behaviour with a range of penalties 
like loss of professional standing or loss of travel privileges. 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2008) warns that not strictly prosecuting offenders 
will have a negative effect on the reputation of the company and that a company 
will finally lose attractiveness to new recruits.
Strictly prosecuting offenders to set the tone and to act as deterrent examples 
for prospective fraudsters is done by all companies. This is also a cultural issue, 
because tolerating occupational fraud is regarded as being a weakness of the 
management. However, due to the size of the country, the labour market in El 
Salvador is considerably small. Therefore, some companies give fraudsters a 
second chance, since it is hard to replace staff in El Salvador. So, 
entrepreneurs have to make a trade-off between strictly prosecuting offenders 
and finding or replacing skilled personnel.
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6.3.6. Management has to give good examples
Top management has to give illustrative and honest good examples and has to 
be committed to the anti-fraud activities in the organization because staff may 
well tend to follow the good or bad examples set by them (Child, 2007; DIHK, 
2008). Deloitte (2007) found out, that in more effective companies, a higher 
portion of senior executives are involved in fraud and corruption control. 
Biegelman and Bartow (2012, p.385) add that “no employee can be expected to 
follow company policy or obey laws if their leaders are not doing the same”. 
O’Gara (2004) estimates, that almost 60% of all occupational fraud against the 
organization is committed by management, so including management into all 
anti-fraud activities is very important. Senior management, the board of 
directors and the audit committee have the primary responsibility of creating the 
tone, have to show a full commitment to the anti fraud strategies and have to be 
illustrative good examples themselves (Bishop and Hydolski, 2009). Tanzi 
(1998, p. 34) recommends “honest and visible commitment by the leadership” to 
fight against corruption. Schwartz (2011) explains that the continuous presence 
of ethical leadership is one key element for an ethical corporate culture which 
has to be openly displayed by top management. Very often, arrogance and 
ignorance of executives fosters corruption, because these executives ignore the 
risk of occupational fraud and “behave in a way that they know better but do 
not” (Poole-Robb and Bailey, 2002, p. 139). Top management should never 
tolerate any “Chutzpah Defences” (Biegelman and Bartow, 2012, pp. 8), where 
any person in charge of detecting fraud excuses himself by stating that he did 
not have enough expert knowledge in that specific area to detect the fraud.
All interviewees stated that management in El Salvadorian companies have to 
give good and honest examples for their employees, thus convincing them to 
behave in the same way. One interviewee summarized, that “management 
cannot expect employees to behave honest, if management does not lead the 
same way”.
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6.3.7. Working together with third parties
According to Johnston (1998), investors should encourage in long-term social 
activities to reduce corruption. Omazic (2010) and Lin (2010) report best 
practice cases, where companies work together with local communities to 
improve the conditions for a better life in communities where they do business. 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) which means “engaging in socially 
responsible actions and contributing positively to the societies in which they 
live” can improve the ethical environment of the workplace resulting that 
employees are less likely to engage in deviant behaviours (Omazic, 2010, 
p. 388). Cragg et al. (2011) explain that integrity pacts between private bidders 
and governmental agencies can generate mutual agreements to reduce 
corruption and fraud where governments, bidders and even civil society are the 
winners. Jarquin and Carillo-Flôres (2000, p. 199) disclose, that “the role of 
citizens (both individuals and the public as a whole), trade groups and various 
organizations of civil-society are crucial to combat corruption and occupational 
fraud by reinforcing the processes”.
Working together with peers and externals, as well as with governmental 
agencies can help to get information and new insights how to cope with 
corruption and occupational fraud in the own organization (Klaiber, 2005). 
UNIDO and UNODC (2006) state, that business associations and trade 
chambers can train SMEs in corruption prevention and provide them with 
practical information. However, The World Bank (2000) objects, that those 
collective business associations for countries in transition are difficult to find due 
to diverse private interests. Hess and Ford (2008) add that whole companies or 
corrupt managers try to hide information about corruptive acts because they 
fear prosecution and a bad reputation.
Just a few companies in reality work together with others. Influenced by social 
norms and manners in El Salvador, potential peers in general are not willing to 
share information about such a sensitive topic like occupational fraud. The 
majority of them fear to lose their face, when admitting, that such activities have 
taken place in their company. Working together with governmental agencies like 
the TEG is adversely discussed. While private people and managers regard
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such meetings as being worthless for them because governmental counterparts 
would just take information but not disclose information, officials regard this 
strategy to be very helpful for them since they get new insights from others.
6.3.8. Implementing adequate and effective controls
Kroll (2010, p. 20) found out, that in the year 2010, investments in financial and 
other controls have been the most important investments for companies doing 
business in Latin America to prevent loss caused by corruption and 
occupational fraud. Corruption control is a complex construct which has to be 
viewed in a multidimensional context (Lange, 2008). Klitgaard (1998) advises 
that controls should be applied to analyze systems, rather than particular 
individuals. A good anti-corruption system maintains controls in a balance 
between its components because otherwise it “creates a secretive and punitive 
culture” (Miller et al., 2005, p. 153).
Wells (2007) as well as Biegelman and Bartow (2012) state, that one can 
prevent corruption and occupational fraud by implementing strict controls, since 
such controls will have a deterring effect on employees and will increase the 
perception of detection to a possible fraudster (Doig, 1998). According to 
Bishop and Hydolski (2009, p. 67), “a strong control environment promotes 
controls to prevent, to deter, and to detect fraud” and “sets an appropriate tone 
for the entity’s attitudes toward fraud and fraud prevention”. Such controls are 
also a good way to identify red flags and other side-effects of fraudulent 
behaviour (Albrecht et al., 2011); red flags are often the first indication of fraud, 
since “fraud is usually committed behind closed doors, and perpetrators make 
great efforts to hide their actions” (ibid, p. 179)
Controls have to be focused on sensitive areas or functions. Saksena (2012, p. 
55) highly recommends focusing controls on two major categories of assets 
which are misappropriated: “cash and inventory” and “other assets”. Bishop and 
Hydolski (2009 and 2009a) have developed a “heat map” and Kriebel (2012) 
has designed a “risk and chance matrix”, where managers can evaluate their 
company in terms of likelihood and significance of occupational fraud so that 
they can focus their controls on areas, where they are able to absorb the risks. 
Wells (2007) recommends surprise audits, because the threat of surprise audits
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may be a powerful deterrent. Controls should not only comprise internal 
processes, but also outsourced activities, which can be prone to “self­
enrichment via conflict-of-interest arrangements” (O’Gara, 2004, p. 60). A 
company has to monitor specific employees and certain groups of employees 
very closely, because the most damaging crimes are committed by older, 
educated and trusted male employees, mostly from the management level 
(Green, 2004). Kroll (2010) and Tl (2009) suggest conducting background 
checks for employees and for the whole scope of companies an investor is 
doing significant business with. Cleveland et al. (2009) and VDMA (2010) also 
advise the careful evaluation of third parties in the value chain.
Effective anti-corruption strategies need to be tailored to the social environment 
in which corruption occurs (Doig and Riley, 1997). Cultural sensitivity of the 
management is required when implementing such controls (Holzmiiller and 
Stôttinger, 2001). Biegelman and Bartow (2012, pp. 383) advise, that all 
activities have to be adopted to the cultural environment and have to be 
continuously adjusted to changes so that they will finally become embedded in 
the “cultural-mind-set” of all employees. Wells (2007, p.9 ff) warns, that controls, 
which are de-motivating employees can bring them to commit fraud, since 
employees feel humiliated and therefore want to “get even with their employer”. 
The development of core values and their protection through regular controls 
have to refer to all stakeholders and must take cultural patterns into 
consideration (Stachowicz-Stanusch, 2010, London and Hart, 2004). All 
controls have to be reviewed and updated continuously to be effective (Tl,
2008), because “the ever-changing nature of corruption makes continuous 
monitoring essential” (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2008, p. 19; VDMA, 2010). 
Green (2004, p. 21) adds that “the crimes of tomorrow will be different from the 
ones today” and explains, that setting the focus on a single risk is like 
“overstuffing a suitcase”; therefore, companies need a proactive approach in 
implementing, monitoring and adjusting their controls. According to Bishop and 
Hydolski (2009), companies also need to consider any possibility of 
management override of the controls, because this is regarded by professionals 
the most cited concern (Cain, 2012). Finally, Wells (2007) warns that tightening 
controls can lead to a “hydraulic effect” (ibid, p.23) which can result, that
169
employees will find other ways to betray a company, as soon as a specific 
control is implemented. Therefore, monitoring the conditions of the complete 
control structure is necessary, because otherwise, controls will fail (Green, 
2004). Finally, Schwartz (2011, p. 292) summarizes that “due to human nature 
crime, corruption and other illegal or unethical activity is unlikely ever to be 
completely eliminated [...] regardless of whatever efforts are undertaken”.
UNIDO and UNODC (2007) found out, that especially SMEs do not want to 
spend money to prevent corruption and occupational fraud because they often 
lack the awareness of the long term hidden costs, which are considerably 
higher than the short term expenses to implement controls. However, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2008) explains that the cost of implementing controls 
pay off well in the long run and therefore, it is wise for companies to undertake a 
cost-benefit calculation of the controls. Bishop and Hydolski (2009, p. 22) argue 
that fraud is not only costly, but it can be hard to recover from and so, 
investments in any kind of fraud prevention and detection is money, which is 
well invested, since “ongoing fraud and corruption schemes represent a 
continuous drain of a company’s profitability”. Singleton and Atkinson (2011) 
also favour anti-fraud and anti-corruption activities, because the most effective 
controls and anti-fraud activities like job rotation, mandatory vacation, training 
for employees and outsourced whistle-blower hotlines are relatively inexpensive 
to implement. Miller et al. (2005, p. 148) disclose, that in many enterprises, risks 
have been reduced to such a degree that management has made the decision 
not to proceed with further risk management, because the residual risk is an 
“acceptable risk” for them.
All investors have implemented controls to prevent their employees as well as 
third parties to betray them. They have adjusted the controls to their individual 
needs as well as to the social norms in El Salvador. Since the majority of 
managers maintain to know their business very well, it is easy for them to 
undertake a cost-benefit analysis and to install controls in an efficient way. They 
also evaluate und implement controls on a frequent base and learn from past 
incidents to stay ahead of possible fraudsters. However, especially SMEs 
tolerate a certain level of occupational fraud, since it is very costly to delete 
such activities completely and “no vale la penal” (It is not worth it!).
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6.3.9. Installing internal and external auditors
Internal control is not a separate discipline but an important component of the 
overall management process guiding the enterprise (Green, 2004). Internal 
auditors, people from the management level and trusted employees play an 
important role in performing proactive fraud and corruption detection work and 
“internal audit departments must accept the challenge to take a leadership role 
in fraud prevention” (Biegelman and Bartow, 2012, p. 385). Therefore, VDMA 
(2008) recommends installing a compliance manager in an organization to 
cover this important function. Musau and Vian (2008) prefer internal auditors, 
because even competent external auditors start their work in general later than 
internal ones and a lot of damage can happen in the meantime; in addition, 
externals could lack specific knowledge of the company or an industry 
necessary to detect any fraudulent activities.
However, the experience of independent externals and outside professionals 
involved in the area of occupational fraud detection is also important for 
companies, because these externals in general posses profound knowledge 
and can support internal auditors in detecting additional wrongdoing (Bishop 
and Hydolski, 2009; Miller et al., 2005). Cleveland et al. (2009) explain that 
professional service firms experienced in forensic accounting, investigations 
and compliance monitoring can assist and support internal auditors. Fraud risk 
assessment and fraud risk control should also evaluate access and override of 
system controls and the help of outside experts should be taken into 
consideration when doing so (HA, AICPA, and ACFE, 2008). Martin (2012) also 
emphasizes the value of an independent evaluation by security firms in 
analyzing the risk of corporate security, since these people have specific expert 
knowledge in this field.
This topic is discussed diversely by the interviewees. While especially bigger 
companies have installed internal or external auditors, smaller companies rarely 
do so, because they do not have enough personnel or do not want to spend 
money for internal auditors. They also object that external auditors would lack 
company or industry specific knowledge. Unfortunately, they forgive a chance to 
get new insights.
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6.3.10. Implementing the latest technology
Bishop and Hydolski (2009, pp. XXIV) highly recommend implementing anti­
money laundering software or advanced analytics to monitor business 
processes for potential fraud and “to enforce higher standards of compliance, 
transparency, and efficiency”. However, management has to apply these tools 
wisely and has to understand “both the potential benefits of advanced 
technology and its inherent limitations” (ibid, p. XXIV). Deloitte (2007) found out, 
that more effective companies in fighting against occupational fraud have 
implemented increased use of technology to monitor this threat. Poole-Robb 
and Bailey (2002 p. 246) state, that technology has come to the aid of closing 
potential weaknesses like the defence of stock with cameras, audio verification, 
a network of detectors, sound alarms and “other tricks that alert standard 
security and police protection”. According to O’Gara (2004, p. 184) and 
Biegelman and Bartow (2012), CAATs “computer-assisted audit techniques” 
and other forensic data analysis tools “are the wave of future to detect fraud in 
organizations”. Bishop and Hydolski, (2009) disclose, that controls have to be 
automated, because they are in general better than manual fraud controls and 
therefore, the best solution to do so is implementing the latest technology.
Since electronic devices like GPS and other technology (e.g. RFID chips) 
became less expensive in the last few years, many companies have installed 
them. However, businesses still favour employing security guards, since their 
wages are considerably cheap and armed guards have a deterrent effect on 
prospective fraudsters.
6.3.11. Set up, management and organization of the company
All fraud risk management strategies have to be integrated within the FDI as 
well as within its various affiliated companies worldwide (Bishop and Hydolski,
2009). Doig (1998) recommends concrete actions rather than refining theories 
and processes to fight the current high level of corruption; Doig and Riley (1997) 
suggest considering more universalistic strategies as well as timing and 
sequence when developing and implementing anti corruption strategies. Poole- 
Robb and Bailey (2002, p. 281) state, that “short terminism” is a problem both
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within and outside of the company, resulting in limited budgets and timescales, 
which will increase the exposure to corruption and occupational fraud; 
companies are strongly advised to avoid these common pitfalls and implement 
long term strategies instead.
Anand et al. (2009, p. 226) have discussed a variety of individual organizational 
responses to corruption and occupational fraud and summarize, that in reality, 
firms react with a mixture of responses, which can either be “a combination of 
strategies or the sequence of actions”; the latter form is often applied when the 
case proceeds and circumstances change, which happens when companies 
operate in developing countries like El Salvador. Doh et al. (2003) recommend 
that firms should pursue multiple business strategies and options to combat 
corruption and occupational fraud. For all activities, “cross-group collaboration 
among chief executives, officers, directors, and the various legal, compliance, 
internal audit, finance, human resources, investigative, and corporate security 
functions” is essential to reduce occupational fraud (Biegelman and Bartow, 
2012, p. 387). 11A, AICPA, and ACFE (2008, p. 6) have set up key principles for 
managing an organization’s fraud risk including implementing a fraud risk 
management, a regular fraud risk exposure assessment and appropriate 
detection techniques.
It is very important to select reliable and trustworthy business partners or joint- 
venture partners when initially starting the investment process (Kroll, 2010; 
Grisham, 2010). Adjusting the entry mode based on the level of corruption in 
the host country (e.g. joint ventures are more adequate if the level of corruption 
is high) is also essential (Doh et al., 2003; Rodriguez et al., 2005). Smarzynska 
and Wei (2000) add that there is always a basic trade-off between fighting 
corruption and losing valuable know-how to local partners in a corrupt 
environment. Biegelman and Bartow (2012) advise that a good rule is having 
zero tolerance for fraud and meaning it, resulting in immediately stopping 
business with corrupt employees and business partners. Therefore, Wells 
(2007) requires, that an organization must take all reasonable steps to 
appropriately respond to this offense by providing clear behavioural boundaries 
and by giving feedback to employees and business partners (Green, 2004).
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Focussing and streamlining the company and its processes, eliminating 
unnecessary business, getting rid of unnecessary positions and downsizing the 
company can help companies to keep their structures simple and transparent, 
since the lack of transparency and accountability and a high level of 
bureaucracy facilitate corruption and harm the performance of a FDI (Miller et 
al., 2005; Poole-Robb and Bailey, 2002). “Transparency enables existing 
corruption to be brought to light and discourages incipient corruption” (Miller et 
al., 2005, p.43). Juravlev (2012) adds that good administrative processes like 
implementing clear and objective criteria for any management decisions are 
essential. “Designing out” corruption in processes through simplified, 
transparent administrative procedures and oversight controls is one important 
component to reduce occupational fraud (Moran et al., 1999, p. 597). Good 
process design and a feedback process that contains best-practice attributes 
will help a company to become more effective; nonstandard processes should 
be avoided, because they lack any controls and can foster occupational fraud 
(Green, 2004). Speeding up processes is another tool to reduce corruption and 
occupational fraud (Del Castillo and Ampudia, 2005). Finally, organizations 
need to be “right-sized and well designed” to counter corruption (Miller et al., 
2005, ix). The Center for Democracy (1999) therefore asks organizations to 
eliminate unnecessary positions and to reduce the number of employees.
A quality management system has to be integrated into anti fraud activities, 
which contains risks assessment and risk management for various aspects 
including corruption and occupational fraud (Doig, 1998). Certifying a company 
requires a continuous improvement of processes by reviewing and learning as 
described by Deming in 1986 with the “PDCA cycle: plan -  do -check -  act” 
(Dahlgaard, 2002, p. 285). Wells (2007, p. 409) advises “bringing up at every 
phase of a routine audit or management review the subject of fraud and abuse 
to raise awareness of these issues”. The certification of a company also 
requires the documentation of processes, which is supported by Child (2007), 
who asks that all procedures should be fully documented in procedure manuals 
and desk instructions to reduce any override of the implemented controls.
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UNIDO and UNODC (2006) as well as Tl (2009) advise that any organizational 
issues have to meet the specific needs of SMEs, the particular business they 
are in, their location and the capacities available in those firms. Fink (2005) 
found out, that placing a large amount of responsibility on one person can make 
a project vulnerable to corruption. Juravlev (2012) recommends that 
entrepreneurs should avoid the decentralization of tasks to reduce a high level 
of discretionary power. Wells (2007, p.279) and Miller et al. (2005, p.33) refer to 
a popular saying of Lord Acton “Power corrupts. And absolute power corrupts 
absolutely” and suggest, that implementing the principle of the division and 
separation of responsibilities is a good way to avoid any conflicts of interest. 
Green (2004, p. 69) explains that “segregation of duties is a common and basic 
control lever often employed in organizations that have enough human 
resources to divide tasks into discrete bits so that no single person can effect a 
transaction without the help of others”. Huther and Shah (2000) as well as Wells
(2007) suggest diverting business to various vendors and tightening 
procurement guidelines. The DIHK (2008) and Tl (2009) recommend 
implementing the “four eyes principle”, job rotation among employees and a 
strict separation between business and private sphere as effective 
organizational issues, which will help to reduce “the inappropriate use of 
corporate resources for personal reasons” (Biegelman and Bartow, 2012). 
Installing a compliance officer will help SMEs to be prepared for the future 
because compliance will become more complex than today and will become an 
important issue for all companies (Kerkhoff et al., 2012). An adequate IT 
security strategy is essential for companies to protect their hard-, software and 
data against internal and external intruders; state of the art techniques have to 
be applied to ensure that a company will stay compliant with the increasing 
importance of that issue (BSI, 2007; Kerkhoff et al., 2012). Child (2007) explains 
that the centralised processing of data can make collisions of corrupt 
employees more difficult. Green (2004) as well as Poole-Robb and Bailey 
(2002) recommend focussing on the control of information flows and the 
restriction of unauthorized dissemination of information, since the loss of 
business secrets can harm a company’s reputation and may lead to financial 
losses. As a general strategy, Kroll (2010) advises keeping overseas operations 
like foreign FDI’s initially separate, so that in the worst case, at least the
headquarters will not be harmed. And finally, physical security measures like 
installing electronic locks on data centres, strongboxes for valuables, electronic 
security monitors and restricted access to sensitive areas like warehouses or IT 
centres are good, visible and longstanding material controls to protect an 
organization and its employees (Green, 2004).
While the literature recommends a strategic approach to prevent occupational 
fraud, especially smaller SMEs lack the resources and the knowledge to do so. 
As a result, they stay with the daily business and operate in fraud preventing 
just tactically. Some issues discussed are not feasible for them, because they 
are too small. New investors in general operate more tactically, since at the 
beginning of the investment process in a foreign country they do not possess all 
relevant information to do otherwise. The owner of a very successful 
conglomerate of businesses is an illustrative exception. He works very 
strategically, organizes his company very well and in doing so, he does not only 
reduce corruption and occupational fraud, but has also increased the 
profitability of his companies. This manager advises that management has to 
continuously monitor its strategies to be successful in the long run.
6.3.12. Establishing and publishing internal rules and principles
Companies, which have implemented written codes of ethics, are less likely to 
accept international bribery (Kinney and Moore, 2008). Bishop and Hydolski 
(2009, p. 74) add, that “one of the most effective mechanisms for promoting 
ethical behaviour is a written code of ethics or code of conduct”. The DIHK
(2008) and Tl (2009) recommend avoiding any grey areas by implementing 
clear guidelines. “Effective codes of ethics facilitate the engagement between 
pre-existing moral values on the one hand, and the reality of day-to-day practice 
on the other hand.” (Miller et al., 2005, p.139). Doh et al. (2003) and The Center 
for Democracy and Governance (1999) suggest providing workshops for 
employees, making the policies of conduct clear and teaching employees with 
the help of practical examples to increase their understanding. Wells (2007) 
asks for the participation of all employees in training programmes which should 
provide practically oriented examples, how to avoid corruption and occupational 
fraud. Schwartz (2011, p. 283) goes one step further and requires “a sign-off
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provision, whereby employees acknowledge that they have read, understood, 
and/or complied with the code”. However, Antes and Mumford (2011) warn, that 
codes of conduct are limited, because they tend to overemphasize the 
outcomes and overlook processes and as a result, they may not work well in 
everyday's business.
While some companies train their employees to grow personally just a few of 
them provide anti corruption training. The majority of companies maintain that 
they have implemented internal rules and principles, but just a few managers 
have written them down. They argue, that their employees know, how to behave 
anyway.
6.3.13. Implementing a whistle blower hotline
A big advantage of whistleblowers is that they are very sensitive to wrongdoing 
before its existence is known to management (Miller et al., 2005). Deloitte 
(2007) and Pricewaterhouse Coopers (2008) found out, that tips passed to a 
whistle blower hotline are the primary way, how frauds are detected and that the 
majority of more effective companies in fighting against occupational fraud have 
implemented a whistle blower hotline. According to Wells (2007, p. 410) “a 
hotline is considered by most professionals to be the cornerstone of an 
employee reporting program”. Albrecht et al. (2011, pp. 174) recommend 
creating an effective whistleblower system to prevent corruption, because this is 
“good business” and will have positive effects on organizations. Hess and 
Dunfee (2003) suggest working on the social architecture of the company. They 
(ibid) state, that procedures must be in place to report any violations of the 
company’s policy without retaliation for any reports about corrupt practices, 
which can be accomplished by an anonymous whistle blower hotline. Bishop 
and Hydolski (2009, p.79) and PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2009) characterize a 
good whistle blower programme as a tool, where “hotlines or other confidential 
reporting mechanisms are accessible to all personnel” and where employees 
can get support if they face problems. An international consultant for 
compliance management advises that a whistle blower hotline does not 
necessarily need to be installed in the form of a telephone or e-mail hotline, but 
can also be implemented by providing a letter box, where whistleblowers can
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drop in their messages anonymously. On the one hand, Child (2007) 
recommends rewarding whistleblowers under a statutory basis to increase the 
use of hotlines. On the other hand, Bishop and Hydolski (2009, p. 107) warn 
that “It is easy to put a whistleblower hotline in place, but more difficult to 
establish one that works and has the confidence of executives and employees.” 
because “all too often it is the whistleblower standing alone against the 
wrongdoer” (Biegelman and Bartow, 2012, p. 257) and he or she has to fear 
reprisals (Martin, 2009). Pool-Robb and Bailey (2002) recommend considering 
cultural barriers for people to blow the whistle. The international consultant adds 
that whistleblowers are hesitant to call because they fear that their whistle 
blowing could be tracked back and they could lose their anonymity; therefore, 
many whistle blower hotlines in El Salvador are not very well used.
The reality of doing business is different from theory with respect to 
implementing whistle-blower hotlines. A lot of SMEs are too small to implement 
them. In addition, this strategy does not work in El Salvador caused by cultural 
issues. People do not want to blackmail others and are curious, if their identity 
is kept confidential when blowing the whistle. As a result, whistle blower hotlines 
are not well used in El Salvadorian companies and as a result, some companies 
have even stopped using them.
6.3.14. Safeguarding against risks
Safeguarding against unforeseen risks to reduce the threat of occupational 
fraud (Kroll, 2010) can be accomplished by mapping and evaluating a 
company’s exposure to corruption and occupational fraud (Bishop and Hydolski, 
2009 and 2009a; Wells, 2007). Poole-Robb and Bailey (2002, pp. 106) 
recommend implementing a corporate counter-intelligence (CCI) which 
describes “all measures taken to discover, asses and defeat the threats from 
other corporations, foreign intelligence services, pressure groups, the media, 
terrorists, extremists, criminals and others” and which “consists of both 
offensive, proactive and defensive elements” (ibid, p. 107). Green (2004, pp. 
107) advises that each company should have implemented a “disaster recovery 
planning (DRP)” to be prepared for all contingencies when a case of corruption, 
occupational fraud or any other crime has happened and its outcomes become
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a severe threat for the future existence of the organization. Poole-Robb and 
Bailey (2002, p. 249) disclose, that “effective contingency planning is always 
prudent, because when a crisis breaks, there is rarely enough time to collect 
thoughts.” Companies should seek to include deal terms that are even more 
defensive than usual when operating in emerging markets (Kroll (2010). Wells 
(2007) suggests developing a satisfactory list of backup suppliers since a strong 
attachment to one primary supplier increases the risk of being asked for bribes 
from that supplier. Kerkhoff et al. (2012) recommend a directors and officers 
insurance policy to cover damages caused by fraudulent top managers.
Just a few companies have insured themselves against such risks after they 
have undertaken a cost-benefit analysis. The majority of companies have not 
yet implemented a contingency planning but some entrepreneurs want to do it 
in the future. Hopefully, it is not too late for them!
6.3.15. Implementing a reporting system and keeping effective 
communication
Kerkhoff et al. (2012) state that a good reporting system is essential to be 
compliant. Biegelman and Bartow (2012) ask, that every organization must 
have an effective reporting mechanism allowing employees and others outside 
of the company to report fraud and they suggest, “that the reporting 
mechanisms must be well-communicated and easily accessible to ensure full 
reporting of all issues” (ibid, p. 387). Open communication will allow employees 
“to state their ethical concerns with organizational practices” (Hess and Dunfee, 
2003, p. 323). A good tracking system including key indicators, a balanced 
scorecard and accurate financial numbers can help a company to identify 
problems, to track red flags caused by occupational fraud and to measure 
process improvement (Green, 2004). Marquette and Doig (2004) underline the 
importance of records and record-keeping in developing countries to combat 
corruption and to promote participation in local anti-corruption activities. Next to 
maintaining a good reporting system, companies should establish effective 
internal and external communication of their anti corruption and anti fraud 
programmes (Tl, 2009; DIHK, 2008). Investors can use electronic sources like 
the FCRA Blog to fight against public corruption with transparency (Cleveland et
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al., 2009). SiFo (2010) explains that a professional communication strategy is 
essential, when fraudulent activities have been detected to reduce any 
reputational damage for the organization. And finally, Miller et al. (2005) 
summarize that it is not always possible to avoid corruptive or fraudulent 
activities and so, the next best solution is to disclose the wrongdoing as a 
deterrent example.
Just one local subsidiary of a worldwide operating company has implemented 
an effective reporting and information system. The majority of companies do not 
want to spend money for this and whenever corruptive acts in their 
organizations will pop up, they prefer not to disclose such things to outsiders or 
even the public. As a result, theory is wrong in a country, where there still exists 
a lot of “machismo”.
6.4. How to deal with mara crime in El Salvador
Urcuyo Fournier (2008) and The World Bank (20011) report, that crime rates in 
El Salvador are among the top five in Latin America and that maras are one of 
the main responsible for violent crime in Central America. Organized crime and 
maras are one of the fastest growing problems for international business as well 
as governments and include activities like drug dealing, robbery and extortion 
(Poole-Robb and Bailey, 2002, pp.79).
Investors have to tolerate maras and cope with them, because maras and other 
organized crime are a part of everyday life in Latin America (Cruz, 2011a; 
Wolf, 2009). Carpenter (2012) reveals that one should communicate with 
maras, negotiate with them and strive for a dialogue to gain a tactical advantage 
since “engagement opens a channel of communication that can help defuse 
crises” (ibid, p. 129). However, Carpenter (2012) warns, that such agreements 
can be dangerous and that informal agreements do not result in a legal 
obligation for maras to keep their promise. Cruz (2011) recommends supporting 
governmental agencies and NGOs in their policies preventing especially 
juveniles from joining gangs and becoming criminals, because the outcome of 
these programmes is more successful than the policy of a “mano dura”.
180
Zamora (2006) states that companies and individuals need to consider any form 
of crime and attacks and it would be a good idea to have several plans, how to 
defend oneself and one’s property against any form of crime. SHFT Plan (2011) 
recommends developing a defence plan and engaging in muster exercises. 
Zamora (2006) explains that preventing crime from happening requires an 
active mind and body and advises that security has to be habitual to be 
effective. Gyves (2011, p. 181) states, that intelligence can “underpin a 
successful counter gang campaign” and can help to mitigate their impact on 
society. Expecting help from police is the wrong way, since many policemen 
cooperate with maras and some of them even try to extort maras (Cruz, 2011).
Peetz (2004) explains that most of the “barrios marginales” (slums in big cities) 
are divided up amongst maras and investors should avoid these dangerous 
areas. Klaiber (2005) recommends that entrepreneurs, their families and their 
businesses should move to gated communities and business parks with 
restricted access for outsiders which are protected 24/7 by security but also 
objects, that this will increase their costs for private housing as well as operating 
the business. Poole-Robb and Bailey (2002, p. 250) and Zamora (2006) 
summarize, that “personal security at home and abroad relies on constant 
awareness of one’s surroundings and the need to exercise care and common 
sense at all times”.
Companies have to invest in burglar alarms, surveillance cameras or security 
personnel, should keep strict control of access keys, must control all visitors 
properly and have to prepare a list of emergency numbers and procedures 
(Poole-Robb and Bailey, 2002, pp. 261). Klaiber (2005, p. 407) reports, that in 
some cases, up to 40% of the investment volume has been spent for all kind of 
security. Green (2004, pp.68) recommends employing the same security 
methods in a company as one does at home, such as locks and deadbolts on 
the doors, electronic security monitors on the windows, strongboxes for 
valuables, fire extinguishers and smoke detectors. SHFT Plan (2011) suggests 
regular guard rotation to protect oneself from criminal personnel and Ungar
(2009) adds that street patrols and infrastructural improvement (e.g. better 
street lighting) are good strategies being adopted around the world as one part 
of protection against crimes.
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Wells (2007) proposes that employers should help their employees financially to 
reduce any high situational pressure caused by extortion through mara gangs. 
Poole-Robb and Bailey (2002) suggest keeping a low profile, which includes 
dressing and behaving conservatively, not displaying any cash or jewellery and 
avoiding any conspicuous behaviour that will draw attention to gangs and other 
criminals. Zamora (2006) adds that the best form of self-defence is avoiding a 
position, where one has to defend oneself. Therefore, Poole-Robb and Bailey 
(2002) advise that people in general should keep private and business 
information confidential. Klaiber (2005) adds that entrepreneurs and their 
families should not to be predictable for maras and therefore have to change 
daily schedules, routes and habits.
Investors, which have grown up in El Salvador or live there for a long time 
manage their exposure to mara crime intuitively very well. They know where to 
locate their businesses and they protect their companies, their families and 
themselves against attacks and extortions by leading an inconspicuous life. 
They have invested into various security measures to protect themselves. 
However, once they are approached by mara attacks or mara extortions, they 
do not call the police or governmental agencies since these organizations 
cannot help them and some criminals within their staff even work together with 
maras. As a result, these investors settle things directly with the gangs. Foreign 
investors are advised to behave in the same way as local investors and learn 
from them to avoid common pitfalls when dealing with mara crime.
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6.5. Concluding remarks
In summary, all of the strategies, how to avoid corruption in FDIs, which have 
been disclosed by the majority of entrepreneurs, are supported by the literature. 
The discussed and implemented activities are also consistent with Cressey’s 
Fraud Triangle:
e The rationalization can be reduced by strictly saying no to corruption 
and by making this clear to all business partners. In addition, the tone at 
the top management is essential, because this will give employees no 
excuse to behave in a corrupt way. Writing down these rules and 
therefore avoiding any grey areas is also helpful.
• The opportunity can be reduced by avoiding any business with 
governmental entities or industrial sectors, which are prone to corruption.
e The pressure can be reduced by bringing the FDI into a favourable 
position, allowing the FDI enough funds and time to start the business, 
sticking with the rules and selling competitive products and services.
Some of the strategies how to avoid occupational fraud in FDIs which have 
been highly recommended by the literature, were not always supported by the 
interviewees to be helpful in the real business world of El Salvador.
e Working together with others is not so helpful for entrepreneurs because 
they do not get enough information. Peers will not openly discuss this 
issue, which is based on the culture of El Salvador since no one wants to 
lose his face when talking about fraudulent activities in his organization.
e Implementing whistle-blower hotlines is not a good strategy for 
entrepreneurs. Employees in general do not want to harm others and are 
cautious to keep their identity anonymous. Therefore, El Salvadorians do 
not blow the whistle. This fact in mind, together with a cost-benefit 
calculation supported just two companies to implement and to operate a 
whistle-blower-hotline successfully. In contrast, the literature and a lot of 
experts recommend this strategy as being very efficient and not costing a 
fortune.
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• Due to the small size of the companies, just a few managers support job 
rotation to eliminate criminal collaboration among employees.
• The majority of companies have only a few outsourced activities and so, 
they do not closely observe them with respect to occupational fraud.
• A lot of investors support implementing written codes of ethics, which is 
also supported by the literature. However, the majority of supporters 
have not yet implemented them in their company. They argue that this 
would not be necessary in their organization, because each employee 
already knows what management expects from him.
All implemented activities of entrepreneurs to avoid occupational fraud in El 
Salvadorian companies are consistent with Cressey’s Fraud Triangle:
• The rationalization can be reduced by maintaining a good working 
climate and by management giving honest, good examples for their 
employees, since this will reduce the propensity to commit fraud. 
Implementing written codes of ethics and strictly prosecuting offenders 
are also helpful strategies for entrepreneurs.
• The opportunity can be reduced by implementing adequate controls 
and by hiring trusted people, which support top management in 
controlling. Investors have to know their business very well, so that they 
can install adequate controls. Learning from past incidents and hiring 
external consultants is another way to gain essential forensic knowledge 
and to be one step ahead of possible fraudsters, therefore reducing the 
opportunity for them to commit fraud. Certifying a company and 
reworking organizational issues throughout the value chain will also help 
to reduce weaknesses within processes of the FDIs, thus reducing the 
opportunity for internals as well as externals to harm the company.
• The pressure can be reduced by taking care of employees, training 
them and paying them well. Providing them with the benefits of 
cooperatives can help employees to improve their financial situation as 
well as that of their families.
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The strategies, how to cope w ith  mara crime in the literature are mostly 
supported by the interviewees. However, the strategy of asking police for help is 
adversely discussed both in the literature and in the interviews. On the one 
hand, examples show that it could be helpful to ask police for help, but on the 
other hand, corrupt police officers are sometimes even cooperating with maras 
or extorting them. As a result, this strategy is not always successful.
In general, the idea of Cressey’s Fraud Triangle can not only be applied by 
investors in El Salvador to fight against corruption and occupational fraud, but is 
also a good tool to reduce other kind of threats by criminals (e.g. burglaries, 
armed robberies or kidnapping), since always all three factors have to come 
together so that a criminal activity can take place and will be successful. 
Therefore, eliminating one of these factors (in many cases, this will be “reducing 
the opportunity to do so”) is always a prudent way to fight against criminals.
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6.6. Suggestions for further research
This research project was focused on the geographic region of El Salvador. All 
Central American countries with the exception of Belize have a similar cultural 
heritage, but Norton and Whatmore (1993, p. ix) describe Central America as a” 
region in which a fantastic range of political, geographical, ethnic and 
environmental forces have collided, producing a magical hybrid.” As a result, 
corruption, occupational fraud and mara crime as well as appropriate strategies 
to reduce the exposure to these threats may differ in each Central American 
country. Each Central American country is considerably small and the recent 
progress in trying to establish a Central American Common Market (MCCA), 
which has been started in the 1960s (Hidalgo, 2009) but always postponed 
could convince entrepreneurs operating only in El Salvador expanding their 
business to neighbouring Central American countries to gain economies of 
scale. Additional research how entrepreneurs in adjacent countries deal with 
corruption, occupational fraud and mara crime could help them to manage 
these threats proactively when exporting and investing into the MCCA.
Almost all of the interviewees are managing family owned, smaller SMEs. Just 
two interviewees work for multinational companies. SMEs in general lack the 
resources which bigger companies possess and so, they may apply different 
strategies than multinationals. Therefore, interviewing managers of larger 
multinational companies operating in El Salvador and evaluating their strategies 
how they deal with corruption, occupational fraud and mara crime could give 
additional insights for SMEs.
During the interviews, the threat of mara crime came up many times. Cruz 
(2011) describes maras as a specific phenomenon of Central America. Many 
ideas exist, how governments and the public should respond to mara crime and 
other threats for companies operating worldwide (cf. Poole-Robb and Bailey, 
2002). Developing practically oriented strategies for entrepreneurs in El 
Salvador, how they can reduce their exposure to organized crime in general 
could enrich the findings of this research. Therefore, further research is 
suggested in elaborating, what strategies Central American entrepreneurs 
should apply to deal with crime in general.
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Reflective Diary
“Nil volenti difficile” - Nothing is difficult for him who has the will. (Unknown)
Before I started taking part in the DBA programme of the University of Surrey, I 
have always been thinking and working on the practical side of life. After I got 
my high school degree, I did an apprenticeship at a bank and afterwards 
enrolled at an University for Applied Science, where I first achieved an 
undergraduate degree in business and economics and then a M .B .A ..
At the beginning of my working career, my approach how to get problems 
solved was focused on a quick, cost efficient and pragmatic way and I worked 
mostly operatively instead of strategically. However, when climbing up the 
career ladder, I recognized that within my current position as a CEO of a 
holding company operating and managing seven companies worldwide, I also 
have to apply a stronger strategic, academic approach to solve complex 
problems. I realized that a DBA would be a good opportunity to personally grow 
into the intended direction.
When I applied for the DBA programme of the University of Surrey, I knew that I 
would have to bring in a lot of my personal, valuable time and would have to 
make a trade-off between relaxing from a hard working day and working for the 
DBA. At the beginning of the programme, the five taught modules and their 
assignments have been really hard to manage due to timely constraints caused 
by unexpected issues coming up in my company. Within that period, I learned to 
spend my time reasonably which helped me to complete the modules in time 
without asking for any extensions for the assignments. This approach was 
similar to my own working environment, where I have to deliver results on time 
and where I am already familiar with distinguishing between “urgent” topics and 
“important” topics. Finally, the experience of personal commitment to the DBA 
grew within the programme and now helps me to manage various professional 
and personal projects simultaneously as well as to say sometimes “no” and to 
delegate tasks to others.
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The five taught modules helped me to enrich my professional as well as my 
personal skills and also had been the foundation to accomplish my thesis, since 
the modules were interrelated with my research project. Each module helped 
me to get new insights into academia. For example, I have never been in touch 
with philosophy and therefore, I was never interested in philosophy. The module 
“philosophical underpinnings” brought up the desire to learn more about 
philosophy. I started reading philosophical books and just by accident, I met an 
old friend whom I have not met for years. He teaches philosophy and I had 
some interesting conversations with him about this topic. He gave me valuable 
information how to gather information for sensitive, loaded topics like corruption 
and fraud. I have been able to apply philosophical knowledge to my DBA thesis 
as well as to my working practice.
The chapter critical reading and writing helped me to progress in several 
aspects. First, I learned to approach new topics in a structured, academic way. 
For example, we had to evaluate an article discussing total quality management 
(TQM). I just knew a few things about TQM. So, I started reading literature 
concerning TQM and I finally had been able to evaluate this article critically 
based on my recently acquired knowledge. In addition, this exercise helped me 
to evaluate the quality of academic articles for my DBA as well as for my daily 
work. I became familiar with evaluating information not as “given facts” but 
learned to ask questions about the quality of the article as well as the “bias” of 
the informant. Finally, I became familiar in processing and triangulating 
information in a structured way to get a broader picture.
The module quantitative research methods dealt with statistics. During my 
undergraduate studies, I had to take classes in statistics, however the classes 
had been just focused on how to calculate the data but not how to apply this 
knowledge practically. In contrast, the DBA assignment was practically oriented 
and the software SPSS was easy to apply. The aim of this assignment was not 
the “calculation” but the “interpretation” of the data including preparing easy 
reading graphics. So, that assignment was a lot of fun for me and I graded well.
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In summary, the taught modules helped me for my professional career in 
various ways: (1) to solve management problems in a structured way (2) to 
evaluate information, literature and reports critically (3) to apply quantitative and 
qualitative methods to solve problems, (4) to think out of the box and to answer 
complex management questions, (5) to present solutions for management 
problems in a structured way to others, (6) and finally to continuously learn 
staying up to date and not working with obsolete knowledge.
When I had to define and to structure my DBA thesis, my topic has been 
defined too broadly at first. During the thesis writing, I learned that it is almost 
impossible to bring in all acquired knowledge but I had to focus on specific parts 
in more depth and I also had to restrict the volume of the text. Therefore, the 
DBA helped me in focusing within my daily work as well as in restricting the 
amount of information provided to others, because sometimes “less is more".
The DBA programme has been designed for part time students to gain 
knowledge and outcomes, which have to be closely related to real business life. 
When I discussed my research topic with my professors, I defined a field, which 
indeed became a practical issue in our company: “How to avoid corruption and 
occupational fraud”. The literature review, the fieldwork and the conclusions of 
my thesis allowed me to apply this knowledge directly to my work environment 
and to grow with respect to academic work as well as to professional talks in my 
company. Due to the fact, that I had to deal with corruption and occupational 
fraud in the real world, I have been able to triangulate and to enrich my 
academic knowledge with practical knowledge. Doig (1998, p. 99) states, that 
“corruption has long held a specialist academic interest, it has become the 
growing practitioner attention and is beginning to move significantly form theory 
to practice” and in my case, this became really true, because I have been able 
to apply my knowledge directly in daily business challenges.
Constant meetings and conference calls with my supervisor helped me to 
accomplish my goals. He helped me to develop my work and he gave me 
valuable guidance how to accomplish my thesis. My supervisor supported me 
on the one hand to develop new perspectives and on the other hand to focus on 
the essentials.
189
During the fieldwork, I learned how to deal with a certain level of uncertainty. 
Together with the local German Chamber of Commerce in El Salvador, I 
developed a tight schedule for the interviews. However, when I arrived in El 
Salvador, appointments just for four instead of twenty-four interviews had been 
made by my contact. With the help of my relatives, their friends and others, I 
finally could interview twenty-two managers within two weeks. This was an 
unexpected obstacle, because I had to focus on the interviews and also on 
finding interview partners, which had been willing to discuss such sensitive 
topics like corruption and occupational fraud. Some tasks took longer than 
expected, because I had to rely on others, which excused them always with 
“mahana” -  everything will be done tomorrow. After a few interviews in an 
unknown cultural environment, I gained confidence as an interviewer and I had 
been able to collect qualitative knowledge in a way that "current experiences 
were shaped by the organizational history, especially through myths and 
stories” (Lansisalmi et al., 2004, p. 249). Now, I feel confident to work with a 
higher level of uncertainty in another cultural environment.
One thing I learned during the literature review was that collecting information 
about a specific research question alone is not enough and that one has to 
focus on selecting the right information and to bring that information quickly into 
the right structure. The best thing to do so is finding an early starting point with 
structuring and writing down the pieces of information. This process will help to 
proceed with the literature review and to gather additional information in the 
“following loops". This is a lesson, which I have already applied to accomplish 
upcoming tasks in my business life.
So, in summary, the DBA was a very interesting learning experience for me and 
helped me to grow personally. The programme supported me to increase my 
confidence in solving unexpected problems in a well structured way in my 
private as well as in my professional life.
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Appendix A
Questionnaire as a guideline for the semi-structured interview
Which of the following strategies could help you and other investors to fight against 
corruption and occupational fraud in their companies in El Salvador?
Detection of corruption and 
occupational fraud
Very
helpful
helpful Less
helpful
Not
helpful
I don’t 
know
Mapping and assessing possible risks 
in advance
Knowing where one in vulnerable
Learning from past incidents and from 
others
Applying regular controls
Regular reviews
Cost benefit analysis of the controls
Ethical issues Very
helpful
helpful Less
helpful
Not
helpful
I don’t 
know
“Anti corruption” is part of the 
company culture
Implementing codes of ethics and live 
them
Top management gives good 
examples
Fostering mutual trust in the company
Avoiding “grey” zones (e.g. gifts, 
entertainment)
213
Organizational issues Very
helpful
helpful Less
helpful
Not
helpful
I don’t 
know
Implementing transparent processes
Separation between business and 
private sphere
Implementing the “four eyes principle”
Asset security (e.g. locking 
warehouses)
Separation of functions and power
Implementing a whistle blower hotline
Implementing a compliance manager
Location and security of sensitive 
functions (e.g. IT)
Implementing an anti corruption 
reporting system
Allowing enough resources and funds 
for corruption prevention activities
Integrating suppliers and customers 
into anti-corruption activities
Human resources Very
helpful
helpful Less
helpful
Not
helpful
I don’t 
know
Screening applicants in advance
Hiring trusted and competent 
employees
Paying acceptable salaries
Strictly prosecuting offenders, applying 
stiff penalties
Eliminating unnecessary positions
Rotating staff
Training employees
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Dealing with third parties Very
helpful
helpful Less
helpful
Not
helpful
I don’t 
know
Closely observing the value chain (e.g. 
purchasing)
Working together with other 
companies
Benchmarking with others
Closely observing outsourced 
activities
Implementing the same standards on 
suppliers and customers
Working together with governmental 
organizations (e.g. TEG)
Strategic issues Very
helpful
helpful Less
helpful
Not
helpful
I don’t 
know
Avoiding certain markets / industries
Safeguarding against unforeseen risk
Tailoring the strategies to the social 
and cultural environment
Living with a “certain” level of 
corruption
Other ideas:
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Appendix B
Evaluation of the strategies of the interviewees 
22 interviews have been held 
How to avoid corruption:
Table 4: evaluation of the strategies (corruption)
Strategy
agree"
„l do not 
agree"
No
statement 
during the 
interview
Comments
Avoiding business 
with the 
government
19 2 1 One interviewee did not 
agree, because corruption in 
his business is no longer an 
issue,
the other person works for a 
governmental organization 
trying to reduce corruption
Management 
giving a good 
example
17 1 4 The interviewee disagreeing 
states, that there are always 
bad apples among 
employees
Strictly saying no 
to corruption
11 11 0 All interviewees initially 
stated that they say no to 
corruption, but during the 
interviews, some of them 
admitted, that they would do 
small bribes to get a 
desperately needed service
Tolerating a certain 
level of corruption
11 4 7 The ones agreeing think that 
this is a cultural issue and 
the cost-benefit calculation 
results in doing so
Patience and being 
in a favourable 
position not to 
bribe
10 4 8 The interviewees 
disagreeing are not in a 
favourable position or the 
cost-benefit calculation 
results that it is better for 
them to bribe to get 
desperately needed services
Always following 
the rules
4 3 15 The interviewees 
disagreeing mentioned that 
they could not reach their 
business goals without 
doing so
Using
intermediaries to 
do the dirty work
4 1 17 This is a business strategy 
for four companies, one 
company uses lobbyists 
working with the government 
to support their business
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How to avoid occupational fraud:
Table 5: evaluation of the strategies (occupational fraud)
Strategy
agree"
,,l do not 
agree"
No
statement 
during the 
interview
Comments
“Tropicalizing the 
strategies”
22 0 0 While this strategy is applied 
intuitively by native El 
Salvadorians, this strategy 
had to be learned by foreign 
investors.
Hiring trusted 
people and having 
trusted people in 
key positions
21 0 1 The person without a 
statement works for a NGO 
and has never worked in the 
private sector.
Knowing one’s 
business and 
therefore knowing 
where one is 
vulnerable
21 0 1 The person without a 
statement works for a NGO 
and has never worked in the 
private sector.
Paying employees 
well, treating them 
fair and taking care 
of them
21 0 1 The person without a 
statement works for a NGO 
and has never worked in the 
private sector.
Some of the supporters 
state that good payment 
does not automatically avoid 
occupational fraud.
Strictly prosecuting 
offenders
21 0 1 While most of the supporters 
would fire an offender 
immediately, some of them 
would give an offender a 
second chance.
The person without a 
statement works for a NGO 
and has never worked in the 
private sector.
Controlling 
employees and 
continuous 
controls within the 
company
20 1 1 Most of the supporters have 
also done a cost-benefit 
calculation of the controls. 
The person disagreeing 
states that too many controls 
are contra productive and 
that people will always find 
ways to circumvent controls. 
The person without a 
statement works for a NGO 
and has never worked in the 
private sector.
Learning from past 
incidents and as a 
result adopting 
strategies
18 0 4 Two supporters mentioned 
that it is difficult to be always 
one step ahead of a 
perpetrator
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Strategy
agree"
„l do not 
agree"
No
statement 
during the 
interview
Comments
Implementing 
organizational and 
physical issues 
including electronic 
surveillance 
devices and 
guards
18 1 3 Most of the supporters have 
done a cost benefit 
calculation which makes 
these issues worth it. The 
opponent of this strategy 
states, as well as some 
supporters state that people 
will always find a way to 
circumvent the controls
Management 
giving a good 
example
17 1 4 The interviewee disagreeing 
states, that there are always 
bad apples among 
employees
Implementing 
written codes of 
ethics
13 8 1 Among the supporters are 
just 10 companies, which 
have implemented them. 
The companies for which 
this is not a good strategy 
state that they are too small 
for doing this or they state, 
that their people know the 
codes anyway, even if they 
are not written down.
The person without a 
statement works for a NGO 
and has never worked in the 
private sector.
Working together 
with others and 
benchmarking with 
others
13 8 1 The supporters of this 
strategy mainly work 
together with trusted others, 
because they, as well as the 
opponents state, that the 
problem is to get honest 
answers from others, which 
may feel losing their 
reputation when they tell 
about occupation fraud 
happening in their 
organization.
Maintaining a good 
business climate
8 O' 14 One of the supporters 
objects that one should not 
be too close with the 
employees, because this 
could result in being 
betrayed by the employees 
(this is a cultural issue)
Focussing and 
streamlining the 
business
8 0 14 Focussing the business and 
eliminating unnecessary 
business helps to keep the 
structures simple and 
transparent.
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Strategy
agree"
„l do not 
agree"
No
statement 
during the 
interview
Comments
Implementing job 
rotation
6 6 10 Most of the companies are 
too small for job rotation, 
Among the supporters are 
just three companies doing 
job rotation but mainly for 
training reasons, two 
companies support job 
rotations but do no job 
rotation in their companies, 
one company does job 
rotation only to cover 
workload during vacation
Certifying the 
company e.g. ISO 
900 or BASC
5 0 17 A certification helps 
companies to describe and 
document their processes 
thus helping to find 
weaknesses.
Downsizing the 
company and 
keeping the 
company small
4 0 18 Most of the companies are 
small companies, so for 
them, this is not an issue to 
mention.
Checking
outsourced
activities
3 6 13 The interviewees 
disagreeing had either no 
outsourced activities or had 
explicitly stated that they do 
not control their outsourced 
activities
Implementing a 
whistle blower 
hotline
3 12 7 The people who do not 
support this strategy state, 
that this strategy will not 
work in El Salvador due to 
cultural issues. Some state 
that in their organization 
exists an informal whistle 
blower hotline, which will 
inform them, if fraud would 
have taken place in their 
company.
Among the interviewees 
without a statement are 
people, who do not know 
about this strategy or who 
work for a NGO and have 
never worked in the private 
sector.
Insuring against 
occupational fraud
2 0 20 The companies supporting 
this strategy have insured 
themselves against robbery 
or against risks from 
occupational fraud
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How to deal with mara crime:
Table 6: evaluation of the strategies (mara crime)
Issue „l
agree"
„l do not 
agree"
No
statement 
during the 
interview
Comments
Maras are an 
increasing threat 
for entrepreneurs
12 3 7 The interviewees which do 
not agree refer to a peace 
agreement among the few 
bigger gangs, which is in 
operation since the 
beginning of 2012.
Maras are a threat 
for my business 
(directly or 
indirectly)
6 6 10 Fewer interviewees state 
that they are personally 
affected by maras, than they 
state that entrepreneurs in 
general are affected, 
because they are personally 
out of the scope of maras 
(small business in the 
informal sector, mom and 
pops, bus drivers)
Strategy
agree"
„l do not 
agree"
No
statement
during
the
interview
Comments
Avoiding an 
excessive life style
9 0 13 All supporters state, that a 
luxurious life will attract 
maras trying to extort them.
Avoiding specific 
areas, businesses 
and locations
9 0 13 All of the interviewees 
agreeing to this strategy 
except one have not been 
involved in mara crime
Not responding on 
attacks and 
rejecting any 
attempted 
extortions
3 0 19 One of the interviewees 
agreeing to this strategy has 
been violently attacked to 
pay, but he rejected
Asking police for 
help
2 0 20 One of the interviewees 
agreeing to ask police also 
states, that police is corrupt 
and will not help
Cooperating with 
maras
2 0 20 One of the supporters even 
supports mara members 
imprisoned
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Appendix C
The following example of a coded transcript shows the process to distil and 
cluster information taken during an interview. To protect the interviewee, the 
history of the company, his name and other information, which could identify the 
interviewee or the company, have been deleted.
History and description of the company:
Not disclosed
Information taken during the interview:
Red is coded for corruption.
Yellow is coded for occupational fraud.
Green is coded for mara crime
He found out, that not only growing your business, but also consolidating it can 
be a strategy to increase profitability. He now makes more profit than before 
(higher margins) because he focuses on smaller customers, where he can 
charge higher prices. Shrinking and downsizing business.
Through the consolidation, the management of the remaining companies has 
become more efficient and he has a better control of the businesses. He can 
focus on fewer economic areas and be more in depth with the remaining 
businesses. As a result, he was able to reduce corruption and occupational 
fraud in his group. Implementing controls.
Important functions like accounting or warehousing are shared with all 
companies and are located separately. Relocating sensitive functions.
In addition, for him it is essential to control his overheads. When a manger 
knows his costs of goods sold, margins and overheads, he can detect and 
control corruption and occupational fraud very easily. Knowing ones business, 
strict controls, looking for red flags.
|He does not do business with government. Once, he has been asked to service 
public busses, but the manager of the public entity asked for kickbacks and 
employees asked for fake invoices to betray their employer or other favours. In 
addition, these public entities had a lot of red tape, when one wants to do 
business with them and they pay their invoices very late. No business with 
government.
He also does not do business with bigger companies, because a lot of their 
purchasing departments are very corrupt, there exists less peer control and
they also ask for kickbacks. (Selecting customers carefully
• He has split up all of his companies into small entities with few people. So, the 
sales volumes as well as the overheads within each of these companies are 
comparatively small.
o He can better control the overheads, because even small deviations are 
visible. Watching for red flags.
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o Red flags always pop up in sales, costs of goods sold or overheads. As 
a result, even small deviations, which could be caused by corrupt 
activities in the company, are visible. Watching for red flags, 
o The small number of employees reduces the level of corruption,
because there is a strong peer control within each entity. HR- controls, 
selecting the right people 
o Smaller companies are more flexible with less bureaucracy and fewer 
positions, which help to reduce occupational fraud. Reducing red tape. 
Once, he desperately wanted to get the transport business for a big 
supermarket chain. He was asked for a bribe of 50.000 USD by the purchasing 
manager. This was the first time, he did pay the bribe. However, someone else 
got the business. He lost the 50.000 USD because he had no chance to sue the 
corrupt manager in front of the court, because he himself behaved illegally. 
Learning from past incidents. Learning from past incidents.
HR:
o Most of his employees are also church members of his parish (a very
strict catholic church), which he knows very well. As a result, these 
members with their strong belief are not very prone to corruption and 
occupational fraud. Hiring the right people, 
o He employs high skilled, educated people, which are less prone to
corruption and occupational fraud. Hiring skilled people, 
o He pays his people well above the average, but Mr. X also states, that
even good payment does not automatically reduce the level of 
occupational fraud. Paying people well, 
o He has downsized his company, so he got rid of unnecessary positions 
and he also got rid of bad apples. Eliminating unnecessary positions, 
o He applies polygraph testing and voice recording. Controlling
employees.
o He asks the people for their solvencia (certificate of conduct) and a
solvencia policia (police clearance certificate). Controlling employees, 
o He checks the credit records of his employees when he hires them and 
also, when an occupational fraud has taken place at the person’s 
workplace, because people who are highly indebted are more prone to 
corruption, because they need additional income. Controlling 
employees.
Mr. X also operates a cooperative for all of his businesses. People can buy 
things for a better rate, they can put their money to the cooperative and get 
better rates and they also can get loans at a better rate. Almost 280 of his 300 
people are members of this cooperative. Taking care of employees.
He has written codes of ethics, and in addition, each employee knows his 
Christian codes of ethics. Implementing written codes of ethics.
His purchase department has to offer at least three quotes and each check, 
which is issued to a supplier, is cross checked with the invoice. Bigger checks 
have to be signed by Mr. X himself. The purchasing department is the only 
department, which is not centralized, because in each entity, he needs experts 
for the specific products. In addition, each manager, who also knows his entity 
very well, is better able to supervise the purchasing department. Supervising 
sensitive functions, separation of power.
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• He has downsized his company and in doing so, he really increased profitability 
because he became more flexible and he had a better control of the companies, 
so, he was able to see red flags earlier and he could detect corruption and 
occupational fraud earlier. His motto is: “sales are vanity, profit is sanity. The 
small sizes of these companies and the clear business focus of each company 
also allow him to know, where each entity is vulnerable to corruption and 
occupational fraud. Streamlining the business, downsizing the business, 
eliminating unnecessary functions.
• In his trucking business, drivers had been very lazy. However, the competition 
is very tough and he had to save costs to stay in business. For example, the 
drivers stole diesel from the tanks and sold them on the black market. First of 
all, he sealed the lids of the tanks and he put paint marks on the various release 
screws and valves within the fuel system to prevent them from stealing diesel. 
However, it is not possible to seal all the pipes. Therefore, he started to pay the 
drivers a premium, if they achieved a higher mileage per gallon. He also pays 
bonuses for better performance (e.g. exact delivery time, good maintenance of 
the trucks. Learning from past incidents, updating controls, knowing one’s 
business.
• All of his trucks are equipped with GPS and he was bought software, so, his 
fleet manager exactly knows where the trucks are located. This also helps him 
to track his trucks and the drivers, if they are high jacked. Installing technical 
devices.
• He also hired a technical consultant, who helped him to reduce the costs of 
operating the trucks (e.g. buying trucks with more suitable engines, preventing 
truck drivers from replacing spare parts in the trucks, which are o.k. with rotten 
ones, selling the good ones on the black market and then claiming a repair. 
Asking for external knowledge and external experts.
• Mr. X also applies polygraph testing, when he hires new people of lower ranks 
or when unusual thefts have happened. However, the employees know where 
to buy pills, which can help them to pass the testing, although they had been 
lying. So, Mr. X has also introduced the testing with voice recording, where it is 
more difficult to cheat. Controlling applicants and employees.
• Mr. X knows that especially the processes dealing with cash or cheques have to 
be carefully observed. Within his businesses, three trusted people manage the 
cash transactions and also control each other dealing with cash. Trusted people 
support management in controlling operations.
• However, in general, Mr. X avoids cash transactions, where possible. Once, he 
gave an employee cash to pay for the renewal of the driver licences of his truck 
drivers. However, that lady did not renew the licences and stole the money 
instead. This came out, when one of the drivers has been controlled by the 
police, who found out that the licences have been expired. He immediately fired 
that person, who was in desperate need for the money. He started a court file 
and he also insisted, that she has to pay back all of the money in monthly 
instalments for years. In addition, he monitors employees dealing with money 
very closely when there pops up a loss of money. However, he accepts one 
mistake, but when that person makes another mistake, he fires him or her.
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Strictly prosecuting offenders, knowing one’s business, controlling sensitive 
functions.
|He made his strict prosecution public within the company as a deterrent 
example for possible offenders and also for dealing with the government. When
he is asked for a bribe, he just walks away from this business. Strictly saying no 
to corruption
Due to the small size of his companies, the amounts paid with checks are very 
small. However, if bigger checks have to be signed, it is done by himself or a 
trusted manager as his deputy. As a result, any possible loss due to check 
fraud from his employees is very small. Separation of power.
He also has regular external auditors in his companies, which help him to detect 
corruption and occupational fraud. On the other hand, such controls are very 
expensive, but Mr. X thinks, that the cost-benefit analysis of all of his controls 
supports them. External audits and certifications.
Within his business, Mr. X asks for a stock count on a monthly base. Although 
this requires a lot of manpower, it is worth it, because personnel are less 
expensive than in Germany. In addition, if the stock counts are done within 
short periods, the cause of the loss can be followed easily and accounting 
always calculates with accurate numbers. Implementing strict controls.
He also asks his accountants to deliver the monthly reports very quickly, so that 
the numbers disclose any possible fraud and the occurrence can be detected 
and followed very quickly, which increases the chance to find the perpetrator. 
Looking for red flags. Trying to be one step ahead of fraudsters.
|ln his hotel business, he was not willing to pay a bribe to get the chance to buy 
a road dividing his two lots, but he mentioned that he will waitjBeing in a
favourable position, patience not to bribe, having enough funds to do so
All of the trucks are equipped with GPS location controls. When a robbery of 
one of his trucks happens, he knows exactly where this has happened. 
Unfortunately, very often, the truck drivers cooperate with the hijackers and give 
them hints in exchange for a commission. So, Mr. X closely observes the 
hijacked truck driver and sometimes he also makes a polygraph test with him. 
He also checks his credit records with the banks to find out, it that person is in 
financial need. He also looks for red flags (e.g. that person spends more money 
than usual). In addition, he cross-checks the police records of the employee, 
because sometimes, that records are faked. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to 
catch corrupt truck drivers. Closely observing employees, looking for red flags, 
implementing the latest technology.
In general, Mr. X has “tropicalized” his activities to fight against corruption and 
occupational fraud, because a lot of activities, which work in the first world, will 
not work in emerging economies or will not work in other societies, tropicalizing
the strategies to the environment of El Salvador. Tropicalizing the strategies to 
the environment of El Salvador.
^Unfortunately, he admits, that although he does not bribe in regular business, it 
is sometimes absolutely necessary to pay small fees to get urgently needed 
permissions or papers from the government. For example, he once needed a 
building permit for one of his businesses. Although he did completely comply 
with the rules, he was asked for a special fee of 500 USD to get the permission
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in time, because getting permissions always take forever. Filing for a court rule 
with a lawyer would have cost him 5.000 USD and a lot more time, so he did 
pay that special fee. Mr. X mentions, that although everybody has to set an 
example to fight against corruption, it is also necessary to know, where ones 
limits are. He thinks that it is ridiculous to bother about such small sums, 
because this is a fight, where he is not in the position to win. One has to use 
common sense to do his business. He also takes the Pareto Principle into 
account, when he has to decide to pay such special fees. He states, that 95% 
of the business to get permissions are o.k., but in 5% of the cases, bribing small
amounts up to 100 USD are the case. Tolerating a certain level of corruption. 
Mr. X states, that the main reason for corruption is not the poverty of his 
country, but more, that the whole world in general is more indebted and 
therefore in desperate need to generate additional income. When one is doing 
global business e.g. with Asian business partners, even honest business 
partners e.g. from Germany will be involved into corrupt activities. So, 
corruption can be “imported” from other countries. Teaching employees how to 
manage their finances and helping them financially.
|Mr. X states, that he has no problem with customs, because his employees 
prepare the customs papers very well and so, there is no need for him to bribe. 
Strictly following the rules.
|ln general, doing business with the government result in being involved into 
corruption. For Mr. X, these main areas are energy, water, electricity,
construction and waste management. Avoiding business with the government
IMr. X has no compliance manager within the group, but his managers as well 
as he himself are illuminative good examples to avoid corruption and 
occupational fraud. Management has to give an illuminative good example. 
Management has to give an illuminative good example.
(Everyone in the company knows that whenever Mr. X is faced with corruption, 
he will not pay and at the worst, will stop that business. Stricly saying no to 
corruption.
(Mr. X is not working together with other organizations to fight against corruption. 
Working together with others is not a good strategy.
Mr. X sometimes benchmarks his anti fraud strategies with trusted others (he is 
a member in various business circles and organizations). However, the problem 
is that a lot of the members do not openly speak about corruption and 
occupational fraud in their business. They do not share information, because 
they care too much about their reputation. As a result, he also does not disclose 
information with everyone. Working together with others is not a good idea.
Mr. X has a good working climate, which also makes him less vulnerable to 
corruption and occupational fraud. He treats his personnel very well, which 
results in a low turnover. After some time, Mr. X offers trusted managers a 
minority partnership in his businesses, which also helps to avoid occupation 
fraud. Maintaining a good business climate.
As an organizational issue, Mr. X has separated power and control, where 
applicable and he always tries to build up additional hurdles to avoid corruption 
and occupational fraud (e.g. additional controls).Separation of power and 
control.
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• Mr. X does not agree to live with a certain level of corruption, because:
o What is a small degree of corruption?
o Small can grow bigger within the time
o jSociety will finally get the bill for tolerating corruption (e.g a poor 
infrastructure) Slfôtly saying no to corruption.
• Mr. X has his IT systems for all the businesses centralized and located in a 
secured backroom. He frequently makes backups and he also controls, which 
person gets which information. His It managers have a lot of power to manage 
that information of information, because they know very well, how much 
information from the systems is really necessary to do the job. The IT managers 
are very trusted people. Hiring trusted people. Putting sensitive function into 
separate locations. Managing the level of information given to each employee.
• Mr. X rotates his employees within his businesses, but just for training issues 
and not to prevent occupational fraud. Job rotation is not a prudent strategy.
Ü M r .  X has located all of his premises into secure area, where the chance to be
harmed by maras is considerably low. His business is guarded 24/7. He lives in
a gated community and lives an inconspicuous life. Location of the business,
nstalling guards, not leading an opulent life
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